OPEN ACCESS

University of BRISTOL

This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from Explore Bristol Research, http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk

Author:
Harrison, Ewan

Title:
Reflexivity in the international system : international institutions and state strategies.

General rights
Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License. A copy of this may be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode This license sets out your rights and the restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.

Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline nature of the complaint

Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible.

Reflexivity In The International System:
International Institutions And State Strategies 1989-1999

Ewan Harrison

A dissertation submitted to the University Of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor Of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, Faculty of Social Sciences.

October 1999

Word Count: 77397

Abstract

The thesis uses the theoretical frameworks provided by neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism to examine the patterns of behaviour in the international system over the first ten years of the post Cold War period. The case studies examined are the state strategies of Germany, Japan and China since 1989, which have been identified by neorealists as key states in the emerging structure of international politics. The thesis examines these cases to generalise about the overall trajectory of international change in the post Cold War period. It explores the view that a liberal theory of international politics adopts a reflexive logic focusing on processes of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system. This contrasts with rationalist approaches which make assumptions about the basis of state behaviour that exogenise the influence of units' characteristics on the determination of outcomes at a systemic level. The term reflexivity is used to capture the interaction between units and structure which is central to a liberal model of socialisation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of liberal states has been reached in the international system. As a consequence, the democratic peace has begun to generate powerful socialisation effects because the structure of interaction within the international system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by the liberal core. The system has come to embody high levels of reflexivity as the socialisation effects generated by the liberal core encourage states at the margins of change to adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn feeds back into the properties of the system. Contrary to both neorealism and institutionalism, and in line with liberal predictions, the prospects for peaceful change in the global international system are high, even in a region such as East Asia where patterns of interdependence between states are poorly developed.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the staff and research students at the University of Bristol Department of Politics between 1996 and 1999 for providing a congenial environment within which to develop my ideas, and for their interest in my research. I am especially grateful for the encouragement offered by Nick Rengger, Richard Shapcott and Molly Cochran in the early stages of my studies.

I owe a particular debt to my supervisor, Richard Little, for his consistent support and commitment to the highest professional standards throughout the course of my PhD.

Finally, over the three years of study I was extremely fortunate to receive constant advice and encouragement from my parents and also my sister, Fiona. Without this source of motivation, this thesis would not have been possible.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University Of Bristol. The work is original and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University Of Bristol.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.

Signed: **Date: 1st October 1999**

Richard Ewan Harrison

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List Of Illustrations

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The recent collapse of the Soviet Union has provided an historic opportunity to examine how key states respond to large scale change in the international system. Between the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the aborted August coup that preceded the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system witnessed the disintegration of the bipolar structure of military power which had characterised the post 1945 international order. Few, including the majority of International Relations scholars, can claim to have anticipated the changes that took place in the international system over this period. Furthermore, the global 'systemic shock' provided by the demise of the bipolar Cold War international order provides a unique context within which to test and refine competing theories of international relations. For these reasons, the end of the Cold War has opened up questions about the overall nature of international change at the close of the twentieth century. This thesis aims to utilise the 'real world laboratory' provided by the end of the Cold War to assess the 'neo' or structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system. Since 1989, the preconditions necessary for each of these theories to make a discrete set of predictions about the overall nature of post Cold War change have been present. In line with the neorealist model, the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought about a major shift in the distribution of military capabilities between states. In line with the institutionalist model, there are significant variations in patterns of interdependence across the global international system. In line with the liberal model, since 1989 the international system has witnessed the historically unprecedented emergence of a core of formally liberal democratic states at a global level. Moreover, a decade has now passed since the end of the bipolar Cold War order. States have been provided with a prolonged period in which to respond to the dramatic changes which began to take place in the late 1980's. If the behaviour of states is indeed significantly affected by the environment within which they interact with others, the incentives and constraints generated by the system within which they operate ought to be beginning to exert their influence on patterns of behaviour and

outcomes observed. Using the opportunity presented by the close of the first ten years of the post Cold War period, this thesis examines how Germany, Japan and China have responded to the changes which have taken place in the international system since the end of the Cold War. By applying general theories of international relations to examining the state strategies of these major powers between 1989 and 1999, the aim of this thesis is to identify the overall nature of change in the international system after the Cold War.

In applying theories of the international system to understanding the state strategies of major powers in the post-Cold War period, this thesis follows the model set out by two collaborative research projects carried out at Harvard University during the 1990s. The first is the Keohane *et al* edited volume *After The Cold War: International Institutions And State Strategies In Europe 1989-1991* (Keohane *et al*, 1993). This book, published shortly after the dramatic developments of the late 1980's and early 1990s, examines how international institutions and state strategies affected one another in Europe in the immediate post-Cold War period. In particular, Part I of the study examines how the United States and the major European powers used international institutions in adjusting to the changes taking place in the international system at the time. The book uses its findings to draw conclusions about the relative merits of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system in explaining patterns of international behaviour and outcomes during this critical period of transition. The second book upon which this thesis is modelled is the more recent *Unipolar Politics: Realism And State Strategies After The Cold War*, edited by Kapstein and Mastanduno (Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999). This book differs from the Keohane *et al* volume in two important ways. First, it examines realist theories on international relations, rather than engaging in debates across competing schools of thought in international relations theory. Hence it focuses primarily on the strategies of the major powers in the international system, rather than on the nexus between international institutions and state strategies. Second, it examines post Cold War state strategies at the level of the global international system, rather than focusing purely on a European context. As with the Keohane *et al* project, this thesis engages in evaluation of competing theoretical paradigms. It therefore focuses on the nexus

between international institutions and state strategies, rather than solely upon state strategies. As with the Kapstein and Mastanduno project, this thesis examines state strategies at the level of the global international system. Nevertheless, this thesis shares an underlying commonality with both the Keohane *et al* and the Kapstein and Mastanduno books in as much as it explicitly uses theories of international relations as frameworks to analyse how major states have responded to the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989.

In order to provide shared points of reference with the two research projects discussed, this thesis adopts definitions of key terms compatible with their use in these studies. In particular, the definitions of the terms 'the end of the Cold War', 'state strategies' and 'international institutions' are compatible with the use of these terms made by the contributors to both these books. Following Keohane *et al*, the term "the end of the Cold War" refers to the withdrawal of Soviet military power from central Europe, and to the reunification of Germany which resulted directly from this (Keohane *et al*, 1993:1-2). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewed as significantly predating the formal collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, referring to the period from 1989 onwards in which the disintegration of the bipolar distribution of military power became clearly apparent at the level of the global international system. The term 'state strategies' conventionally refers to the ways in which states deploy the material and diplomatic resources available to them in order to achieve security and maximise their welfare within the international system. The term is utilised in order to capture the general foreign policy orientation of key states in the international system. Following the pattern set out in both the Keohane *et al* and Kapstein and Mastanduno projects, this thesis focuses on the grand strategies of key states in the international system, rather than examining in detail any particular aspect of their foreign policies over the 1990s. Finally, 'international institutions' are understood as sets of principles, norms, rules and operating procedures around which states orient their expectations within the international system. This follows the conventional and widely accepted definition of an international regime established by Krasner (Krasner, 1983:2). It is important to recognise that this provides a broad definition of what constitutes an international institution, encompassing both formal

and informal aspects of the institutionalisation of state behaviour. Thus, state behaviour need not be formally institutionalised for it to reflect reciprocally recognised rules of conduct.

The general aim of this thesis is to investigate the overall nature of change in the post-Cold War international system. So it is necessary to specify the precise terms in which this change is to be measured. The 'overall nature of change' in the international system is defined in terms of variation along three inter-related dimensions, each of which are derived logically from the general theories to be utilised. Each of the three theories to be analysed generates radically different predictions about: 1) the key variable affecting state behaviour; 2) the levels and type of institutionalisation which will take place between states; 3) the sources of 'power' for states in the post Cold War international system. By examining patterns of international behaviour and outcomes along each of these three dimensions, it is possible to make general statements about the trajectory of international change since 1989. Following Kapstein and Mastanduno, the purpose of analysing the overall nature of international change is both empirical and theoretical (Kapstein and Mastanduno, 1999:1-2). At an empirical level, the thesis aims to analyse the grand strategies of important actors in the emerging international order, and account for how they have adjusted to the end of the Cold War. At a theoretical level, the thesis aims to examine whether it is possible to make any general statements about the patterns of behaviour observed in the post Cold War international system. In so doing, the thesis aims to contribute to the assessment of competing theoretical paradigms, and draw provisional conclusions about the future direction of change as the international system enters the twenty first century.

Having outlined the general nature, scope and purpose of the project to be engaged in, the remainder of this introduction addresses two issues. First, it examines the theoretical foundations of the thesis, and introduces the concept of 'reflexivity' to the study of international relations. The second section of the introduction deals with more technical issues relating to aspects of research design.

Section 1: Theoretical Foundations

This section of the introduction outlines the theoretical framework to be adopted by the thesis by providing a brief summary of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system. The centrality of the concept of reflexivity to the liberal model of the international system is emphasised. It then develops a more general discussion of the concepts of 'reflexivity' and 'reflexive modernisation', and how they might be useful for international relations theorists interested in charting the overall trajectory of change in the post-Cold War international system.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis takes an overtly theoretical approach to the study of international relations after the Cold War. It aims to be clear about the theoretical assumptions underpinning its analysis, and to apply these to answering a substantive research question about the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system. The promise of adopting a theoretical approach to the study of international relations is that it aspires to move beyond a purely descriptive analysis by offering generalisable explanations of recurrent patterns of international behaviour and outcomes (Waltz, 1979). However, following Keohane *et al* the thesis recognises that existing theories of international relations are too imprecisely specified to permit the rigorous testing of hypotheses in the context of the emerging post Cold War international order (Keohane, *et al*, 1993:7). It therefore adopts Keohane *et al*'s prescription of using international relations theories to help devise frameworks for the construction of more sophisticated empirical investigations (Keohane *et al*, 1993:7). The purpose of the thesis is therefore largely descriptive and documentary, the aim being to collect, collate and present information on the nature of change in the post Cold War international system. Nevertheless, the analysis presented is explicitly structured by theoretical frameworks which have emerged in the professional academic study of international relations over the 1980's and 1990s. Indeed, the extent to which the descriptive and documentary evidence collated and presented in this study is useful in providing a provisional account of the nature of change in the emerging post Cold

War international system will itself be a litmus test of the value of adopting an overtly theoretical approach to the study of international processes.

Following the procedure adopted by Keohane *et al*, this thesis is informed by structural or neo-realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system (Keohane *et al*, 1993:3-6). A full account of the three models of the international system to be utilised is presented in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. However, in order to clarify the parameters of the research project being undertaken, a preliminary account of their central claims is required. The structural or neorealist model stresses the importance of the polarity of the international system for determining patterns of international behaviour and outcomes. Neorealism posits that, given the anarchic character of the international system, defined in terms of the absence of a central organising political authority, states must make provisions for their own defence in order to provide for their security. However, in so doing they unintentionally make other states insecure, and thereby establish a security dilemma. The overall result is that the international system tends towards recurrent formations of balances of power, defined as a condition in which no one state can further increase its existing capabilities. The key explanatory variable highlighted by the neorealist model is therefore the *structure* of the international system, defined in terms of its anarchic organisation and the distribution of capabilities between states. Indeed, it is the parsimonious, structural explanation of patterns of behaviour and outcomes it offers which distinguishes the neorealist model of the international system from 'classical' realist perspectives which focus their account of international politics on human nature or the nature of states. Given the security dilemma faced by states, neorealist theory anticipates that patterns of institutionalised activity in the international system will be of a relatively limited nature, and will occur within the constraints provided by the international structure. Any rule patterned behaviour which does occur will be predominately organised around the tendency of the system as a whole towards a balance of power equilibrium. The sources of power for states under these circumstances will be the relative gains they can make in their material capabilities with respect to other units in the system.

The institutionalist model focuses on the configuration of information and institutions for the determination of patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the international system. Institutionalism asserts that, even in the absence of a central organising authority in the international system, institutionalised activity between states is possible under certain conditions. Where complex patterns of interdependence among actors are well developed and states engage in ongoing interactions, international institutions can take on instrumental value to states in maximising their security and welfare. By providing forums which reduce the costs of undertaking diplomatic negotiations, reducing uncertainly and shaping states' expectations, international institutions can facilitate the emergence of co-operation between states. By focusing on the configuration of information and institutions in determining international behaviour and outcomes, the institutionalist model focuses on system *process*. Process refers to allocative and bargaining behaviour which occurs within the power structure provided by the distribution of capabilities among actors. Given the potential for process level variables to facilitate the emergence of co-operative patterns of behaviour between states in the international system, institutionalist theory anticipates that state behaviour can become institutionalised around limited forms of reciprocity organised on the basis of tit-for-tat exchanges. Under such circumstances, the prominent source of power for states will become the mutual (or absolute) gains they can make from their interactions.

Both neorealist and institutionalist models of the international system exogenise the domestic political characteristics of states from the account of the systemic determination of behaviour. By contrast the liberal model stresses the reflexive interaction between domestic politics and international relations. In contrast to the neorealist focus on structure and the institutionalist focus on process, a liberal model of international relations therefore stresses the importance of the *reflexive component of system organisation*. States' political preferences, which reflect an underlying identity derived from sets of domestic political values and ideas, economic interests and political institutions, play a crucial role in the liberal model. In particular, liberal democracies behave differently towards one another than do authoritarian states in the sense that they rarely or never fight wars against one another. This is because liberal

states are unique in their ability to *trust* one another about their underlying strategic intentions in an anarchic context. A liberal model is therefore more optimistic about the level and type of institutionalisation which can occur in the international system. When there is a significant convergence of liberal preferences, the liberal model anticipates comparatively high levels of international co-operation between formally democratic states, and the diffuse practice of reciprocity.

It is important to recognise that, in the liberal model, a strong convergence of liberal state preferences affects not only relations within the core of formally liberal democratic states, but also relations between liberal and non-liberal states at the margins of change in the system. This is because it is the *configuration* of state preferences which is the key explanatory variable in liberal theory. In particular, once a critical mass of formally liberal states exists, it changes the patterns of interaction which occur within the international system as a whole. In consequence, formally non-liberal states at the margins of change in the system come under intense systemic pressures to adopt changes in their underlying political identity which will allow them to conduct their relations with the core on terms compatible with the democratic peace. By implication, liberalism develops a distinctive view of the sources of *power* for states in the international system, at least when the system as a whole is in the late stages of development. Once a stable core of formally liberal states exists within the international system, the predominant source of power for states will be to sustain the *trust* of others by transparently conveying a benign set of intentions towards them. This will enable states to develop deeply institutionalised ties with states in the dominant core. However, it also requires them to become socialised to the dominant norms and rules of the liberal international system. Thus it is important to recognise that liberal theory's stress on the configuration of state preferences as the key variable determining state behaviour which allows it to develop a distinctive account of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system.

The term *reflexivity* is used to capture the distinctive patterns of interaction between units which are central to a liberal model of socialisation. Specifically, it captures the dynamics of interaction between states under the particular circumstances associated

with the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal democratic states at the core of the international system. Liberalism suggests that after the emergence of a liberal core, states achieve high levels of *autonomy of action* in the sense that the political preferences they articulate become chronically influential in changing patterns of behaviour at a systemic level. It is important to recognise that this does not necessarily ensure that states adopt a formally liberal democratic identity or express preferences compatible with the democratic peace. Indeed, particularly at the margins of change in the international system, the articulation of non-liberal preferences is compatible with the predictions of the liberal model and is even to be expected. The most important feature of the international system is not necessarily that individual states articulate formally liberal preferences, but that the configuration of preferences is dominated overwhelmingly by the liberal core. However, it is equally important to recognise that an international system in which states have acquired a high degree of autonomy of action itself takes on properties which are historically distinctive. The characteristic patterns of interaction generated by the liberal core develops powerful socialisation effects. At the margins of change, states which persistently articulate non-liberal preferences are likely to come under intense systemic pressures to adopt changes in their political identity. In turn, these shifts generate positive feedback which reinforces the liberal configuration of preferences in the core. The term reflexivity is used to capture the way in which the liberal model suggests that with the emergence of critical mass of liberal states, units acquire high levels of autonomy of action in the international system, a process which in turn reinforces the overall trajectory of systemic change in a historically distinctive fashion.

The significance of the concept of reflexivity for the development of a liberal theory of international relations has not been widely recognised within the discipline of international relations. There are two plausible reasons why this might be the case. First, liberal theory has been under-developed. Most of the theoretical debates which have occurred over systemic theorising within the discipline of international relations over the 1980's and 1990s have been between neorealists and institutionalists. Probably the most significant attempt to account for the effect of liberal state preferences on international behaviour and outcomes has emerged in the literature on

the democratic peace. However, by focusing on the debate over whether or not democratic states are more peaceful in their relations with other democratic states, this literature has underestimated the significance of a convergence of liberal state preferences for patterns of interaction which occur within the system as a whole. In consequence, it has overlooked the way in which the emergence of a critical mass of liberal states in the international system may generate an effect which is worth more than the sum of its individual parts. Second, most of the theoretical literature which has emerged within the discipline of international relations over the 1980's and 1990s has been avowedly rational in its orientation. Rational approaches exogenise questions about the underlying identity of actors. States' conceptions of their 'interests' are given by assumption. By contrast, liberalism posits a theory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system. This presupposes that states are capable of behaving reflexively in relation to the complex environments within which they operate. That is to say, it presupposes that states are capable of internalising patterns of behaviour and deploying this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of action. In combination, the underdeveloped nature of liberal theory combined with the rationalist orientation of much of the theoretical literature has ensured that the avenues of enquiry opened by the concept of reflexivity have remained largely unexplored by the discipline of international relations.

However, the concept of reflexivity has been increasingly influential in the social sciences as a whole during the 1980's and 1990s. In particular, it has been developed by the prominent social theorist and sociologist Anthony Giddens. Giddens' work has been indirectly influential in the discipline of international relations through his work on the so called 'agent-structure problem' in social theory. In the late 1980's and early 1990s, the international relations theorists Alexander Wendt and David Dessler drew upon Giddens' research into the so called agent-structure problem to open up fundamental theoretical questions about the constitution of the international system (Wendt, 1987; Wendt 1992; Dessler, 1989). The ideas generated by Wendt and Dessler have become enormously influential within the discipline of International Relations over the 1990s, providing the theoretical foundations for the emergence of a 'constructivist' school of thought within the discipline. Constructivism emphasises the

socially constructed and historically contingent nature of patterns of behaviour within the international system, and stresses the importance of state identity for patterns of behaviour and outcomes observed within it. The criticism is often made of the constructivist literature that it has ultimately failed to resolve the problems about the overall nature of change in the international system which it has opened up (Keohane, 1989: 170-174; Keohane, 1996:472-473).[1] More specifically, it has failed to identify the precise historical conditions under which states' domestic political characteristics can play a significant role in influencing the properties of the international system as a whole. In attempting to address this issue, Wendt and other constructivists have tended to move away from their initial interest in Giddens' writings. However, it is perhaps surprising that constructivists such as Wendt and Dessler have so far failed to consult Giddens' own writings on the historical development of the nation-state in the international system, and more generally the broader sociology of modernity within which he situates this account. In the attempt to move beyond the limitations faced by the constructivist literature, this thesis has returned to draw further inspiration from Giddens' sociology, and in particular his discussion of reflexivity and reflexive modernisation.

Reflexivity, Reflexive Modernisation

Anthony Giddens is both a social theorist and a sociologist. Both strands of his work are interconnected, and both engage with the concept of reflexivity. Giddens' writings as a social theorist encompass the early stage of his career. During this period, he examined the so called agent-structure problem in social theory, and in so doing identified what he refers to as 'reflexive monitoring of action' as a general feature of human social conduct. Giddens writings as a sociologist have occupied his attention in the more recent phase of his career. They have examined the sociology of modernity, and deal with reflexivity as a historically specific feature of modern forms of social organisation. The two strands of Giddens' thought are closely related in as much as he is careful to stress that the reflexivity of modernity presupposes the reflexive

[1]It is important to recognise that not all constructivists regard themselves as liberals. However, there are significant affinities between the liberal and the constructivist models which are highlighted in the account of the liberal model provided in the theoretical chapter of this thesis.

monitoring of action as a more encompassing feature of human social conduct. Thus Giddens has developed his sociology of modernity on the theoretical foundations provided by his more general approach to social theory.

The 'agent-structure problem' is a theoretical issue which is of central concern across the social sciences. It refers to the way in which established forms of social analysis have tended towards one of two poles. On the one hand, structural forms of analysis focus upon various kinds of social totality; on the other hand, interpretative approaches focus upon the role of the individual actor. Giddens aims at a synthesis of these incompatible approaches through the elaboration of what he refers to as structuration theory. According to structuration theory, "(t)he basic domain for study of the social sciences, ... is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across time and space" (Giddens, 1984:2). Thus the fundamental unit of analysis for structuration theory is neither any form of social structure, nor individual action but rather social *practices*. Social practices refer to how social activity is 'carried on' as a continuous and ongoing flow of conduct. Social structure and individual action, far from being mutually exclusive categories of social analysis, necessarily presuppose one another, both logically and as they are carried out in day to day routines. Alternatively phrased, social structure and action are both part of a much deeper and more fundamental ordering of social relations across time and space.

Giddens uses these ideas to develop a distinctive approach to both action and structure in social theory. He identifies the *reflexive monitoring of action* as the most distinctive feature of human social conduct. The reflexive monitoring of action refers to the idea that "actors not only monitor the continuous flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move" (Giddens, 1984:5). To Giddens, this aspect of human agency represents a "chronic feature of everyday action" - an inescapable quality of human social conduct (Giddens, 1984:5). Giddens therefore portrays social agents as *competent*, *skilled* and *knowledgeable*, even in the most taken for granted routines of social life. Importantly, he does not assume that social agents are

necessarily 'rational' in the sense that they attempt to maximise their expected utility from patterns of social interaction. Actors can behave in ways which are skilled, competent and knowledgeable, but which fail to 'utility maximise'. Giddens illustrates this point though a discussion of 'slips of the tongue'. He notes that the very fact that agents acknowledge and deal with such slips as errors reveals not only the degree to which by and large actors are aware of what they are doing and why they are doing it, but also their great skill at coping with them by compensating for them appropriately (Giddens, 1984:93-104). This is not, of course, to make the claim that all actors will necessarily survive in particular social systems. Unintended consequences of interaction may, under some circumstances, severely punish some types of behaviour. Nevertheless, to Giddens, 'rationality' is not the defining quality of human action. Rather it is the ability of social agents to act in purposive and meaningful ways, and it is this sense in which he incorporates the insights of interpretative approaches to social theory (Giddens, 1984:2).

Giddens also uses structuration theory to approach the notion of social structure. He notes that 'structure' is conventionally conceived of as an arrangement of material resources which provides an external constraint on the free initiative of the human agent (Giddens, 1984:16). Within structuration theory, however, structure is considered as a set of *rules and resources* which are continuously and recursively implicated in the reproduction of social practices (Giddens, 1984:17). 'Resources' refer to underlying forms of material capability available to actors. 'Rules' refer to "generalisable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices" (Giddens, 1984:21). To follow a social rule is to know how to 'go on' in social life. Structures are therefore not conceptualised in terms of an external constraint on actors, but are *internal* to them and are reproduced only through their knowledgeability. Giddens also develops the related notion of 'the duality of structure'. This expresses the idea that structure is "always both constraining and enabling" (Giddens, 1984: 25). It is important to recognise that this is a statement about the logical relationship between structure and action, and *not* a statement about concrete social circumstances. It represents the idea that structure is recursively drawn into social action, thus permitting 'action' to take place in any meaningful sense. It does not, Giddens is

careful to emphasise, "prevent the structured properties of social systems from stretching away ... beyond the control, of any individual actors" (Giddens, 1984:25). Nevertheless, such a view of structure does imply that social practices are continually open to *potential* transformation by the actors which constitute them. Thus to analyse the structuration of social systems is to examine the *conditions governing* the ongoing flow of social interaction (Giddens, 1984:25).

In his more recent writings, Giddens has shifted his focus from the level of social theory to the analysis of social dynamics under particular historical circumstances. More specifically, Giddens has attempted to pin down the nature of *modernity* as a distinctive type of social organisation. He has developed this approach in the attempt to move beyond the limitations bequeathed to sociology by Marx, Durkheim and Weber. According to Giddens, the classical sociologists all suffered from the tendency to see social order as being "bounded" by the parameters of one institutional dimension of modernity in the form of capitalism, industrialism, or the concentration of military and administrative power in the nation-state (Giddens, 1990:10-14). Instead, "the question of order should be reformulated as a problem of how it comes about that social systems 'bind' (social) time and space. The problem of order is here seen as one of *time space distanciation* - the conditions under which time and space are organised" (Giddens, 1990:14). He suggests that modernity is "multidimensional at the level of institutions", but nevertheless a deeper social reality is common to all the various institutional dimensions modernity encompasses (Giddens, 1990:12). In this way, Giddens' sociology of modernity attempts to identify the basic framework for action within which the various institutional dynamics it exhibits are articulated; it attempts to characterise modernity as a distinctive social *form*.

Giddens identifies two generic features of modernity as a form of social organisation. The first is its inherently globalising nature (Giddens, 1990:63). According to Giddens, globalisation is a feature of social organisation which cuts across the various institutional dimensions embodied by modernity. Globalisation cannot be understood in terms of a single ineluctable dynamic, but rather encompasses a complex set of tendencies that simultaneously push in diametrically opposed directions. Globalisation

must therefore be understood in terms of "the complex relations between *local involvements* ... and *interaction across distance*" (Giddens, 1990:64). Such a view emphasises the dialectical character of globalisation "because local happenings may move in the very opposite direction from the very distanciated relations that shaped them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space" (Giddens, 1990:62). Globalisation is therefore understood in terms of the various 'push and pull' tendencies it embodies: between universalisation and particularisation; the local and the global; and the extensional and the intensional. Giddens suggests that it is the distinctive way in which modernity organises time and space which provides the key to understanding its globalising character. In traditional societies, "time and space were connected *through* the situatedness of place" (Giddens, 1991:16). By contrast, modern society presupposes the separation of time and space such that they become abstract dimensions along which social life is organised. The separation of time and space allows modern institutions to become 'disembedded' or continuously lifted out of localised contexts of interaction and restructured across indefinite spans (Giddens, 1990:21). In consequence, with the onset of modernity "time and space are recombined to form a genuinely world-historical framework of action and experience" (Giddens, 1990:21).

The second generic feature of modernity identified by Giddens is the expansion of social reflexivity. According to Giddens "the reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character" (Giddens, 1990:38). The concept is intended to convey the way modern society uses knowledge about the circumstances of social life as a constitutive element in its organisation. Giddens is careful to distinguish the reflexive quality inherent in human social conduct from the expansion of social reflexivity as a feature of modern social organisation. As has been noted, he refers to the former as the reflexive monitoring of action. By contrast, the latter refers to *institutional reflexivity*. The expansion of social reflexivity presupposes human beings' abilities to monitor the circumstances of their activities as a routine element of their social conduct. However,

the institutional reflexivity associated with modernity involves the development of a calculative attitude towards the conditions of social reproduction which was largely absent from traditional societies (Giddens, 1993:6). Giddens stresses the association of institutional reflexivity with the generation of 'power' understood in terms of an ability to transform the conditions of social reproduction. For this reason, "the expansion of institutional reflexivity stands behind the proliferation of organisations in circumstances of modernity, including organisations of global scope" (Giddens, 1993:6). It is the expansion of social reflexivity which lies behind the emergence of the various institutional dimensions of modern social life represented by capitalism, industrialism and the bureaucratic apparatus of the nation-state.

Giddens develops a related distinction between simple and reflexive modernisation, or alternatively between 'early' and 'late' modernity. The period of simple modernisation was associated with the globalising of the various institutional dimensions of modernity. Capitalism, industrialism and the system of nation states proliferated so as to become organisations operating on a world wide basis, and in consequence this period saw the virtual eradication of pre-modern civilisations across the globe. During the period of reflexive modernisation, the expansion of social reflexivity becomes more fully developed, and there is an intensification of the influence of globalisation. The generic features of modern social organisation become more pronounced in their influence, which in turn begins to alter the overall nature of global social change. Reflexive modernisation lies behind developments as diverse as the collapse of the command economies, the rise of neoliberal political and economic thinking, the global shift towards liberal democracy in authoritarian states, the simultaneous decline in political participation in states which are already formally democratic, changes in the structures of the family on a world wide basis, and the changing nature of social risk (Giddens, 1994). Whilst each of these developments might not appear to have common origins, Giddens suggests that what lies behind each of them is that they are the product of intensified globalisation and the increased *autonomy of action* brought by the expansion of social reflexivity. They are the product of a world of 'clever people', who actively and reflexively engage with the complex environments in which they operate (Giddens, 1994:7). The result is

unprecedented and wholesale fluidity, dynamism and change at all levels of global society.

A specific area in which Giddens has analysed in depth the effects of the changes associated with reflexive modernisation has been the realm of interpersonal relations which he suggests is the site of some of the most profound social changes taking place in the world today. In his book *Modernity And Self Identity*, Giddens discusses the impact of the onset of a period of developed institutional reflexivity on aspects of day to day life and personal identity (Giddens, 1991). He argues that, under conditions of late modernity, the self becomes a "reflexive project" sustained through revisable narratives of self-identity (Giddens, 1991:32-33). Globalising influences penetrate more deeply into the fabric of everyday life than they have in previous eras, with the result that, more than at any previous stage in history, sources of self-identity for individuals cannot be sustained with regard to pre-established traditional social practices. Instead they have to be actively created and managed for the intrinsic value they bring individuals, and in the context of a plurality of possible choices. That is to say, individuals acquire a great deal of autonomy from traditional structures which in the past would have constrained them in the development of their personal lives. Giddens is careful to stress that this process of change opens up both opportunities and risks for individuals. In terms of opportunities, Giddens documents the emergence of the *pure relationship*. The pure relationship, according to Giddens, "is one which ... exists solely for whatever rewards the relationship ... can deliver" (Giddens, 1991:6). It is a relationship negotiated and sustained on the basis of *trust* and free choice between partners who consider themselves equal and independent (Giddens, 1991:6). That is to say, the pure relationship is reflexively organised according to criteria generic to the relationship itself. Although ideal typical, the emergence of the pure relationship opens up new possibilities for individual self fulfilment which are historically distinctive and largely unavailable in previous historical eras. In terms of risks, changes taking place in personal life are associated with the rise of *fundamentalism*, understood as a response to the decay of tradition as a structuring feature of everyday life and the threat of meaninglessness this brings in its wake (Giddens, 1991:201-202). Giddens understands fundamentalism as edged with the

possibility of violence. It "can arise in all domains of social life where something has to be decided about rather than just taken for granted", and represents a direct response to the increased autonomy of action associated with heightened social reflexivity (Giddens, 1994:6).

Giddens makes the claim that the institutional influences he analyses in the context of interpersonal relations may also operate at the level of changes in patterns of social organisation in large scale social systems. Indeed, one of his underlying concerns is to highlight the way in which a distinctive feature of modernity as a form of social organisation is the increasing connections it brings between the intentional and extensional dimensions of social life (Giddens, 1991:1).[2] In particular, Giddens suggests that the institutional influences which operate at the level of interpersonal relations in principle apply to the way in which nation-states construct and sustain their identity within the international system. He notes that "(i)n the literature on international relations, nation-states are seen as 'actors' - as 'agents' rather than structures' - and there is a definite reason for this. For modern states are reflexively monitored systems which, even if they do not act in the strict sense of the term, follow co-ordinated polices and plans on a geopolitical scale" (Giddens 1991:15). Indeed, such a view is compatible with his own analysis of the nation-state in the international system, which has been another major empirical focus of his writings on the sociology of modernity. In *The Nation-State And Violence* Giddens documents extensively the rise of the modern nation-state and the associated emergence of a global international system (Giddens, 1985). He suggests that in the early stages of modernity, the concentration of military and administrative power in state bureaucracy leads to the emergence of a reflexively organised international system organised around the structure provided by the distribution of military capabilities. This process is identified by Giddens as playing a central role in the constitution of state sovereignty and national identity in the early modern state. Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this system became globalised, a process which culminated in the emergence of the bipolar Cold War order in the post war period.

---

[2]This, of course, relates back to his more general attempt to transcend the divisions between micro and macro social analysis using structuration theory.

In his more recent writings, Giddens has developed an analysis of the nation state in the international system under conditions of reflexive modernisation. The analysis he sets out echoes strongly the assessment of the trends in interpersonal relations he documents in his analysis of self-identity formation under these historical conditions. According to Giddens, the collapse of the bipolar order is indicative of a profound transformation in the constitution of the international system which must be understood in terms of the wider patterns of social change in the present era he documents. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, themselves developments which are the direct product of the process of reflexive modernisation, opens up the realistic possibility of the end to major war amongst the great powers on a global scale (Giddens, 1994:233). In turn, in a world without clear enemies, nation states are required to develop a more reflexive construction of their national identities than they have in the past (Giddens, 1998:130-133). Giddens effectively transposes his analysis of self identity formation in inter-personal relations to the understanding of processes of *state* identity construction within the international system. Under conditions of late modernity, the structural features provided by the balance of military power between states is increasingly influenced by the more general expansion of social reflexivity. States become relatively free of structures of constraint previously imposed on them, and the autonomy of action they acquire encourages them to alter the basis of their interactions with other actors in the international system. Indeed, one might logically extend Giddens' analysis to the form relationships between states take and the underlying causes of violence between them. Extending Giddens' analysis implies that relations between states will increasingly be sustained on the basis of active trust, and negotiated on the basis of independence and formal equality between 'partners'. Where a state persistently fails to redefine its national identity in a manner appropriate to a world without clear enemies, it will suffer from a loss of internal cohesion and legitimacy. This may culminate in a potentially violent reassertion of a 'traditional', exclusivistic sense of national identity as a fundamentalist response to the increased autonomy of action brought by high levels of reflexivity in the international system.

Overall, this discussion of Giddens' analysis of reflexivity and reflexive modernisation suggests that scholars of International Relations might benefit from an engagement with Giddens' sociology of modernity. In the late 1980's International Relations specialists such as Wendt and Dessler drew fruitfully upon structuration theory to develop important insights about the conceptualisation of key issues in international relations theory. In line with Giddens' intentions, they used structuration theory to highlight that the structure of international anarchy is open to potential transformation, and they challenged the rationality assumption predominant in much of the theoretical literature. However, in so doing they opened up questions about the conditions under which states may participate in the transformation of the international system which structuration theory is unable, in and of itself, to answer. In order to respond to the questions about the historical transformation introduced into the discipline by Wendt's formulation of the agent-structure problem, international relations theorists might fruitfully return to Giddens' writings in order to link a series of essentially ontological claims about the logical status of anarchy in IR theory to definite patterns of institutional alignment and change in the international system under concrete historical and sociological circumstances. In turn this may challenge conventionally held assumptions about the distinctiveness of the international system, and open up connections between research programmes in the disciplines of International Relations and Sociology.

Section 2: Research Design

Having discussed the theoretical basis for and intellectual origins of this thesis, the second section of the introduction addresses technical issues of research design. It examines methodological considerations, case selection criteria, chapter organisation, and the question of the originality of the thesis.

Methodological Considerations

Attempting a single author comparative study of the state strategies of major powers over the first ten years of the post-Cold War period is potentially a vast undertaking.

As such, it requires close consideration of methodological issues relating to how information about the nature of post-Cold War change is to be gathered, and the status of the knowledge generated by the thesis.

The methodology adopted by this study is to survey the large body of professional secondary literature (books and specialised foreign policy journals) in the English language which has emerged on the post-Cold War state strategies of each of countries to be examined. The English language literature has been targeted because it provides the most extensive body of available writing on the foreign policies of the major powers after the Cold War. It provides an extremely rich, high quality and easily accessible source of 'information' about each of the selected countries' strategies since 1989. The professional literature which has emerged on this subject is itself enormous, and the survey of the literature undertaken makes no pretence to be comprehensive. However, it is certainly extensive and can legitimately claim to have consulted the great majority of the relevant materials which have appeared in the professional literature within the field of International Relations. In order to facilitate the gathering of relevant materials, the procedure adopted was to identify the major book and pamphlet based studies available, and then draw up a list of articles from a series of core journals. Although not all of these works were actually utilised in the course of writing the case study chapters, they were consulted. 'Major' books and pamphlets were identified as those written or edited by the appropriate single country specialists within the field, or alternatively have been published under the auspices of major foreign policy think thanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations, The Brookings Institution, The Royal Institute For International Affairs and, the International Institute For Strategic Studies (IISS). The 'core' journals utilised were the major English language journals which specialise in the field of International Relations, or which routinely publish articles on foreign affairs: International Security Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, International Affairs, Survival, Aussenpolitik, Pacific Review, and Asian Survey. Significantly, many of these journals are associated with the foreign policy think tanks listed above. From this initial body of literature, further references were collected and collated, and drawn upon where they appeared to offer relevant insights. The criteria through which

information was utilised are therefore loose and interpretative. Information was not selected on the basis a tight set of criteria for relevance.

It is important to identify some caveats and qualifications about the general principles outlined above. First, the 1st January 1999 has been selected as an arbitrary cut off point for the literature survey in order to make the make the project finite and manageable one in the closing stages of research. Second, it has to be acknowledged that some literature published after this date has been employed in this study. This literature has been employed selectively for a variety of reasons. A major exception to the January 1999 cut of point was the publication of the Kapstein and Mastanduno research project in April 1999. The justification for this is that access to a draft manuscript of this book had been available since mid 1996 and had played an instrumental role in providing a template for the research engaged in this thesis as has been identified. Furthermore, the literature published after the cut off point was consulted in situations where developments occurring in the closing years of the study did not receive attention because of the considerable lag which exists in the production of specialist literature. Owing to this lag, articles discussing developments which have occurred in the late 1990s have sometimes not been available. Under these circumstances, footnotes have been used to acknowledge the lack of availability of specialist literature on these topics. Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge that a number of International Studies Association conference papers have been drawn upon by the case study chapters on a number of occasions.

It is important to make explicit the methodological status of the foreign policy literature. In his contribution to the latest edition of *The Handbook Of Political Science* Goldmann has proposed a useful typology for categorising the nature of research into the post Cold War international system. His three fold typology, illustrated in Figure 1, is based on the purposes the research embodies:

Figure 1:

The Purposes Of Research



(Taken from Figure 16.1, Goldmann, 1996:409)

Type I research is motivated by a desire to inform and influence policy makers. Type II research is motivated by intra-academic concerns, namely the desire to test and refine general theories of the international system. Goldmann identifies that both Type I and Type II research is *positive* in orientation in the sense that its purpose is to add to existing knowledge. This contrasts to the purpose of Type III research, which is critical in its orientation and is designed to investigate the limits of what others take to be knowledge (Goldmann, 1996:408-414). Goldmann's typology is intended to be ideal typical. However, most if not all of the surveyed foreign policy literature fits into Goldmann's Type I and Type II research. Type I research tends to characterise the majority of the literature including the longer established foreign policy journals, and many of the specialist books. There is also a significant minority of Type II research which is explicitly social scientific in orientation. This literature characterises the more recently established journals within the field, notably International Security.[3] However, this trends towards professionalisation of the literature is also more generally apparent in specialist books and articles appearing over the 1990s.

[3]Since 1995 when it became a refereed journal, Pacific Review has also increasingly adopted this approach.

This thesis draws on both types of positive research identified by Goldmann in order to access information about state strategies of the selected countries in the post Cold War international system. It is important to draw attention to the way in which the specialist foreign policy literature available in the English language is not necessarily overtly social scientific in orientation, nor is it necessarily theoretically informed. In his Presidential Address to the International Studies Association in 1988, Keohane suggested that the "preponderance of empirical researchers ... implicitly or explicitly accept" the premises of theories of the international system (Keohane, 1989:173). However, in practice the majority of positive research within the field is of a Type I nature and is orientated towards loosely descriptive and interpretative analysis and policy prescription rather than the systematic, theoretically informed collection of empirical evidence. It is not possible to turn to the available foreign policy literature to find a series of comprehensive and systematic surveys about all, or even most, aspects of the foreign policies of major powers in the post Cold War international system. However, what this literature does offer is a rich and informed body of 'expert' analysis. Thus two further limitations of using the secondary literature in the English language must be made explicit. First, the studies upon which this thesis draws does not represent a rigorously selected sample of a systematic body of information about all aspect of the state strategies of the case countries to be analysed. Second, it is important to recognise that the evidence drawn upon by this thesis in support of theoretical claims is not necessarily produced through clearly specified processes of descriptive inference. Rather it draws upon the loosely descriptive and interpretative analysis offered in the available literature by foreign policy specialists.

In view of these considerations, this thesis does not aim to definitively test and/or falsify the general models of the international system under analysis, but rather provides a *preliminary* study. Reliance upon primary data across the three cases is not possible at the present historical juncture. The collection of high quality primary documentary evidence to support the claims of this thesis would not only be extremely difficult and financially expensive, but would also be enormously time consuming. Instead, the thesis uses the foreign policy literature as a vehicle with which to probe the plausibility of a series of competing theoretical claims about the

overall trajectory of change in the post Cold War international system. The literature is surveyed in order to draw out strands within it supporting various theoretically informed interpretations of the state strategies pursued since 1989 for the cases under examination. However, the thesis accepts that there may be systematic bias in the information being relied upon. Future historians will have access to the time and resources to develop a more comprehensive and systematic survey of the changes taking place in the international system today. For the time being, reliance on secondary literature provides a practical and efficient way in which to present a highly relevant account of the overall nature of post Cold War international change contemporaneously with the unique historical juncture provided by the close of the first decade of the post Cold War period.

At deeper level, the use of secondary literature has more fundamental implications for the methodological status of the thesis. In particular this thesis adopts the methodological premises compatible with structuration theory. At the core of structuration theory is the insight that, unlike the natural sciences, social science is "not concerned with a 'pre-given' universe of objects, but with one which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects" (Giddens, 1993:168). Although human agency is bounded and patterned in significant ways, the reproduction of society is a skilled performance undertaken by knowledgeable and reflexive actors. It follows that concepts developed by social theorists are involved in what Giddens refers to as a *double hermeneutic*. The idea of the double hermeneutic is intended to convey the way in which social theorists generate concepts which not only describe and explain patterns of behaviour which occur independently of the observer, but also enter into the discursive environment drawn upon actors and in so doing become constitutive of patterns of behaviour and outcomes. Thus according to Giddens "there is a continual 'slippage' of the concepts constructed by ... (social theorists), whereby these are appreciated by those whose conduct they were originally coined to analyse, and hence become integral features of that conduct ... thereby ... potentially compromising their original usage within the technical vocabulary of social science" (Giddens, 1993:170).

Giddens argues that these considerations are intimately bound up with the *logical* status of social scientific activity. He does not accept that there is a dualism between positivist and interpretative approaches to the study of society. Social researchers cannot ignore the way in which their research generates a double hermeneutic without compromising the scientific *rigour* of their activities. This is because all scientific activity must first recognise the most distinctive properties of the field of investigation, which in the case of human social activity is the capacity of human beings to exercise individual agency. As a logical corollary of effective explanatory and descriptive analysis, researchers must 'sensitise' themselves to the constitutive functions performed by their activities. This has important considerations for the practical conduct of empirical research. In the context of the present study, it might be suggested that whilst reliance upon secondary literature enhances the relevance of the analysis it presents, it necessarily compromises the degree of social scientific rigour it embodies. This would reflect a positivist view that social scientific enterprise should be modelled on the same techniques and standard of descriptive inference employed by the natural sciences. By contrast, it is the methodological premise of this thesis that such an approach would be inappropriate to the object of enquiry, and as such would compromise the social scientific rigour of the study being undertaken. In particular, by employing secondary literature generated by the professional literature on post Cold War state strategies it is possible to sensitise research to the way in which this literature is drawn upon as part of the routine conduct of actors within the international system. This methodological premise may be formulated in terms compatible with Goldmann's typology of research into international relations after the Cold War. Contrary to the assumptions made by the vast majority of the foreign policy specialists, it is the premise of this thesis that critical or Type III research is a necessary prerequisite to the identification of positive trends in the international system of interest to Type II professional social scientists and Type I policy analysts and makers.

In summary, the methodological approach adopted by this thesis is to undertake a detailed survey of the available secondary literature on the foreign policies of the case study counties over the post Cold War period. As with all approaches to social

research, this methodology has significant limitations which have been made explicit in this account. However, it also has two advantages over alternative approaches which might be adopted. First, it presents the most effective means available of carrying out a large scale comparative study of overall patterns of change in the post Cold War international system. Second, it provides a means of sensitising the research to the mutually constitutive relationship between professional theorising about the overall nature of change in post Cold War international relations and the strategic practices of states over the post Cold War period. It thereby enhances the *rigour* of the social scientific analysis.

Case Selection

The case selection criteria employed by this thesis are derived logically from the theoretical considerations set out in chapter one. All three of the theories which inform the analysis agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War will present critical tests for their predictions about the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system. However, they differ radically in their predictions about what the overall trajectory of change will be.

The neorealist model of the international system is pessimistic about the overall direction of post Cold war international change. It predicts a return to the conflictual patterns of behaviour which characterised the international system in the late ninetieth and early twentieth centuries. Prominent neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz, Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer have identified that the structure of the international system creates strong incentives for Germany, Japan and China to balance against preponderant US power (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993: Mearsheimer, 1990). Given Russia's continued status as a nuclear power in the post Cold war period, the likely result is the emergence of a five power multipolar system characterised by shifting patterns of alliances among the major states. Neorealist predictions specify ranges of behaviour which are therefore relevant to both a European and East Asian context. It makes a pessimistic set of predictions about the state strategies that will be engaged in over the post Cold War period by the major

powers in both these regional settings. Patterns of institutionalised behaviour between states across both these regions will be minimal or significantly reduced from the levels of institutionalised activity that developed under the shelter of the bipolar Cold War structure. Under these conditions, states will be motivated in their behaviour primarily by their relative status in the international system and their potential capabilities as actors.

The institutionalist perspective is more optimistic about the patterns of behaviour which it predicts will emerge in the post Cold War period. It is prepared to challenge neorealist claims, most notably in the context of Western Europe. In particular, the prominent institutionalist Robert Keohane argues that, contrary to neorealist predictions, Germany has strong functional incentives to remain committed to the institutional frameworks within which it has participated over the post war period (Keohane, 1993:289-290). Germany is therefore presented with strong reasons to continue to practice limited forms of reciprocity with other states in the international system for the absolute befits this can provide for its security and welfare. However, institutionalists have difficulty in challenging core neorealist claims in an East Asian context in the absence of well developed patterns of interdependence between states in this region. According to institutionalist theory, the prospects for international co-operation between states in this region, particularly Japan and China, are potentially difficult to manage. However, in practice prominent institutionalists have been extremely influential in the formulation of US foreign policy in the East Asia region. Notably, the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye was employed in the capacity of Assistant Secretary of State for defence during the period in the mid-1990s, and undertook the most important review of US security policy in the East Asia region in the post Cold War period (Office Of International Security Affairs, 1995; see also Nye, 1995). The defence report which resulted recommend that, the US should maintain a strong forward defence presence in the East Asia region. Although this would not substitute for a well developed pattern of interdependent relations between China and Japan, it could provide some of the preconditions for multilateral

institutions to take on instrumental value for these states in formulating their strategies.[4]

The liberal model is more optimistic still about the nature of change in the post Cold War international system. With the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal states at the core of the international system in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, patterns of interaction amongst the units will be strongly affected at a global level. Under these conditions, patterns of institutionalisation between states are likely to become well developed. In a West European and German context, the levels and type of institutionalisation expected by the liberal model are higher and of a more developed quality than institutionalist theory predicts. Moreover, liberalism predicts that similar patterns of institutionalisation are also likely to emerge in an East Asian context, affecting the behaviour of Japan and China even in a region where patterns of interdependence between states are poorly developed. Two points about the patterns of change predicted by the liberal model are important to recognise. First, the most extensive patterns of institutionalisation of state behaviour predicted by the liberal model will occur at the level of informal institutionalisation. Liberalism predicts that, with the emergence of the liberal core, relations between the major powers will increasingly be conducted around norms of trust and the diffuse practice of reciprocity. This reflects the way in which liberalism suggests that sustaining trust is the most important source of power for states when there is a strong convergence of liberal preferences in the international system. Second, the articulation of non-liberal preferences by states is to be expected at margins of system change. However, states which articulate non-liberal preferences are likely to show signs of coming under intense socialisation pressures arising from the liberal core. Rather than envisaging a neorealist style global multipolar structure, or a world order of multi-level interdependence as suggested by institutionalists, liberalism suggests that the post

---

[4]Note that the theoretical chapter of this thesis does not examine the implications of the Nye report for the predictions of institutionalist theory after the Cold War. It focuses purely on comparing models of the international systems in abstract terms in order to make an independent theoretical statement. However, it is important to recognise that the conclusions of the Nye report follow logically from institutionalist international relations theory. The Nye report suggests that, in the absence of a situation of complex interdependence in the East Asia region, the US must maintain a strong forward defence presence in the region in order to foster conditions favourable to multilateralism. Thus in the case study

UNIVERSITY

Cold war international system will be best conceptualised in terms of a gradual core-periphery continuum.

Overall, the state strategies adopted by the major powers identified by neorealists in Western Europe and East Asian context will provide clear tests of the predictions offered by the models of the international system which inform this thesis. Examining the strategies with regard to international institutions adopted by Germany, Japan and China over the first ten years of the Cold War period will provide an effective means of arriving at a general picture of the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system.

Chapter Organisation

The thesis is organised into a theoretical chapter which is followed by the three case study chapters. The theoretical chapter provides a detailed comparison of the foundations and predictions of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system. The neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models have been selected as the theories of the international system to be used to structure the case study analyses because they are the only available theoretical perspectives which are able to offer parsimonious and systemic level explanations of behaviour and outcomes in the post Cold War period.[5] Waltz's neorealist account of the international system was the first theoretical approach to develop the parsimony and systemic orientation which made it capable of producing general explanations of historically recurrent patterns of behaviour in international politics, notably the occurrence of war and the formation of balances of power. In contrast to classical realist approaches the neorealist perspective offers exploratory elegance and generalisable predictions about state behaviour, thus making it compatible with a scientific approach to the study of

---

chapters, the implications of the Nye report for state strategies in an East Asian context are considered because they are crucial significance for institutionalist predictions.

[5] Contructivism cannot claim this status because it cannot specific the precise historical conditions under which the substantive content of foreign policy varies. As Wendt is careful to make explicit, constructivist theory "says something about what kinds of entities there are in the world and how their relationship should be conceptualised, and as such provides a conceptual framework or meta-theory for thinking about real world social systems, but it does not tell us what particular kinds of agents or particular kind of structures to expect in any given concrete social system" (Wendt, 1987:355).

international politics. The institutionalist model was the first to emerge as a serious contender to neorealism. By focusing on systemic variations in the quality of information available to states, institutionalism is also available to offer generalisable explanations and predictions about state behaviour.

The liberal model of the international system remains in the embryonic stages of development, although a number of recent attempts have been made to develop its insights by Wade Huntley and Andrew Moravcsik (Huntley, 1996: Moravcsik, 1997). In particular, Moravscik has identified that liberalism's focus on the configuration of state preferences for the determination of state behaviour provides liberalism with the parsimony and elegance expected of a systemic level theory of international relations (Moravscik, 1997). Nevertheless, given the underdeveloped character of liberal theory, the theoretical chapter of the thesis offers an independent statement about the nature of a liberal theory of international politics, and its relationship to the neorealist and institutionalist models. The relationship of the liberal model of the international system to neorealist and institutionalist theories is important to analyse because it is liberalism's *synthetic* nature which accounts for its most distinctive characteristics and predictions. In particular, it is liberalism's synthetic nature which allows it to explain both the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, and indicate the historical significance of the emergence of a critical mass of formally democratic states at the core of the international system for the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international order.

The three case study chapters analysing the state strategies with regard to international institutions of Germany, Japan and China since 1989 each follow the same structure. The bulk of the case study chapters focus on applying the models of the international system being utilised to the state strategies adopted by the specific country under consideration. The three theories are applied in the same sequence in each case, working through neorealist, institutionalist and liberal accounts of the behaviour of the state concerned. The third section of each chapter, which applies the liberal model, concentrates upon attempting to develop a characterisation of the distinctive foreign policy preferences of the country under analysis. It is left until the fourth and final

section of each chapter to analyse the strategic choices facing each state in negotiating the transition to the post Cold War international order. This section examines how each state being analysed has been affected by its interactions with other units in the international system, and assesses of the implications of this interaction for the direction in which their strategies are being encouraged to develop by systemic level trends. By applying the same chapter structure to each of the case study chapters, the comparative dimension of the project being undertaken shall be brought into sharper relief. In turn, this facilitates the ease with which generalisations might be made across the three countries analysed.

Second, each case study chapter adopts a metaphor drawn from Giddens' analysis of processes of self identity formation as set out in the book *Modernity And Self Identity*. Using the metaphor, the state is personified in both the opening sections of the introduction and the closing sections of the conclusions. The metaphor is useful for the organisation of each chapter in the sense that it provides a 'coat-hanger' around which each chapter can develop its overall argument. However, the use of the metaphor is also intended to draw attention to the crisis of identity-transition faced by Germany, Japan and China in the post Cold War period. It is intended to provide a graphic way of illustrating the way in which the end of the Cold War has created a 'defining moment' for each of the three cases examined. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify that the use of the metaphor is no way designed to draw direct parallels between trends in interpersonal and international relations, which can not be substantiated on the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis.

Originality and 'Value Added'

A final question relating to aspects of research design pertains to the originality of the thesis in terms of the value it adds to existing knowledge within the discipline of international relations. The originality of this study lies in its presentation of a systematic evaluation of competing theories of the international system through a comparative study of state strategies at the unique historical juncture provided by the close of the first ten years of the post Cold War period. The thesis seeks to show

which strategies states adopted after the end of the Cold War, and the degree to which their responses to this development was institutionalised around co-operative norms. In doing so, it provides knowledge that may help towards an understanding of important features of contemporary world politics. At the present time, trends in the emerging international system are relatively opaque and difficult to extrapolate. However, the information and analysis presented in this study should prove useful when trying to understanding the historic changes which have taken place over the past decade. In turn, this knowledge can be brought to bear on the grand theories that provide our deepest presumptions, and which shape our understanding of the emerging world order.[6]

[6]Adapted from Keohane *et al*, 1993:19

CHAPTER TWO

Reassessing the Logic of Anarchy: Rationality versus Reflexivity

Drawing on the insights of constructivism and recent attempts to develop a liberal model of international relations, this chapter compares neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of their competing conceptualisations of the composition and dynamics of the international system. It argues that prominent institutionalists have mistakenly interpreted neorealism as a rationalist model of the international system in order to develop their own arguments countering its central propositions. Rather than relying on rational actor assumptions, neorealism instead adopts a reflexive logic focusing on processes of identity construction and socialisation arising from the generative consequences of international anarchy. Thus whilst neorealism and liberalism differ fundamentally in terms of their assessment of the nature and long term consequences of international anarchy, they may actually be closer to each other in terms of their conceptualisation of system composition and dynamics than neorealism and institutionalism. On the basis of this argument, the chapter rejects a 'linear' understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism. Instead, it proposes a 'triangular' understanding of the relationship between these three models of the international system in which the debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms, liberalism's focus on the generative consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than institutionalists' attempts to refine rationalist models.

In developing this argument, the chapter focuses on the debates between neorealists, institutionalists and liberals over the mechanisms through which the anarchic structure of the international system is constituted (reproduced/transformed). All three of these

theories agree that international anarchy is constituted through the interaction of units. Importantly, however, they identify different mechanisms through which units within the international system interact. One way in which units can interact is on the basis of *rational* behaviour. Units which behave rationally "possess consistent, ordered preferences, and ... calculate the costs of benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximise their utility in view of these preferences" (Keohane, 1984:27). The notion that actors behave rationally in their interactions exogenises questions about the characteristics of units within the international system, since units' conceptions of their 'interests' are given by assumption (Wendt, 1992:398). An alternative means through which units can interact is on the basis of *reflexive* behaviour. Actors which behave in a reflexive manner "not only monitor the continuous flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move" (Giddens, 1984:5). Actors are therefore viewed as competent, skilled and knowledgeable about the complex environments in which they move, but they are not necessarily rational in the sense that they expect to maximise their expected utility from patterns of social interaction. For example, even what may appear from a rational-choice perspective to be 'irrational' social behaviour involves a high degree of reflexive attention and awareness by purposeful social agents. The idea that actors are capable of reflexive behaviour involves making statements about their basic *identity* as agents. To adopt Wendt's definition, identity refers to "relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self" from which actors define their portfolio of 'interests' (Wendt, 1992:397). That is to say, 'interests' depend on identities which are either actively or passively constructed by knowledgeable actors on the basis of intersubjective meanings and purposes acquired from their institutionally defined roles (Wendt, 1992:398).

The chapter is organised into three sections examining the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system respectively. First, their assumptions about the nature of international anarchy are analysed to shed light on differences in the ontological status of anarchy across the theories. Second, the way in which each theory conceptualises the constitution of the international system is examined in order

to identify whether a rationalist or a reflexivist logic is adopted. Finally, the theories are compared with respect to their predictions about both the sources of state 'power', and the levels and type of institutionalisation expected within the international system. A final section of the chapter will consider the relationship which exists between the three models set out, the possibilities for a general synthesis between them, and the implications of these abstract theoretical considerations for substantive research programmes within the discipline.

The Neorealist Model

The key variable identified by the neorealist model of the international system is the configuration of capabilities between states. This conclusion is drawn from the specification of Waltz's theory of international politics. Waltz's model begins by clearly distinguishing between the structure of domestic and international political systems. For Waltz, domestic political systems are centralised and hierarchical. In contrast, the structure of the international system is anarchic because of the absence of a central organising authority in international relations (Waltz, 1979:88). Waltz argues that, because of its anarchic deep structure, the international system becomes a self help one analogous to an economic market in the sense that "(w)hether units live, prosper or die depends on their own efforts" (Waltz, 1979:91). Under these circumstances, states will be encouraged to behave in ways which produce the recurrent formations of balances of power. Due to the anarchic organising principle of the international system, "those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to danger. Fear of unwanted consequences therefore stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of power" (Waltz, 1979:118). In this way, the balance of power may be seen as a condition of structural "equilibrium" in the distribution of capabilities among states within the international system in which no one single unit can further increase its existing capabilities (Waltz, 1979:121). It exists externally to the actors themselves, and emerges in an unintended way as a "constraining and dispensing force" on the behaviour of units within the international system (Waltz, 1979:69).

As Dessler notes, Waltz's model of the international system relies on a positional model of structure which focuses on the role of unintended consequences of interaction arising from a unit's relative position within a given set of relationships (Dessler, 1989:448-451). Within such a model, "the units precedes the system, and through action generates structure. ... (Thus whilst) in Waltz's causal explanatory scheme, structure is seen as constraining and disposing state action .... ontologically speaking, it is the interaction of units that creates the structure" (Dessler, 1989, p.449). To demonstrate this claim, Dessler cites Waltz's assertion that that "*From* the coaction of like units *emerges* a structure that affects and constrains all of them. *Once formed* ... [... a system] becomes a force in itself that the *constitutive units* acting singly or in small numbers cannot control" (Waltz, cited Dessler, 1989:448-449, Dessler's emphasis; see also Waltz, 1979:90). Wendt similarly identifies that in the neorealist model states are what he refers to as "ontologically primitive" entities (Wendt, 1987:339). He rejects Ashley's early argument that Waltz is an unreformed structuralist, arguing instead that Waltz adopts an *individualist* definition of the structure of the international system (Wendt, 1987:341; see also Ashley, 1986:238-242). Waltz himself claims that neorealist theory emphasises that causation runs from both structures to states and from states to structures (see figure 3.1 in Waltz, 1979:40). However, as Dessler notes, properly speaking the creation of system structure through unit interaction is postulated ontologically, whilst the constraint imposed on interaction is explained theoretically by neorealism (Dessler, 1989:449 fn 33).

The implication of Waltz's adoption of a positional model of structure is that the international system envisaged by neorealism takes on a reproductive rather than a transformative character. To Waltz, unintended consequences of interaction cause patterns of behaviour to reoccur even against the wishes of the system's members. In this view, structure is defined as an arrangement of actors which acts as an external constraint on state action (Dessler, 1989:449). Once formed structure becomes "essentially impervious to attempts to modify it or control its effects. ... Even when structure is recognised for what it is, it continues to defeat strategies designed to evade

its influence" (Dessler, 1989:450). It is ultimately due to his adoption of a positional model that Waltz's neorealist theory is seen as privileging the causal role played by system structure in the constitution of the international system (Wendt, 1987:340-344). It is important to recognise that the logic of Waltz's theory does allow some scope for the transformation of the international system if its ordering principle shifts from anarchy to hierarchy, presumably through the instigation of some form of world government (Waltz, 1986b:342). However, this must be seen as unlikely because of the anti-hegemonial character of the balance of power mechanism in Waltz's model which works to ensure the persistence of anarchy (Waltz, 1986b:343 and 340-341). As Ruggie has identified, in Waltz's model "continuity (in the form of the persistence of anarchy) ... is the product of premise even before it is hypothesised as an outcome" (Ruggie, 1986:152). Alternatively, Cox suggests that Waltz's is a problem solving theory that "takes the world as it is, with the prevailing social and power relationships within it ... as the given framework for action", rather than a critical theory capable of directing attention towards possible sources of historical transformation (Cox, 1986:208).

Despite the essentially reproductive role played by the structure of international anarchy in the neorealist model, it is important to recognise that there is a strong dynamic quality to Waltz's understanding of international relations which he is careful to emphasise (Waltz, 1986b:341-344). Due to his stress on the role of unintended consequences of interaction within the international system, Waltz argues that "(i)n systems theory, *structure is a generative notion*" (Waltz, 1979:72, emphasis added). For Waltz, "structure acts as a selector" (Waltz, 1979:73), and over time will eliminate units which fail to respond to the imperatives of the system. Waltz's stress on the generative qualities of international anarchy leads him to place a great deal of emphasis on the "pervasive" importance of *competition* and *socialisation* within the international system (Waltz, 1979:74). For Waltz, socialisation is a process of emulation, and competition a process of elimination (Waltz, 1979:74-77). Waltz sees these forces at work in the international system through its structural effects. For Waltz, states face strong structural incentives to emulate the effects of the most successful and in so doing become 'socialised' to the international system. If they fail

to respond to these incentives, competition will, over time, tend to eliminate them from the international system as imbalances of power are restored to equilibrium. This has both internal and external consequences for the organisation of states within the system. Internally, they will adopt equivalent organisations. Externally, states will adopt structurally similar repertoires of behaviour. Competition and socialisation within the international system therefore encourage the *homogenisation* of units within the international system such that they are functionally alike, and furthermore promote the *convergence* of the international system around a balance of power equilibrium.

Waltz's suggestion that the structure of international anarchy is generative has important implications for the way in which he conceptualises the role played by the state in the constitution of the international system. Waltz is conventionally interpreted as making the theoretical assumption that states behave *rationally* in response to incentives provided by system structure. Most notably, Keohane, a prominent institutionalist, adopts this interpretation of neorealism. He holds that "(f)or Waltz ... (t)he link between system structure and actor behaviour is forged by the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. ... Otherwise, state behaviour might have to be accounted for by variations in the calculating ability of states; in that case the systemic focus of Structural Realism (and much of its explanatory power) would be lost. Thus the rationality assumption ... is essential to the theoretical claims of structural realism" (Keohane, 1986:167; see also Keohane, 1984:83-84; Keohane, 1993:273). However, in making this claim Keohane knowingly counters Waltz's own assertion that his theory "requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory simply says that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside" (Waltz, 1979:118; see also Keohane, 1986b:201 fn 15). Waltz does hold that his theory requires the assumption that at least some states seek to ensure their survival (Waltz, 1979:91 and 118). However, he does *not* assume that they pursue this strategy rationally. Instead, he relies on the generative consequences of the structure of international anarchy to 'select out' those who pursue this strategy relatively poorly,

and reward those who pursue it relatively successfully. Indeed, in his response to his critics, Waltz stresses "the importance I accord, and Keohane denies, to the process of selection that takes place in competitive systems" and asserts that "(w)e should keep the notion of 'selection' in a position of central importance" (Waltz, 1986: 330 and 331). Waltz does qualify these statements with the assertion that he does not differ with Keohane over the issue of rationality "except semantically" (Waltz, 1986:330). However, in the light of more recent developments in international relations theory, it is possible that Waltz's judgement about the semantic nature of his differences with Keohane on this issue may have been somewhat premature.

In particular, Buzan *et al* have elaborated further on the role played by the state in neorealist theory. They suggest that "it is ... possible to show that Waltz has independently alighted on a solution to the problem (of the relationship between units and structure within the international system) ... that coincides with the position now being adopted in other areas of the social sciences" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:110). In particular, they argue that the state in neorealist theory is best characterised as a *reflexive* rather than a rational actor. They propose that implicit in Waltz's model is an incipient 'top down' theory of the state (Buzan, 1993:117-119). Whilst recognising that the international system is individualist in origin in neorealist theory, they identify that "(o)nce states are coacting ... Waltz is quite clear that the structure of the international system does have an important bearing on the development of the state. This is because he believes or theorises that the ordering principle of international anarchy generates a competitive environment" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:117). It is for this reason that Waltz observes the importance of the *imitation* of successful practices of others within the system, a process which "plays an integral part in the process that maintains the balance of power and, in turn, sustains the anarchic system" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:117-118; see also Waltz, 1979:127-128). Thus, in the neorealist model, "agents of the state, like Janus, are required to look in two directions simultaneously. They confront two sets of structures: one internal and the other external" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:120). Buzan *et al* use this observation to argue that Waltz's view of the unit-structure relationship strongly echoes a depiction of social agents as "knowledgeable and reflexive, having not only a sophisticated view of the world and how it is

structured, but also the ability to monitor their actions in the light of this knowledge" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:107).

There is a distinction which it is important to highlight between an understanding of the state as a reflexive actor, and an understanding of it as a rational actor. Buzan *et al* use the example of the behaviour of motorists at traffic lights to illustrate this point. They note that there is a complex set of social institutions that shape the behaviour of motorists which "are observed not because of the sanctions imposed on deviants, but because of the reflexive ability to see what would happen in situations of strategic interaction if the structures did not exist. ... So it follows that a structure constitutes a structure only because of the behaviour of the agent, which in turn is intimately bound up with knowledge of the structure" (Buzan *et al*, 1993:107). In this way, patterns of behaviour may persist not because of rational calculations of interest on behalf of units, but because of the essential *recursiveness* of social life, i.e. the way in which social activity is 'carried on', at least at the level of practical consciousness, by reflexively aware actors. Dessler makes the same point when he notes that whilst neorealism suggests that the distribution of material capabilities amongst actors motivates their behaviour, the anarchic structure implicitly generates rule following activity on the behalf of units within the international system (Dessler, 1989:459-461). Dessler uses this observation to argue that "(r)ules, which give shape and meaning to rationality and thereby make survival possible, are a necessary (if theoretically suppressed) component of structure in the neorealist model" (Dessler, 1989:461). Indeed, the balance of power may even be seen as conforming to Wendt's definition of an institution as "a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests ... (which exists) only in virtue of actors' socialisation to and participation in collective knowledge" (Wendt, 1992:399). Distinguishing between a social structure sustained by rational action and one sustained through reflexive self-regulation on behalf of actors is difficult to identify purely through observation because the outcomes in the form of patterned behaviour over time is identical. However, the distinction between rational and reflexive behaviour on the part of actors within the international system is of crucial importance for the way in which the composition and dynamics of the system concerned are conceptualised.

In particular, the salient point to recognise at this stage in the argument is that neorealism does indeed have a theory of the state, and specifically a theory of state identify construction and socialisation within the international system. It postulates that states are reflexively aware agents capable of internalising appropriate patterns of behaviour and deploying this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of action. What are initially 'external constraints' on state action are over time internalised and learnt by reflexively aware actors through a processes of socialisation. To appropriate Wendt's language, within the neorealist model, the state is able "1) to have a theoretical understanding (however inaccurate) of its activities, in the sense that it could supply reasons for its behaviour; 2) to reflexively monitor ... its behaviour; and 3) to make decisions" (Wendt, 1987, p.359). Wendt himself explicitly accepts the view that neorealism presents a rationalist model of the international system, drawing on Keohane's seminal article outlining rationalist and reflectivist approaches to substantiate this point (Wendt, 1992:391, see especially fn 2). However, it is interesting to note that more recently Wendt *et al* have explicitly acknowledged that "Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he acknowledged that anarchic structures tend to produce like units" (Wendt *et al*, 1996:34). Wendt *et al* do go on to make a valid qualification of this assertion by pointing out that that whilst "Waltz allows for what he calls 'socialisation' and 'imitation' processes ... he envisions the shaping of the behaviour of *pregiven* actors" (Wendt *et al*, 1996:41). However, it is equally important to recognise that Wendt *et al* are merely drawing attention to the way in which neorealism adopts a positional model of structure in which states are primitive units. The essential point is that in the neorealist model states should be understood as being reflexive rather than rational actors remains, and takes on crucial significance when comparing neorealism to institutionalist and liberal models of the international system.

Tensions in Waltz's account of the relationship between units and structure within the international system become most apparent when the status of neorealism's predictions about the behaviour of states within the international system are scrutinised. At a superficial level, it seems relatively straightforward to arrive at

general statements about the character of the international system that may be associated with Waltz's model. Power for Waltz is "defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities" within the international system (Waltz, 1979: 192). Power is therefore understood in relative rather than absolute terms, relating back to the positional model of structure on which his theory is based. The predominant source of power for states in the international system will be the *relative gains* in terms of actual or potential capabilities to be made in their interactions with other units (Grieco, 1993a; Grieco, 1993b). In terms of neorealism's predictions about the levels and type of institutionalisation that will take place within the international system, Waltz is at pains to point out that the decentralised character of the international system does not mean that it is not ordered in important ways. Instead, anarchy means that "patterns emerge and endure without anyone arranging the parts to form patterns or striving to maintain them" (Waltz, 1979:77). Waltz anticipates that patterns of behaviour that take place in the international system will converge around a balance of power equilibrium. For Waltz, therefore, the international system becomes 'institutionalised' around the balance of power. He notes that "(i)nternational organisations do exist, and in ever growing numbers. Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either themselves acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states, or they soon reveal their inability at act in important ways except with the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the principle states concerned and the matters at hand" (Waltz, 1979:88). Levels of institutionalisation occurring above and beyond the balance of power will therefore be limited. The existence of any effective international organisations will ultimately be contingent on shifting distributions of power between states within the structure provided by international anarchy, and it is ultimately for this reason that international politics is merely "flecked with particles of government" (Waltz, 1979:114).

However in the light of recent debates over the status of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy, it is becoming increasingly clear that neorealism is fundamentally ambiguous about the extent to which international structure will determine international behaviour and outcomes. Waltz is insistent that neorealism represents a theory of international politics which operates at a structural level of analysis, rather

than as a theory of foreign policy which offers predictions about the determinate behaviour of units within the international system (Waltz, 1996). Yet, as Elman has noted, this leaves the status of any predictions about the behaviour of states made by neorealism open to question. He identifies that Waltz has himself used neorealism to both explain the foreign policy behaviour of particular states, and make specific predictions about the behaviour of others. Elman makes the point that "(n)eorealists who believe that their theories are unable to make foreign policy predictions should stop making them" (Elman, 1996a:10-11; Elman, 1996b:60). However, Elman simultaneously cautions that "refraining from making such predictions would diminish neorealism's usefulness considerably" (Elman, 1996b:60). If, as Waltz asserts, international political theory can explain states' behaviour only when external pressures come to dominate the internal disposition of states (Waltz, 1996:57) then the key question faced by international relations analysts becomes how to explain the *variation* in the influence of system structure upon outcomes over time. There are therefore fundamental ambiguities about the nature of the predictions neorealism makes about the behaviour of states in the international system that may be traced to its inability to specify clearly the relative influence of unit and structure over the foreign policy behaviour over time.

In summary, three aspects of the neorealist model of the international system have been highlighted. First, the neorealist model develops a positional model of structure, and as such it takes on an essentially reproductive rather than a transformative logic. Second, the neorealist model is not, as is widely supposed, committed to the assumption that states are rational actors. Instead, neorealism relies on the generative consequences of international anarchy in combination with the idea that units are reflexive agents which behave knowledgeably in relation to the complex environments in which they operate. Thus it is important to acknowledge that neorealism does have a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system, albeit that these processes are understood as occurring within a pre-given set of structural parameters. Thirdly, neorealism predicts that power in the international system resides in relative gains from inter-state interaction. Under these conditions, levels of institutionalisation in the international system will be low, and

that the behaviour of states will become 'institutionalised' around the balance of power. However, it is also important to recognise that due to the tensions between neorealism's conceptualisation of unit-structure relations introduced by Waltz's acceptance of the notion that international anarchy is not fully generative, the neorealist model is fundamentally ambiguous about the status of its predictions about international behaviour and outcomes within the international system.

The Institutionalist Model

The key variable identified by the institutionalist model is the configuration of information and institutions within the international system. By focusing on the systemic impact of information and institutions, institutionalists seek to demonstrate that international co-operation is possible from the same set of core assumptions about the nature of the international system as neorealism. Institutionalist theory therefore purports to accept neorealist assertions about the nature of international anarchy, and to share in common with neorealism the assumption that states behave rationally. The essence of the institutionalist argument is therefore that neorealism's conclusions do not follow from its premises.

Institutionalists purport to accept neorealist claims about the structure of international anarchy for patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the international system. Keohane asserts that his analysis of international relations "begins at the systemic level because I believe that the behaviour of states ... is strongly affected by the constraints and incentives provided by the international environment" (Keohane, 1984:26). However, as well as international anarchy, institutionalists also stress the importance of interdependence between states in the international system. Here institutionalists build on the research into the effects of interdependence on international relations engaged in by Keohane and Nye during the 1970's. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as a situation of mutual dependence or situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries (Keohane and Nye, 1989:8). They developed the idea that, under a situation they referred to as complex interdependence, the existence of multiple channels of

communication and high level of information flows between advanced industrial states led to relationships between them from which they could potentially benefit mutually (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 23-37). Thus, whilst accepting the significance of international anarchy, instititutionalists' analysis of the prospects for international co-opertion also assumes that there are extensive common interests amongst certain types of states (Keohane, 1984:6).

Keohane suggests that game theory can be useful when understanding the difficulties posed by the problem of international anarchy for cooperation between advanced industrial states. According to Keohane, such a situation can be modelled by the game known as Prisoner's Dilemma in which two participants in a game could benefit from cooperation but fail to do so due to the patterns of incentives generated by the structure of strategic interaction that exists between them (Keohane, 1984:68). That is to say, institutionalists draw upon game theory to model a possible situation compatible with neorealism in which the structure of international anarchy generates a collective action problem even in situations where parties can benefit mutually through co-operation. In making the claim that it is theoretically valid for relations between states in the international system to be modelled in terms of a Prisoner's Dilemma, institutionalists "concede to neorealists the causal powers of anarchic structure" (Wendt, 1992:392). As with neorealists, institutionalists are engaged in problem solving theory rather than critical theory because they offer only an internal rather than an external critique of neorealism's logic (Powell, 1994:329). Institutionalism concentrates on system process, understood in terms of allocative and bargaining behaviour within a given power structure (Keohane and Nye, 1989:21). However, because insitiutionalists "lack a ... theory of how ... (systemic transformation) occurs ... (they) must privilege realist insights about structure while advancing their own insights about process" (Wendt, 1992:393).

Nevertheless, having asserted that Prisoner's Dilemma is an appropriate model for theorising relations between advanced industrial states, institutionalists go on to build their critique of the neorealist model of international relations. As has been noted, institutionalists adopt a particular interpretation of neorealism in which the state is

regarded as a rational actor. Drawing on theories of rational choice, Keohane suggests that whether or not defection is the dominant strategy within a Prisoner's Dilemma depends on the number of times the game is played. If the game is played once or only a small number of times, defection will be the dominant strategy for rational egoists. However, if the game is played iteratively by the same players, cooperation between the participants can rationally emerge if the participants value future rewards (Keohane, 1984:75). The reasoning behind this is that the iterative playing of the game generates a shadow of the future, such that "(t)he more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less incentive to defect today - since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow" (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993:91). Thus within an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation will rationally emerge through a strategy of 'tit-for-tat' between egoists (Keohane, 1984:76). Cooperation between states becomes institutionalised around norms of what Keohane refers to as *specific reciprocity*, in which "specified partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence" (Keohane, 1989b:134). Having made these claims, Keohane goes on to suggest that iterated rather than single play Prisoner's Dilemma is the more appropriate model for understanding the routine conduct of diplomacy between advanced industrial states. This is because negotiations between these states on issues of mutual concern "take place continuously and are expected to continue indefinitely into the future" (Keohane, 1984:76).

Keohane also holds that international regimes can play a functional role in facilitating cooperation among states which act as rational egoists. International regimes are conventionally defined as "sets of implicit or explicit sets of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983a:2). Keohane suggests that although regimes do not substitute for reciprocity, they can play an important role in encouraging states to engage in this behaviour (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993:110). To demonstrate this, he draws on economic theory to develop the insights of the Coase Theorem when applied to what he refers to as 'political market failure' (Keohane, 1984:84-88). The Coase Theorem suggests that the externalities leading to market failure can be dealt with in the absence of a central authority if there is a legal

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

framework establishing liability for actions, perfect information, and zero transactions costs. In international politics, none of these situations holds, leading to 'political market failure' in the form of the collective action problems faced by states under international anarchy. However, Keohane suggests that international regimes can be functional for states seeking to cooperate for mutual gains for two principle reasons. First they can reduce the transactions costs of coming to an agreement, for example, by making it cheaper for governments to get together to negotiate agreements (Keohane, 1984:90). Second, regimes can help reduce uncertainties by providing information which shape states' expectations of future behaviour in a number of important ways. For example regimes can reduce asymmetries in information, by helping states insure compliance, raising the costs of deception and irresponsibility (Keohane, 1984:97). This does imply that regimes will be difficult to create, since under international anarchy it is difficult for states to establish legal liability for states through regimes (Keohane, 1984:89). However, once brought into existence (for instance, by a hegemonic power) they will be functional for states and will therefore tend to endure (Keohane, 1984:100-101). Thus regimes may rationally persist even when structural conditions within the international system change. Keohane goes on to explore the implications of relaxing the assumption of rationality by examining the implications of assuming 'bounded rationality' (Keohane, 1984:110-120). He also discusses the possibility of limited redefinitions of actor interests away from pure egoism (Keohane, 1984:120-130). However, he qualifies this by recognising the move away from the assumption of rational egoism takes his analysis beyond the functional theory of regimes he has set out (Keohane, 1984:132). Thus it is important to recognise that Keohane's functional theory of regimes never abandons the assumption that states behave as rational actors, and indeed *requires* this assumption in order that it can be seen as progressively expanding neorealism's explanatory power.

It is important to acknowledge that institutionalism's commitment to the assumption that states are rational actors has important theoretical implications for how it conceptualises the composition and dynamics of the international system. In particular, *institutionalism does not, and indeed cannot, provide a theory of state identity formation within the international system*. Keohane explicitly acknowledges

that "rationalists theories contain no endogenous dynamic. Individual and social reflection leading to changes in preferences or in views of causality ... are ignored. That is preferences are assumed to be fixed" (Keohane, 1989c:171). This commitment to a rational choice framework makes institutionalist theory highly distinctive from both neorealist and liberal models of the international system. As has been explained, neorealism does make an attempt to provide a theory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system and as such adopts a view of the state as a reflexive rather than a rational actor. Similarly, whilst institutionalism shares with liberalism a concern with explaining the formation of international institutions and regimes, unlike a liberal model of the international system, it allocates no role in this process for the importance of cognitive human characteristics such as the capability for autonomous self-reflection and choice, intentionality and the possibility of social learning for world politics (Keohane, 1989c:168-170). Instead, states simply respond mechanistically to functional incentives to cooperate.[1] It is on the basis of these tensions in institutionalists' analysis of international institutions that Moravcsik argues that functional regime theory, referred to by Keohane himself as neoliberal institutionalism or simply as neoliberalism is *not* properly a liberal theory of international relations (Moravcsik; 1997: 536-537). Wendt makes the same point when he distinguishes institutionalism's "weak liberalism" which brackets processes of interest and identity formation, and "strong liberalism" which encompasses insights about learning and cognition (Wendt, 1992: 393-394). Indeed, Keohane explicitly concedes the validity of such arguments when he notes that "(I)n view of the links between insititutionalist thinking and both liberalism and realism, I now prefer the simple appellation 'institutionalist' to 'neoliberal institutionalist' or 'liberal institutionalist'" (Keohane, 1993b:298 fn 3).

---

[1]It might be suggested that the institutionalist model can be re-read to contain a reflexive dimension because of the iterative nature of the games it assumes are played by actors. In particular, institutionalism assumes that actors value future rewards, and this could be understood as a form of ability to acquire knowledge and reflexive awareness. However, it is important to recognise that the knowledge of actors in the institutionalist account is given by assumption, such that they merely respond to patterns of incentives generated in their external environment. It makes no assertions about their basic identity as actors because their knowledge is not *internalised* through a process of socialisation. Thus the iterative games played by actors in the institutionalist model does not require them to behave reflexively and engage in learning. Instead actors merely respond mechanistically to external incentives.

Nevertheless, despite the potential tensions in its analysis of international institutions, the institutionalist model of the international system does make relatively clear predictions about both the sources of power for states, and the level and type of institutionalisation expected within the international system. The predominant source of power for states in the international system, at least where relations are conducted in the context of complex interdependence, will be the *absolute gains* to be made through states' functional incentives to co-operate (Baldwin, 1993:5-6). Keohane and others have accepted that pursuit of absolute gains is to some extent conditional, and there are debates about the precise nature of these conditions (Keohane, 1993:278-283; see also Powell, 1993). However, Keohane is clear that institutionalism's focus on absolute gains constitutes a key prediction that may be tested against patterns of behaviour in the emerging international system (Keohane, 1993: 284-291). Institutionalisation is likely to take place between advanced industrialised states only, where there are strong potential incentives to cooperate. Where patterns of interdependence between states are poorly developed and/or highly asymmetrical, potential incentives to cooperate will be weaker and regimes will tend not to form in the absence of a hegemon. The type of institutionalisation expected will be that which is organised around norms of specific reciprocity, reflecting states rational incentives to cooperate to receive mutual benefits on a tit-for-tat basis. Finally, the level of institutionalisation expected by institutionalists under conditions of complex interdependence is best described as moderate or between advanced industrial states only. This is in contrast to both the comparatively low level of institutionalisation predicted by neorealism and the comparatively high level of institutionalisation expected by liberalism in a late stage of development of the international system (see below).

In summary, three aspects of the insititutionalist model of the international system have been highlighted. First, like neorealism insititutionalism takes on an essentially reproductive rather than a transformative logic. Second, unlike neorealism, institutionalism is committed to the assumption that states behave as rational actors. As such it lacks a theory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system. Finally, institutionalists predict that the predominant source of

power in the international system will be the absolute gains they can make from international cooperation, that the level of institutionalisation in the international system will be moderate (between advanced industrial states only), and that the type of institutionalisation that will occur will be organised around norms of specific reciprocity.

The Liberal Model

The key variable in explaining international behaviour and outcomes identified in the liberal model of the international system is variation in the configuration of state preferences (Moravcsik, 1997:513). State preferences are defined as fundamental social purposes which provide the basis for the strategic calculations made by governments (Moravcsik, 1997:513). Preferences may be understood as reflecting an underlying political identity derived from sets of domestic political values and ideas, commercial/economic interests and political institutions (Morvacsik, 1997:524-533). However, liberalism's stress on the importance of states' preferences in determining international outcomes should not be understood as undermining its ability to account for the impact of international anarchy for state behaviour. Indeed, one of the distinctive features of the liberal model is that it develops a theory of state identity construction within the international system based on a very particular view of the nature and long term effects of the structure provided by international anarchy.

A liberal theory of international relations builds upon the insights of constructivism, a point which has been acknowledged by advocates of both these theoretical persuasions (Wendt, 1992:394; Moravcsik, 1997:539-540). In particular, liberalism adopts what the prominent constructivist David Dessler refers to as a transformational model of structure (Dessler 1989:452-454). Within a transformational model of structure, the dynamics of the international system can push it towards fundamental change rather than simple reproduction. A transformational model of structure requires a very particular conceptualisation of the mechanisms through which the international system is constituted. In the transformational model units and structures "are understood as "'codetermined' or 'mutually constituted' entities" which are of

equal and irreducible ontological status (Wendt, 1987:339). Structures exist "only through the medium of the agents and practices they constitute" (Wendt, 1987:360). Thus structure is conceptualised as enabling as well as constraining and as internal to actors rather than external to them because "state action is possible only if there exist the instruments through which that action can in fact be carried out" (Dessler, 1989:453). Thus in the transformational model, structure is viewed as more than simply an arrangement of actors. Rather, anarchy is conceptualised as a set of *rules and resources* which are continuously and recursively drawn upon by units in an ongoing process of development and change within the international system. In this context, rules refer to frameworks of meaning and resources to physical attributes through which units communicate with one another (Dessler, 1989:452-454). Thus the ontological status of international anarchy in a liberal theory of international politics differs fundamentally from neorealist and institutionalist models.

The implications of liberalism's adoption of a transformational model of structure are two fold. First, liberalism is not necessarily committed to a narrowly state-centric view of the international system. If structure is viewed purely as an arrangement of actors as in the positional model, the broad historical context within which units operate is not relevant to its characteristics. By contrast, if structure is viewed as a set of rules and resources drawn upon recursively by units in an ongoing process of historical change, then the social, economic and political characteristics of the units become important for the overall trajectory of development produced in and through the structural effects generated by the system as a whole. As Moravcsik notes, in contrast to neorealism and institutionalism, the view of system structure adopted by a liberal model of the international system "forges a direct causal link between economic, political and social change and state behaviour in world politics" (Moravcsik, 1997:535). In particular, liberalism stresses the significance of modernity in terms of the development of world society for overall patterns of change within the international system. Thus "(o)ver the modern period the principles of international order have been decreasingly linked to dynastic legitimacy and increasingly tied to factors directly drawn from ... liberal theory" in the form of sets of domestic political values and ideas, commercial/economic interests and political institutions compatible

with liberal state preferences (Moravcsik, 1997:535). Liberalism's conceptualisation of structure in terms of rules and resources means that it adopts an inherently 'critical' approach to international anarchy.

Second, liberalism's view of structure as rules and resources allows it to adopt a view of anarchy which is, in principle, always potentially open to transformation by the actors which constitute it. As Wendt remarks, "social structures are only instantiated by the practices of agents. The deep structure of the states system, for example, only exists in virtue of the recognition of certain rules and the performance of certain practices by states" (Wendt, 1987:359). However, a liberal theory of international relations also goes beyond the constructivist view that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). As Huntley identifies, it also specifies a set of determinate historical and sociological dynamics which encourage the emergence and perpetuation of these tendencies in the form of the long term effects of competition and socialisation within the international system (Huntley, 1996:57-62). Liberalism's conceptualisation of the mechanisms through which the international system is constituted can be represented as set out in the matrix in Figure 1 below. The top left box of the matrix represents an international system which is constituted along the lines suggested by neorealism, whereby the structure of international anarchy results in its simple reproduction. Within this model, units within the system have limited discretionary power because regardless of their intentions outcomes will remain confined to relatively limited ranges. The bottom left box of the matrix represents an international system in which the structure of international anarchy has generated *unintended consequences* which have acted to encourage system transformation through competition and socialisation processes. For example, Huntley discusses the ways in which liberal states will tend to outperform non-liberal states in long term competition, and similarly identifies liberal states' capacity to be trusted as casting a long 'shadow of the future' effect, thereby unwittingly socialising them to the liberal peace (Huntley, 1996:57-58).

Figure 1: System Composition and Dynamics

	Unintended consequences	**Intended consequences**
System Reproduction	Neorealism	XXXXXX (Fundamentalism)
System Transformation	Liberalism 1 Unintended consequences arising from anarchic structure	Liberalism 2 Arising from conscious agency and choice - '*cultural change*'

↔

INTERACTION
(Reflexive component of system organisation)

Thus Huntley identifies important ways in which within the liberal model of the international system, anarchy is "'both a constraining and dispensing force' and a force for transformation and progress" (Huntley, 1996: 61). As Moravcsik suggests, liberalism provides a framework able to provide an explanatory account of systemic level transformations which complements constructivist insights concerning the ontological status of anarchy in international relations theory (Moravcsik, 1997:540). Liberalism therefore both draws upon and moves beyond the claim of constructivists that "there is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another" (Wendt, 1992: 395). In this sense, a liberal theory of international relations has affinities with neorealism in as much as anarchy is viewed as having important *generative* consequences. Yet, unlike the neorealist model, liberalism "is able to offer a conception of structure that accounts for its own transformation" (Huntley, 1996:61). Within the liberal model there is a definite 'logic of anarchy', but rather than this logic being reproductive as neorealists suggest, it is fundamentally transformative.

It is the bottom right hand corner of the matrix, however, which is perhaps the most distinctive element of a liberal model of the international system. It stresses the importance of '*cultural change*' for the operation of competition and socialisation within the international system (see Wendt *et al*, 1996). Unlike the unintended effects of international anarchy, cultural change involves conscious human agency and intentional choice, and as such is crucially important at the margins. This draws attention to the ways in which the liberal model understands competition and socialisation in the international system as operating at least partly through the *dynamic interplay* of state agency or action and anarchic structure. Competition and socialisation cannot be considered unit level phenomenon because they operate at least partly through the unintended effects generated by international anarchy, thus imbuing them with a systemic quality. Yet nor can they be considered purely as the unintended outcome of the structure provided by international anarchy because at the margins of system change states' intentions are crucially important. As liberal culture expands globally, states' conscious and intentional choices reinforce the already powerful long term unintended effects of competition and socialisation which push states towards the adoption of liberal norms of behaviour. This process will continue until a genuinely stable *equilibrium* has been reached as the ideal of peaceful federation of liberal democratic states on a global scale is approximated. It is therefore the bottom right hand box of the matrix which draws out the full implications of liberalism's reliance on a transformational model of structure for its understanding of system composition and dynamics. The role played by cultural change within the liberal model of international relations means that although it adopts the same modalities of system reproduction suggested by neorealism - competition, socialisation and equilibrium - it nevertheless understands these central characteristics in very different terms.

The special place that cultural change has in liberalism's conceptualisation of competition and socialisation processes draws attention to important differences and similarities it has with other theories of the international system. The liberal model's most distinctive feature is that it adopts a more differentiated view of the composition

of the international system than that adopted by neorealism and institutionalism. Whilst neorealism focuses primarily on the effects of structure and institutionalism primarily on the effects of process, liberalism's analysis of system composition and dynamics requires a focus on unit-structure *interaction* within the international system. Liberalism suggests that an international system is not necessarily defined and constituted within limits tightly set by its structure. Instead, it is the *reflexive component of system organisation* - the interaction of states' intentional choices with the long term unintended consequences of anarchic structure - which is of greater overall historical significance for the trajectory of the international system. Nevertheless, important parallels between the neorealist and liberal theories of the international system remain which set them apart from institutionalism. First, unlike insititutionalism but like neorealism, liberalism offers a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system which is directly related to its conception of the generative effects of international anarchy. As Huntley identifies, the liberal model parallels neorealism in as much as there are powerful "homogenising" influences within the international system in which "competition and socialisation ... (work) dynamically, promoting convergence towards the rule of law" both within and between states (Huntley, 1996:57 and 59). Second, because of their shared reliance upon the socialisation of units to conceptualise dynamics within the international system, liberalism shares with neorealism a conception of the state as a reflexive rather than a rational actor. This is because units' abilities to be 'socialised' presuppose their ability to internalise appropriate patterns of behaviour and deploying this understanding knowledgeably in contexts of action. Unlike neorealism, state identity is not shaped within pregiven parameters because the model of structure adopted by a liberal theory of international relations is essentially transformative. Indeed, within the liberal model the ability of actors to engage reflexively with the international environment is critical to the process of cultural change which drives systemic transformation. However, differences between neorealism and liberalism in terms of their conceptualisation of the fundamental nature and long term consequences of anarchy should not detract from their shared view of the state as a knowledgeable, reflexive agent.

Moravcsik makes the argument that a liberal model of international relations relies on the assumption that states are comprised of aggregates of individuals and groups which are "on the average rational", citing the authority of Kant on this issue (Moravcsik, 1997:516 and 517 fn 7). Such a claim would seem to indicate that liberalism shares with institutionalism a commitment to the assumption of actor rationality. The validity of this claim, however, is dependent upon the precise definition of 'rationality' Moravcsik adopts. His conception of rationality, however, is ambiguous given the lack of any clear definition of this term within his paper. If by 'rationality' Moravcsik means the ability to rank preferences whilst making *a priori* assumptions about actor identity in the manner suggested by institutionalists, this is incompatible with a liberal model of international relations. As has been identified, a liberal model of the international system is oriented towards providing an account of the socialisation of agents through a process of learning involving cultural change. By contrast, if Moravcsik's understanding of 'rationality' refers to the ability of agents to reason autonomously about the conditions under which they interact with others through the use of their cognitive faculties, this is a position compatible with a liberal model of international relations. However, such behaviour is more usefully depicted as reflexive rather than rational for two related reasons. First, it draws attention to the way in which, within the liberal model, the state is viewed as an *agent* rather than merely as an object which responds mechanistically to patterns of incentives provided by an external environment. This becomes particularly important in providing a theoretical explanation for the possibility of 'fundamentalist' behaviour, as is discussed below. Second, it draws attention to the clear distinction which must be drawn between the conception of the state offered by the institutionalist and liberal models of international relations. In consequence, it also highlights important differences between institutionalism and liberalism in terms of their conceptualisation of mechanisms through which the international system is constituted.

Liberalism's stress on the importance of the reflexive component of system organisation allows it to identify the ways in which competition and socialisation encourage the expansion of a 'Pacific Federation' of liberal states in a dynamic way through recursivity effects within the international system. That is to say, the systemic

forces of competition and socialisation generate a strong, "dialectical 'causal loop'" of self-reinforcing positive feedback (Huntley, 1996:59). This feedback loop furthers systemic incentives towards further changes in state identity conducive to continued progressive change within the international system. As positive feedback gathers historical momentum within the international system through recursivity effects, the international system will come to embody higher and higher levels of reflexiv*ity*. That is to say, the socialisation effects generated by the liberal core encourage states at the margins of change to adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn feeds back into the properties of the system by strengthening the liberal core. Within an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity, units within the international system will acquire a high degree of *autonomy of action* in as much as the underlying political identity their foreign policy preferences reflects will become critically important to the determination of systemic outcomes. Under these conditions, liberalism's focus on state preferences as the key variable affecting state behaviour allows it to make predictions about the behaviour of states which fall outside the ranges provided by either neorealist or institutionalist international relations theory. In particular, liberalism stresses that it is the *configuration* of state preferences which is the important factor in explaining patterns of international behaviour and outcomes (Moravcsik, 1997: 523). Liberalism suggests that under circumstances where states do acquire a high capacity for autonomous action, patterns of behaviour within the international system become determined through a process of "strategic interaction" between states' different political preferences. Thus "the expected behaviour of any single state .... reflect not simply its own preferences, but the configuration of *all* states linked by patterns of significant policy interdependence" (Moravcsik, 1997:523; also 545 for use of term, 'strategic interaction').

It is important to recognise that a system in which levels of reflexivity is high also opens up the possibility that states which persistently articulate a non-liberal identity within the international system will rekindle the tendency of international anarchy towards conflict and violence. At this stage of development of the international system, the top right hand corner of the matrix in Figure 1 above also becomes

important to the determination of outcomes within the liberal model. It is possible to identify such behaviour as being *fundamentalist* in origin. It persists, even though the state concerned will be severely punished by the dominant liberal core, and may even risk elimination as a serious actor within the system. That is to say, the behaviour represents a response to the high levels of autonomy acquired by actors rather than being determined by structures of constraint as might be suggested by neorealism. Such behaviour is beyond theoretical explanation by rationalist models, since only actors capable of persistently *failing* to internalise a liberal-cosmopolitan political identity in the face of a plurality of possible options are capable of fundamentalist behaviour. Moreover, it is also the case that fundamentalist behaviour can be important for explaining overall patterns of behaviour and outcomes within the international system. In particular, fundamentalist behaviour has the effect of pushing the international system away from transformation and back towards simple reproduction. As Moravcsik points out, "socialisation towards convergent norms stem from convergent domestic institutions and ideas. Liberal institutions and norms may be particularly conducive to the promotion of peace and co-operation, but the argument also implies that the convergence of *nonliberal values* ... may also have significant effects" (Moravcsik, 1997:540, authors emphasis). The possibility of fundamentalist behaviour on behalf of units within the international system therefore draws attention to the explanatory importance of conceptualising the state as knowledgeable and reflexive rather than as a rational actor.

Related to its conception of system composition and dynamics, a liberal theory of international relations also develops an associated understanding of the nature of *power* for states within the international system (Moravcsik, 1997:523). In an international system where levels of reflexivity are high, the autonomy of action acquired by states means that information about their underlying strategic intentions is the critical factor in the determination of behaviour and outcomes. Under these circumstances, being *transparent* about their foreign policy preferences becomes a highly effective way for states to influence the overall trajectory of international change. In particular, clearly conveying preferences reflecting a benign set of strategic intentions to other states will allow them to establish their relations with others on the

basis of *trust*. Trust between states may be identified as a form of institutionalisation within the international system, and more specifically reflects norms of what Keohane refers to as *diffuse reciprocity*. In contrast to specific reciprocity, diffuse reciprocity does not depend on exchanging items of equivalence in delimited sequence, but rather upon meeting obligations by "conforming to generally accepted standards of behaviour" (Keohane, 1989b: 134). Neorealism suggests, and institutionalism accepts, that the anarchic nature of the international system inherently tends to breed mistrust between states, regardless of their intentions towards one another, thereby placing important constraints on the ranges within which patterns of interaction within the international system can occur. By contrast, the liberal model of the international system counters this argument by suggesting that when levels of reflexivity in the international system are high, trust becomes the predominant source of power for states within the international system.

Here, liberalism may again draw fruitfully upon constructivist insights. Sustaining the trust of others allows states to establish a basis for common action with other states based upon "feelings of *solidarity*, *community*, and *loyalty* and thus for collective definitions of interest" (Wendt, 1994: 386, emphasis added). Keohane notes that in relations characterised by norms of diffuse reciprocity, actors contribute their share or behave well towards others "not because of ensuing rewards form specific actors, but in the interest of continuing satisfactory overall results for the group of which one is a part, as a whole" (Keohane, 1989b: 146). He recognises that "such norms need not imply altruism ... (but) can consist of standards of behaviour which are widely regarded as legitimate; they do not necessarily embody ethical principles that override self-interest" (Keohane, 1989b: 147)[2]. Wendt, however, goes further in identifying the way in which collective definitions of interest - or what he refers to as a collective identity - can act as a positive source of power for states. He notes that acting on the basis of interests derived from a collective identity "does not mean that actors are

---

[2] There are strong potential linkages here with the analysis of legitimacy and community in international society provided by the English School of international relations. As Hurrell notes in his discussion of regime theory from an international society perspective, "the status of the norm of reciprocity (within rationalist approaches) raises serious difficulties. It is seen as an ahistorical and acultural norm ... . But there is a powerful argument that its functioning depend on a pre-existing sense

irrational or no longer calculate costs and benefits but, rather, that they do so on a higher level of social aggregation. This discourages free riding by increasing diffuse reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives" (Wendt, 1994:386). For example, Wendt argues that collective identity can form an important basis for "states to make commitments to multilateral action against non-specific threat ... (by) providing an important foundation for it by increasing the willingness to act on 'generalised principles of conduct' and diffuse reciprocity" (Wendt, 1994: 386). Overall, therefore, liberalism suggests that when levels of reflexivity in the international system are high, sustaining the trust of others is a source of power for states in the sense that it allows states to act in ways which they would not otherwise be able to. In particular, states will be able to form more deeply institutionalised ties with one another than neorealism and institutionalism predict is likely or even possible.

It is extremely important to distinguish between the type of information flow stressed by liberalism, and the kinds of information flow identified as theoretically significant by institutionalists. If a state's strategic preferences are benign, transparency helps promote trust between states, a form of diffuse reciprocity proving a basis for collective identity and solidarity founded on mutual obligations. This is the type of information flow stressed by liberalism. By contrast, Keohane is clear that the type of information flow stressed by institutionalism's theory of regimes promotes and facilitates only specific reciprocity. The information exchanged between the actors does not relate to their underlying strategic intentions towards one another, but rather reflects a process of strategic bargaining for tit-for-tat exchange. Thus the type of information flow represented by transparency about underlying intentions is beyond theoretical explanation by a functional theory of regimes. This distinction is important to draw attention to for two reasons. First, it highlights the primacy of state preferences as the key variable in the liberal model, in contrast to institutionalism's focus purely on non-preference related information as a factor influencing state behaviour. Second, the distinction is of fundamental theoretical significance, and yet

---

of community, or at least that it is itself reflective of that community. And the more that reciprocity becomes generalised and diffuse, the more it tends to be synonymous with fairness" (Hurrell, 1993:68).

has been glossed over in the debates between neorealists and institutionalists. In his summary of these debates, for example, Baldwin identifies 'intentions versus capabilities' as one of six key "focal points" for discussion between these schools of thought (Baldwin, 1993:7-8 and 4). However, the inclusion of this focal point perhaps more accurately reflect institutionalists' tendencies to hold personal sympathies for liberal arguments about the nature of the international system rather than being derived logically from institutionalist theory.

Related to its predictions about the sources of power for states in the international system when levels of reflexivity are high, liberalism also provides predictions about the levels and type of institutionalisation which will take place between states under these conditions. Liberalism predicts that in an international system in the late or mature stages of development, levels of institutionalisation will be high in contrast to the moderate and low levels of institutionalisation predicted by institutionalism and neorealism respectively. They suggest that states can begin to challenge the uncertainty and mistrust they, along with neorealists, assume is necessarily a feature of an anarchic international system. Furthermore, contrary to institutionalism which holds that states incentives to institutionalise their behaviour will be strongest between advanced industrialised states because only these types of relations may be modelled in terms of a Prisoner's Dilemma, liberalism suggests that states' incentives to institutionalise aspects of their behaviour will be strongest at the *margins* of change within an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity. States within the core which have already engaged in cultural change face relatively low incentives to become socialised to the system's dominant norms since they have already internalised them. Peaceful relations between these states emerge as an unintended consequence of the structure of the interaction between their shared political identities. It is therefore *between* the core and the periphery in the international system that socialisation effects generated by the system as a whole operate most powerfully within the liberal model. Whilst these states may be formally non-liberal, they face intense systemic pressures to internalise shifts in their political identity compatible within the overall trajectory of international change. A liberal theory of international relations predicts not only higher absolute levels of

institutionalisation within the international system than insititutionalism - it also suggests that there will be higher levels of institutionalisation at the margins of system change.

In terms of the type of institutionalisation predicted, liberalism suggests that, under conditions in which levels of reflexivity in the international system are high, relations between states will become organised around norms of diffuse reciprocity. The global international system at this stage in development will be overwhelmingly dominated by a security community of liberal democratic states. Relationships between states within such an international system will be increasingly conducted on the basis of trust. This has important implications for the form of relations between states. In particular, it implies that states will begin to *negotiate and sustain their relationships on the basis of mutual independence, and thereby in terms of equality between partners*. This follows by logical extension from Keohane's definition of the general concept of reciprocity. Keohane suggests that both specific and diffuse reciprocity share two core features. First reciprocity implies contingency because it involves conditional action. Second, reciprocity implies at least a rough equivalence of benefits. Within specific reciprocity, these features are only weakly developed on a tit for tat basis. However, within diffuse reciprocity these features become more strongly developed. Exchange becomes contingent upon parties taking on *obligations* towards one another on the basis of independent and autonomous choice, such that the relationship becomes a partnership rather thàn merely contractual in nature. In turn, this implies equivalence in the sense that parties to exchange regard these obligations as mutual.

In summary, three aspects of the liberal model of the international system have been highlighted. First, a liberal model of international relations adopts a transformational model of structure in which international anarchy is understood as a set of rules and resources recursively drawn into an ongoing process of development within the international system. Second, liberalism is not committed to the assumption that states are rational actors. Like neorealism, liberalism relies on the generative consequences of anarchy in combination with the idea that units are capable of acting as reflexive

agents. Consequently liberalism provides a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system. Thirdly, liberalism offers a distinctive set of predictions about the international system in a late stage of development. It holds that under these conditions trust will become the dominant source of power for states within the international system. The level of institutionalisation associated with a system in this stage of development will be high (including at the margins of cultural change), and the type of institutionalisation which takes place will be organised around norms of diffuse reciprocity.

Having outlined each of the three models of the international system, Table 1 summarises their central attributes:

Table 1: Summary Of Theoretical Framework

	Key Variable	State-as-actor	Status Of Anarchy	Source of State Power	Level of Institutio-nalisation	Type Of Institution-alisation
Neorealism	Configuration of Capabilities	Reflexive	Reproductive	Relative capabilities	Low	Institutionalisation around balance of power
Institutionalism	Configuration of Information and Institutions	Rational	Reproductive	Functional incentives to cooperate	Moderate (Between core states only)	Specific Reciprocity
Liberalism	Configuration of State Preferences	Reflexive	Transformative	Trust about underlying strategic intentions	High (Including core-periphery margin)	Diffuse Reciprocity

Towards A General Theoretical Synthesis

The final section of this chapter analyses the relationship between neorealist, institutionalist and liberal theories of the international system outlined and the prospects for a general synthesis between them. The discussion shall be framed around a comparison of what shall be referred to as the 'linear' and the 'triangular' conceptualisations of the relationship between the three theories. Each of these competing conceptualisations of the relationship between the three models under

discussion suggest the possibility of a synthesis of competing theories of the international system. However, they differ over the issue of the terms on which such a synthesis can be achieved. In turn, this has important implications for the content of substantive research programmes within the discipline of international relations after the Cold War.

Prominent institutionalists have characterised institutionalism as a school of thought in terms of a 'mid-point' between the two extremes of neorealism and liberalism. According to Keohane, neorealism's central characteristic is its stress on the importance of system structure for determining international behaviour and outcomes (Keohane, 1989a:7-8). Its approach is a rationalist one which makes the assumption that state preferences are exogenous to the explanation of international behaviour and outcomes (Keohane, 1989c:160). By contrast, liberalism "stresses the role of human created institutions in affecting how aggregations of individuals make collective decisions. It emphasises the importance of changeable political processes rather than simply of immutable structures, and it rests on a belief in at least the possibility of cumulative progress in human affairs" (Keohane, 1989a:10). Liberalism is reflectivist in as much as it emphasises "the importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics". As such it is essentially hermeneutic or interpretative in orientation (Keohane, 1989c: 161). On the basis of these arguments, Keohane arrives at the conclusion that "institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles that eschews determinism and that emphasises the pervasive significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state power" (Keohane, 1989a:11). Understood in these terms, institutionalism is uniquely positioned to draw upon and incorporate the strongest elements of neorealism and liberalism into its own analysis.

Keohane's analysis implies what shall be referred to as a 'linear' conceptualisation of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism. In this view, institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism as depicted in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: The Linear Model

NR ——————— I ——————— L

Rationalism Reflectivism

A linear conceptualisation of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism suggests the intuitively plausible argument that neorealism is closer to institutionalism in terms of its understanding of the composition and dynamics of the international system than are neorealism and liberalism. On the basis of the understanding of neorealism he adopts, Keohane reasons that neorealism and institutionalism share a rationalistic approach to international relations theory (Keohane, 1989c:160). By contrast, although institutionalism and liberalism have a common concern with the origins and persistence of international institutions, their approaches differ in as much as the former is rationalist and the latter is reflectivist in orientation (Keohane, 1989c:171). Thus, on Keohane's account, whilst neorealism and institutionalism share a rationalistic approach to the study of international relations, and institutionalism and liberalism adopt a shared concern with international institutions, neorealism and liberalism have no theoretically significant commonalties.

Keohane's opinions on the nature of the relationship between the different schools of thought in international relations theory have led directly to his assertions on future research within the discipline of international relations. In particular, Keohane's view that only institutionalism allows researchers to provide an adequate account of international institutions leads him to suggest that future research within the field should engage in attempts to refine rationalist models, both conceptually and, more importantly, through empirical research (Keohane, 1989a:12-16). More recently, Keohane has set out the rationalist research programme in more detail. Conceptually, he suggests that debates should focus on the precise conditions under which states will be concerned about relative and absolute gains (Keohane, 1993b: 273-283). Empirically, researchers should seek to test neorealist against institutionalist theory in the context of the emerging post-Cold War international system. Specifically, Keohane argues that Western Europe provides the most fruitful context in which to

test competing rationalist theories of international relations. Here Keohane is responding to the prediction made by the prominent neorealist John Mearsheimer, and echoed by Waltz himself, that a united Germany in the centre of Europe would lead this region 'back to the future' (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz 1993). On the basis of Mearsheimer's argument, Keohane argues that Europe is an area of the world where neorealism and institutionalism develop divergent hypothesises about the nature of international change (Keohane, 199b:272-273). He does qualify his argument with an acknowledgement that the end of the Cold War, a development which was unanticipated by most IR scholars, may suggest that academic debates in international relations theory may have been overtaken by the pace of international change (Keohane, 1993:297). Nevertheless, the thrust of his argument is clear - that attempts to refine rationalist models are likely to demonstrate that insititutionalism provides the most fruitful terrain for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations.

However, it is possible to develop a different conceptualisation of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism as models of the international system which has the implication of challenging Keohane's conclusions. The starting point for this alternative approach is to challenge the institutionalist's interpretation of neorealism as a rationalist model of the international system. As has been highlighted, this assumption both runs explicitly against both the wishes of Waltz, and the logic of neorealist analysis. Instead of making rational actor assumptions, neorealism develops a theory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system arising from the generative consequences of international anarchy. In this sense, neorealism adopts a reflexivist logic and is closer to liberalism than it is to insistitutionalism's rational choice framework. Thus rather than conceiving of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of a linear spectrum, it is more accurate to conceptualise the relationship between the three models in triangular terms. Within such a conceptualisation, debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute the rationalist leg of the triangle because neorealism's commitment to a positional model of structure means that it is potentially amenable to a rationalist interpretation, as insistitutionalists have

attempted to exploit. By contrast, debates between neorealists and liberals about the generative consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of state identity construction and socialisation within the international system constitute the reflexivist leg of the triangle.[3] The triangular model of the relationship between neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system is illustrated in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: The Triangular Model



Such a conceptualisation of the relationship between realism, insititutionalism and liberalism as theories of the international system has important implications for understanding the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights. In particular, it calls into question the validity of insistitutionalists' claims that their own theory provides the strongest basis for subsuming the research programmes of competing approaches. Instead, it suggests that liberalism's focus on the generative consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than institutionalists' attempts to refine the rationalist models. Liberalism's most important characteristic in this regard is the claim that, unlike neorealism, it "provides a plausible theoretical explanation for *variation* in the substantive content of foreign policy" (Moravcsik, 1997:534, emphasis added). Neorealist assumptions about the international system hold when states have certain preferences. A liberal model of

---

[3]The third leg of the triangle identifies the links which exist between institutionalism and liberalism. In particular, both institutionalism and liberalism stress the importance of *institutions* for the constitution of the international system. However, institutionalism and liberalism makes very different assumptions about the fundamental nature of social actors. As such the links which exists between these schools of

international relations invites analysts to scrutinise the conditions under which those preferences are prevalent (Moravcsik, 1997:517). Two such conditions suggest themselves: situations in which levels of reflexivity in the international system are comparatively low due to the long term effects of competition and socialisation being poorly established; and situations in which levels of reflexivity in the international system are comparatively high, but in which states adopt non-liberal fundamentalist political identities in their interactions. This indicates that liberalism offers what Moravcsik refers to as a "*general account of variation in socialisation*" (Moravcsik, 1997:540). It demonstrates that "liberal theory remains important, even primary, even in what are currently considered 'least likely' cases, for example, where there exist direct threats to national security, high levels of interstate conflict and large numbers of non-liberal states" (Moravcsik, 1997:541). Indeed, the ability of a liberal model to offer an account of variation in socialisation within the international system answers the call made by Waltz himself for "a single theory capable of explaining the behaviour of states, their interactions, and international outcomes" (Waltz, 1996:57). In this sense, a liberal model of the international system subsumes the research programme generated by neorealist analysis, and as such satisfies the criteria for theory evaluation against which Waltz himself suggests neorealism should be assessed (see Waltz, 1997: 914).

The account of variation in socialisation offered by a liberal model of systemic dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4 below. Curve A depicts a perfect positive correlation between the level of institutional density within the international system and the contingency of system structure. This illustrates the ways in which levels of institutionalisation will rise as the international system comes to embody higher and higher levels of reflexivity over time. Curve B suggests a possible modification to the basic liberal model which could incorporate some of the insights offered by the institutionalist school of thought. Under the scenario envisaged in Curve B, certain levels of functional interdependence between states are considered a prerequisite to the emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states. Once this point

---

thought are not directly relevant to the overall line of argument being developed by this chapter, and shall not be discussed here.

has been reached (time period t2 below), then the socialisation effects can begin to operate effectively, and levels of institutionalisation will rise more rapidly. The overall trend will thus produce a concave curve such as the one depicted. Thus, as Moravcsik identifies, a liberal model of the international system is unique in terms of its ability to explain "when and why the assumptions about state preferences underlying realism and institutionalism hold, whereas the reverse is not the case" (Moravcsik, 1997:543).

Figure 4



(Adapted from the matrix suggested in Wendt *et. al.*, 1996:38)

The account of variation in socialisation provided by the modified liberal model of the international system illustrated in Curve B in Figure 4 above highlights the significance of a *point of criticality* in a developmental sequence of change in the international system. Criticality may be identified as a point at which a system's emergent properties switch, resulting in a dramatic change in overall patterns of alignment within it (see the terminology adopted by Jervis, 1997:12-17 and 210-252).

The type of system effects envisaged by the liberal model are therefore dramatically different to those envisaged by neorealism. The neorealist model envisages what Jervis refers to as linear system effects, in which negative feedback loops promote stability through homeostatic reproduction and path dependent change. It is for this reason that the structure of international anarchy fixes international behaviour and outcomes within relatively well defined ranges (Jervis, 1997:92-146). By contrast, the system effects envisaged by the liberal model envisage what Jervis refers to as non-linear change or "nonlinearities". Within such a system, "there will be a disproportion between the magnitude of the cause and the results, which will depend on the system as a whole" (Jervis, 1997:146). In particular, after the point of criticality has been reached, what were initially small and insignificant changes within the system can build up and suddenly produce an enormous change in the system's overall characteristics. A simple example from the physical world is provided by the type of spinning top which so designed that, once it spins at above a certain velocity, its centre of gravity shifts so that it flips and spins on what was previously its head. Within the liberal model of the international system, such a point of criticality is provided by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democratic states at a global level at time period t2 on Curve B in Figure 4. Up until this point, the existence of democratic states within the system may have some significant effect on international behaviour and outcomes, but does not result in a fundamental shift in the emergent properties of the system as a whole. After this point, however, the structure of interaction within the system as a whole changes. The socialisation effects generated by the core begin to dramatically transform overall patterns of alignment and change within the entire system.[4]

The most obvious point of historical reference for the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic states is provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. As

---

[4] The overall picture which emerges from this synthetic approach resonates strongly with systemic dynamics envisaged by Buzan in his attempt to render compatible structural realism and regime theory with the insights offered by the English School of international relations theory (Buzan, 1993). Buzan attempts to provide a developmental model of systemic change linking structure, process and interaction as components of system organisation. Furthermore, to achieve this he adopts a critical stance towards conceptualising the relationship between schools of thought often considered distinct in their approaches to international relations. The work of at least one major analyst therefore provides at least one recent precedent for the enterprise engaged in this chapter.

Huntley identifies, "The strikingly rapid collapse of communist ideology and Soviet authority marks an historic threshold" for the development of the international system (Huntley: 1996:67). Liberalism is uniquely positioned to be able to both explain this development, and account for why it might constitute a point of enormous significance for the overall course of historical change in relations between states. First, the liberal model could plausibly suggest that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not only a cause of system change, as suggested by neorealism, but was itself *symptomatic* of overall historical trends within the international system in terms of the long terms effects of competition and socialisation processes. As Huntley argues, "the demise of Soviet Style communism is perfectly compatible with the long term patterns of change in international politics" provided by a liberal understanding of competition and socialisation within the international system (Huntley, 1996: 67). Second, a liberal model of the international system provides a vision of the emerging post-Cold War international order which is "sharply divergent" from the predictions offered by established theoretical frameworks (Huntley, 1996: 62). It is more optimistic about the prospects of a genuinely world-wide Pacific Federation of states, positing the idea that systemic dynamics are pushing in this direction across the globe (Huntley, 1996: 70-72). It suggests that a realistic vision of the world in the twenty-first century is a shift towards the chronic institutionalisation of the international environment around liberal norms. Thus, as Huntley identifies, the "new era of world politics now emerging seems likely to provide telling tests between opposing expectations" of competing theories of international relations (Huntley, 1996:72).

In particular, the general synthesis provided by a liberal model of the international system suggests a very different research programme to that proposed by institutionalists such as Keohane. First, within a European context, the research programme is broader than institutionalists anticipate. Liberalism, as well as neorealism and institutionalism, develops divergent hypotheses regarding the overall nature of change in the post Cold War Europe. As has been identified (see Table 1 above), these hypotheses encompass both the sources of power for states and the levels and type of institutionalisation within the international system. Second, a liberal model of international relations suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal states within the international system has implications which extend *beyond* the confines of Western Europe. Liberalism suggests that this is a development affecting the international system at a truly global level, affecting the overall trajectory of historical development more strongly at the margins of change between the core and the periphery of the international system than within the established core itself. Prominent neorealists have identified China and Japan as emerging Asian powers which are likely to engage in balancing behaviour within this region as part of a more general shift towards global multipolarity (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993). The post Cold War foreign policy behaviour of key East Asian states identified by neorealists provide critical tests for liberalism's predictions about the overall trajectory of change in the post Cold war international system. States such as Japan and China are at the margins of international change in as much as they interact in a regional context in which complex patterns of interdependence are not clearly established, and there are large numbers of formally non-liberal states. As such these cases represent 'least likely' cases for the strong predictions offered by the liberal model. However, even under these conditions, liberalism makes predictions about both the levels and type of institutionalisation and the sources of power between states in the East Asia region which go well beyond what might be anticipated by institutionalists, even compared to institutionalist's predictions about state behaviour within a European context. This suggests that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has much more dramatic implications for research within the discipline than institutionalists anticipate. Indeed, liberalism indicates that the collapse of the Soviet Union ought to be considered a development of truly profound significance for the study of international relations.

In summary, this discussion of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system has revealed that it is possible that prominent institutionalists have fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the relationship between these schools of thought, and in so doing underestimated the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights. Institutionalists have proposed what has been referred to as a linear conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models of the international system discussed. Understood in these terms, attempts to refine rationalist models of

the international system provide the most fruitful research programme for the discipline of international relations, and as such the critical focus of applied research after the Cold War is identified as the West European region. However, it is possible to dispute institutionalists' conclusions by questioning its interpretation of neorealism as a fundamentally rationalistic model of the international system. Instead, neorealism may be interpreted as adopting a reflexive logic in virtue of its focus on the generative consequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system. This implies a triangular conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models in which debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms, liberalism's focus on the generative consequences of international anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialisation within the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than institutionalists' attempts to refine the rationalist approach. This is because of the ability of liberalism to offer a fully generative model of the international system providing an account of variation in socialisation which can subsume the research programme generated by both neorealism and institutionalism. Such conclusions have important implications for substantive research within the discipline, indicating that the collapse of the Soviet Union has much more profound implications for the study of the global international system than institutionalists have indicated. In particular, the foreign policy behaviour of key states in East Asia as well as in a European context will provide critical tests for identifying the overall trajectory of change in post Cold war international relations.

Conclusions

One of the most distinctive features of debates within the discipline of international relations over the 1980's and 1990s has been the attempt to pin down systemic approaches to the field of enquiry. Systemic level theory offers the promise of providing general explanations of recurrent patterns of behaviour in international

politics, and as such potentially provides the discipline as a whole the logical rigour and explanatory insight that its status as a modern social science demands.

However, the debates which have taken place between neorealists and institutionalists have become increasingly unproductive, both theoretically and empirically. Even major contributors to the debate have long recognised it has "tended to obscure rather than clarify", and has become increasingly "sterile" (Powell, 1994:313 and 344). At a theoretical level, the attempt by institutionalists to critique the neorealist model of the international system has encountered important limitations. In particular, institutionalists have proved unable to overcome neorealism's central theoretical propositions about the nature and consequences of international anarchy. Yet it is important to recognise that the reason for this failure is *not* simply that institutionalists' attempts to take on neorealism on its own terms is a fundamentally misconceived endeavour. A more sophisticated approach to identifying the deficiencies of institutionalism is to identify the ways in which it fundamentally mischaracterised the nature of its relationship with both the neorealist and the liberal models of the international system. Institutionalists have developed an uncritical understanding of the relationship between schools of thought within the discipline. Institutionalists adopt a linear model of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism. In this view, institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism and as such is the model most likely to be able to reconcile the competing claims of alternative positions. However, whilst superficially plausible, such a view of the relationship between schools of thought glosses over important similarities between neorealism and liberalism as systemic approaches to international relations. Indeed, it is possible that it has been institutionalism's commitment to rationalism which has actively blocked the development of a model of the international system fully compatible with liberal assumptions. A more nuanced approach proposes a triangular understanding of the relationship between these three models of the international system, with debates between neorealists and institutionalists constituting its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberal constituting its reflexivist leg. Such a conceptualisation of the relationship between the three models allows a

fuller appreciation of the complex linkages which exist between them, and calls into question institutionalists' claims that their own theory provides the most plausible site for a general synthesis of the insights of competing perspectives. In particular, it highlights the way in which liberalism's distinctive focus on the generative consequences of international anarchy allows it to offer an account of variation in socialisation within the international system which is capable of subsuming the combined research programmes generated by neorealist and institutionalist models.

Finally, it important to recognise the way in which these abstract theoretical considerations have had important implications for the content of substantive research programmes within the discipline in the post Cold War period. Proponents of neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism have all identified that the collapse of the Soviet Union has provided an historic opportunity to test competing theoretical claims about the nature of the international system that has begun to emerge after the Cold War. Neorealists have developed a broadly pessimistic analysis of the nature of international political change after the Cold War, predicting a return to conflictual multipolarity on a global scale. The nature of the responses to the challenge laid down by neorealists derived from institutionalism and liberalism varies considerably. On the basis of their argument that attempts to refine rationalist models of the international system are likely to provide the most promising basis for future research, prominent institutionalists have suggested that the discipline of international relations should focus its enquiries on testing a relatively limited and extraordinarily narrow range of propositions about the conditionality of relative gains seeking behaviour, and to do so primarily within a West European context. In making these claims, however, institutionalists have glossed over the way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps one of the most significant developments in world politics over the past half a century, was not predicted by either neorealist or institutionalist international relations theory. As such, they have failed to identify the way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a relatively stable body of formally liberal democratic states at a global level has raised fundamental questions about the long term historical dynamics embodied by the international system. By contrast, liberalism's distinctive claim to subsume the insights of the neorealist and

institutionalist models suggests that it is capable of both accounting for this development in terms of the long run effects of competition and socialisation within the international system, and of providing a much richer and ultimately more challenging agenda for research into the overall nature of post-Cold War international change. International relations specialists can and must learn from the debates between neorealists and institutionalists that have taken place over the 1980's and 1990s in order to revitalise systemic level theory for the post-Cold War period. However, to do so they need to engage critically with what have become deeply ingrained assumptions about systemic level theorising, and think imaginatively about the overall trajectory of international political change at the turn of the century.

CHAPTER THREE

Germany: *Second Chances*?

In his book *Modernity And Self Identity*, Anthony Giddens begins the opening chapter with a discussion of a sociological investigation of divorce and remarriage entitled *Second Chances* by Judith Wallerstein And Sandra Blakesee. This book, Giddens notes, "describes the impact of marriage break-up, over a period of some ten years, on sixty sets of parents and children. Divorce, the authors point out, is a crisis in individuals' personal lives, which presents dangers to their security and sense of well being, yet also offers fresh opportunities for their self-development and future happiness. Separation and divorce, and their aftermath, can cause long lasting anxieties and psychological disturbances; but at the same time the changes brought about by the dissolution of a marriage provide possibilities, as the authors put it, to 'grow emotionally', to 'establish new competence and pride' and to 'strengthen intimate relationships far beyond earlier capacities'" (Giddens, 1991:10). Giddens goes on to record that "going though a phase of mourning, according to Wallerstein and Blakesee, is the key to reclaiming oneself after divorce. Anyone who successfully 'decouples' from his or her previous spouse faces the task of stabilising a 'new sense of self', a 'new sense of identity'. .... A separated or divorced person needs moral courage to try new relationships and find new interests. Many people in such circumstances lose courage in their own judgements and capabilities, and may come to feel that planning for the future is valueless ... Overcoming such feelings demands persistence in the face of setbacks and a willingness to alter established personal traits or habits" (Giddens, 1991:11). Giddens chooses to open his discussion with a resume of Wallerstein and Blakesee's *Second Chances* because he sees the trends they document as symptomatic of the developed institutional reflexivity characteristic of late modernity. The self becomes a 'reflexive project' sustained though revisable narratives of self identity, and it is this phenomenon which is reflected in the discussion of the dangers and opportunities created marital breakdown in the book *Second Chances*.

Features of Giddens' discussion of Wallerstein and Blakesee's *Second Chances* resonate with themes developed in the literature on Germany's position within the post Cold War international system. As the historian Arnulf Baring notes, contemporary commentators have spoken of "'a second chance' for Germany" in the context of its transition since 1989 (Baring, 1994:1). Since the peace of Westphalia in 1648, the so-called 'German Question' has played a pivotal role in Europe and the wider world. On Baring's account, the German Question stems from Germany's location at the centre of Europe and its position in the European balance of power: "Germany was, and remains, too weak and at the same time too strong to be easily accepted by its neighbours" (Baring, 1994:2). In the aftermath of the Second World War, a temporary solution to the German Question was found only by its division into East and West. Germany's turbulent history resulted in separation or 'divorce'. During this period, Germany became a 'semi-sovereign' state in the sense that the predominant interpretation of Article 24 of the Federal Republic's constitution permitted its participation in systems of collective security but precluded the Bundeswehr's involvement in anything other than self-defence activities. As a result, over the post-war period it was removed from its traditional position within the European balance of power by being subsumed within the wider Cold War international order. With the sudden collapse of the Soviet bloc and the (re)unification of Germany in 1989, the German Question has been reopened, and it is this which has raised the issue of a possible 'second chance' for a united Germany.

Baring himself follows others in making the argument that Germany is unlikely to have a second chance to develop a more stable basis for its relations with its partners. To Baring, Germany's new position in the centre of Europe is likely to mean a return to Germany's 'sonderweg' or special path through history (Baring, 1994:14-17). It remains tempting, however, to look more closely at the issue of a possible second chance for Germany. Is it possible that, having lived through a period of separation and introspection, Germany will be able to change its ways? This chapter seeks to answer this question by applying neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international relations to analysing the state strategies adopted by Germany over the

first ten years of the post-Cold War period.[1] Conclusions will then be drawn as to the validity of each of the three models in the case of Germany before returning to reflect upon the appropriateness of the theme of 'second chances' as a metaphor for understanding Germany's behaviour in the emerging international system.

Neorealism

A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make various predictions about the behaviour of Germany in the post Cold War international system. Most notable of these have been Mearsheimer, Layne and Waltz, who, despite differences in emphasis, have drawn upon neorealist theory to arrive at broadly pessimistic conclusions about the role a united Germany will play in the emerging structure of international politics (Mearsheimer, 1990; Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1993). Nationalist historians, most notably Rainer Zitlemann, have also made arguments which resonate strongly with the geopolitical logic of the neorealist model, although to date have published only in the German language (Pulzer, 1995:9-12; Heilbrun, 1996:82-83). Mearsheimer uses the neorealist model to predict a return to conflictual multipolarity within Europe itself. He argues that "(t)he departure of the superpowers ... would transform Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system. Germany, France, Britain and perhaps Italy would assume major power status; the Soviet Union would decline from superpower status but would remain a major European power, giving rise to a system of five major powers and a number of lesser powers. The resulting system would suffer from the problems common to multipolar systems, and would therefore be prone to instability" (Mearsheimer, 1990:7). The emphasis of Layne and Waltz is on the emergence of conflictual multipolarity at a global level, with Germany, Japan and China rising to balance US hegemony in the wake of the power vacuum left by the

---

[1] After the September 1998 general election in Germany, the ruling CDU/FDP coalition government headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was replaced by a new SPD/Green coalition government. The new Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, appointed Joschka Fischer of the Green Party as his Foreign Minister. Due to the limited period of time which has elapsed since the 1998 elections and the lag in the production of specialist international relations literature, there is a shortage of secondary material available on the new German government's foreign policy. For this reason, this chapter does not deal extensively with the foreign policy pursued by the new German government in the second half of 1998.

collapse of the Soviet Union (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993).[2] However, there are important underlying similarities between the predictions offered by Mearsheimer, Layne and Waltz about Germany's role in the emerging structure of international politics. First, they see Germany locked into a defensively positional location in post Cold War security order. They predict that Germany's position within the structure of the post-Cold War international system will encourage it to define its interests according to its relative capabilities in order to ensure its continued security. The outcomes compatible with such behaviour would be either a return to late nineteenth century-style conflictual multipolarity within Europe and/or between Germany and the other major global powers.

Neorealists could point to various aspects of the process of German unification which could be interpreted as reinforcing their predictions about the orientation of Germany's post Cold War foreign policy. First, they could point to the failure of the Kohl administration to consult Anglo-French opinion on the issue of German unification before making this policy a stated objective (Horsley, 1992:230; Muller, 1993:129). Second, they could point to the bilateral character of the process of negotiations with eastern European countries - notably the Soviet Union and Poland. The Germans negotiated with the Soviets independently before taking the agreed conditions for German unification to be ratified within the Two Plus Four framework (Horsley, 1992:230; Waltz, 1993:62). In the case of the bilateral negotiations between Germany and Poland, Kohl caused considerable international anxiety by an apparent hesitation to guarantee the Oder-Neisse as the permanent eastern border of the united Germany (Horsley, 1992:231-232; Muller, 1993:146-150). These events could be construed as supportive of neorealist hypotheses concerning the state strategies of a

---

[2] Waltz himself makes the important qualification that Germany's place in the global multipolar structure may be taken by a united Europe. Consideration of such a claim is beyond the scope of this thesis and would require a separate analysis of the foreign policies of a possible future unified European state. However, the consistency of Waltz's position on this issue is disputed by those who argue that it is important to examine closely the political form that European integration takes, and the terms on which it is achieved with Germany's participation. In particular, it is important to recognise that European integration may not culminate in a form of political organisation that resembles the classical nation state, and may be achieved on terms other than as an instrument of German hegemony in Europe (see Pond and Waltz, 1994). Indeed, even the prominent neorealist Grieco has accepted that the validity of Waltz's predictions is being undermined by the dynamics displayed by the process of European integration over the 1990s (Grieco, 1996; Grieco, 1999).

unified Germany. They point to a refusal of German statesmen to contemplate use of multilateral decision making frameworks in cases of decisions where vital interests of national security may be at stake. The Polish border incident also reveals an apparent willingness to contemplate violation of existing international law when this conflicts with potential future German territorial gains in eastward expansion. Furthermore, taken together, these incidents reveal just how quickly sloppy diplomatic conduct by a unified Germany could unintentionally re-establish traditional security anxieties in a European context. Regardless of Germany's actual intentions and motives, countries such as Britain, France and Poland suffered considerable worries about German behaviour during this period.

Further evidence in support of neorealist hypotheses comes from German behaviour in international crisis situations since unification, most significantly in the form of the German initiative for the diplomatic recognition of Croatia in mid-late 1991. Until this time, Germany had supported the European and US line that the priority was to keep Yugoslavia intact. Yet by December 1991 - on the eve of the Maastricht summit - Bonn announced that it would "formally recognise Slovenia and Croatia by the year's end even if this meant breaking ranks with the UN, the United States, and the majority of its EC partners" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993: 50). This had the effect of bringing about formal EC recognition of the two counties in January 1991 (Muller, 1993:152). Although formally it had acted within the structures provided by the EC, Germany's actions represent a major breach of the EC's formal decision making procedures (Muller, 1993:152). In effect, it had used the threat of unilateral action to prompt a change in the European line on the issue. In contrast with its assertiveness in the Yugoslav crisis, it is Germany's apparent weakness over its policy in the Gulf which may be cited as evidence of German reluctance to follow a multilateral line. In the Gulf conflict, the German government contributed over DM16 billion to the allied coalition, and also made limited deployments in Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean (Muller, 1993:138). However, it was notable for its unwillingness to commit ground forces to the area of action of the war - unlike Britain, France and Italy. The international crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the Gulf have been seen as a testing ground for the effectiveness of European political co-operation on foreign

affairs. By implication, they also represent a crucial case for Germany's resolve to work within existing frameworks for international co-operation on security issues. In a comparative analysis of European states' policies in these two crises, Salmon has noted that Germany is one of "a number of states (which) have fairly consistently maintained their freedom of manoeuvre" (Salmon, 1992:235). Salmon makes this argument despite the existence of constitutional limitations on Germany's use of force in the Gulf which were widely supposed to exist at the time. Salmon argues that both crises illustrate "that while consensus might readily be achieved by 'reflex' on second order problems, on matters of first order importance ... (there arose) forced fissures in policy and actions" by EC countries, including Germany (Salmon, 1992:248). Salmon's argument has important implications for assessing the character of Germany's response to these international crises. It implies that Germany's policy making 'reflex' in major international crises still shows a pronounced tendency to place its own vital interests and policy making autonomy over the higher order goal of a common European response.

Similarly, Germany's attempts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its involvement with the formation of a European defence identity and its changing attitudes towards the use of military force abroad over the 1990s may also be interpreted as being consistent with neorealist logic. In 1994, Germany explicitly expressed a desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:18). In line with a neorealist analysis, Heilbrun sees this development as indicating that "the Germans will not abandon any of the institutions supposed to contain their power, for there is no incentive for them to do so. Instead, they will attempt to use these institutions to fulfil their aims" (Heilbrun, 1994:48). The first steps towards the consolidation of the Western European Union came in 1991 with the Franco-German initiative to establish a Eurocorps (Horsley, 1992: 234-235; Muller, 1993:155). The announcement of this measure caused great anxiety in both Britain and the United States, which harboured concerns that Germany intended the measure to weaken NATO (Horsley, 1992:235; Muller, 1993:156). Furthermore, in 1993 Germany took the important step of clarifying the provisions of its constitution so as to allow its armed forces to take part in military interventions

outside of the NATO area (Heilbrun, 1994:48; see also Ruhe, 1993:130). Overall, neorealists could find plausible evidence of what Heilbrun identifies as a "return to normality" in German security and defence policies (Heilbrun, 1994:48). That is to say, Germany will become increasingly assertive and independent in its pursuit of its national security interests, and will respond as other states do to the imperatives of its relative position in the international system.

Aspects of Germany's economic diplomacy and its strategies with regard to the process of European integration since 1989 are also amenable to a neorealist interpretation. Germany's role in the GATT negotiations during the early-mid 1990s revealed potential tensions between its commitment to supporting both France as its key partner in the process of European integration whilst at the same time fulfilling its commitments to the broader international economic order. France and the US came into dispute in the GATT negotiations over the issues of subsidies to agriculture and audio-visual production (Wood, 1995:229). Faced with this tension, the German government lent their support to France (at some economic cost to themselves), thus forcing American concessions over this issue (Wood, 1995:230-231). Whilst these developments did not hamper the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, it does highlight longer term tensions in Germany's relations with the US and Europe which may be seen as highly significant from a neorealist perspective. More direct tensions in Germany's economic relations with other states emerged in the summer of 1992 when the Bundesbank raised German interest rates in the wake of inflationary pressures in the German economy arising from the impact of German unification. This caused serious economic difficulties in a number of southern European states, including France, and most dramatically forced the exit of Britain from the ERM. This development greatly strained the Franco-German relationship which has historically been central to the dynamic of European integration (Wood, 1995:225). It also made Germany vulnerable to the accusation that it was using its dominant position in European currency markets to force the costs of unification to be borne by its neighbours (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann, 1993:50). Such an argument is supported by the failure of German politicians to heed the advice offered by the Bundesbank during the unification process, which had cautioned against rapid

German Economic and Monetary Union (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann, 1993:41). On a neorealist interpretation, it could be argued that German politicians were willing to suspend the imperatives of the Bundesbank where the vital national interests of German unification was at stake, but not in subsequent cases where the economic and political interests of other ERM members were at risk. As with Germany's behaviour in international security crises, Germany appears to have been unwilling to develop a reflex of co-operation on issues of first order significance for Germany itself.

Indeed, Heilbrun goes as far as to propose that there are signs that a united Germany is losing interest in the process of deepening European integration with France, and is instead attempting to achieve hegemony over eastern Europe in line with the strategy it pursued under Bismarck (Heilbrun, 1994:44; Kirshner, 1996:169 also recognises this possibility). Heilbrun suggests that "Germany is using the widening of the EU as a means of emancipating itself from France. The new EU members will allow Germany to create a Northern bloc, whose new members are acutely aware of their debt to Germany and they may look to Berlin rather than Paris for direction" (Heilbrun, 1994:46). Thus, in Heilbrun's assessment, "Germany .... is creating an old fashioned sphere of influence in the East in which Central and Eastern Europe form a vital market for German goods and provide cheap labour for German manufactures" (Heilbrun, 1994: 47). He even proposes that Germany is now being courted by Russia and backs this statement by citing German support for Russian entry into the G-7 group against the wishes of the US and Japan in May 1994 (Heilbrun, 1994:47). It may also be possible to interpret the pressure Germany brought to bear on Japan to provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union in 1991 in these terms, although this does not appear to find explicit support in the available literature. During talks in 1991, Germany was one of the strongest supporters of the provision of economic assistance to the Soviet Union. By contrast, Japan was one of the least forthcoming on this issue due to Moscow's refusal to concede territorial rights to the Northern Islands. Germany stepped in to mediate over this issue, the result being that tension between the two states was considerably reduced (Sato, 1993:381-382). On a neorealist interpretation, Germany's role as a broker on this issue might be understood as echoing a Bismarkian attempt to carve out a sphere of influence for itself to its east.

Such an assessment of the nature of Germany's state strategies after the Cold War fits squarely within the ranges predicted by the neorealist model.

Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of literature which would favour a neorealist interpretation of German state strategies in the period since 1989. Significant aspects of Germany's behaviour in this period tend to point to the emergence of a more aggressively unilateral stance in international institutions in which it participated in effectively during the Cold War period. There are also signs that fundamental incompatibilities of interest are emerging between a united Germany and the United States, as well as many of Germany's European partners as illustrated through conflicts of interest within NATO over the WEU, the crisis within the ERM, and the issue of German influence over eastern Europe. These could point to either the emergence of splits within the Atlantic Alliance framework or the beginnings of a resurgence of a German hegemony in Europe. All these factors tend to weigh in favour of neorealist hypotheses and predictions about united Germany's role in a Europe and the wider world after the Cold War.

Institutionalism

Germany is a state which may reasonably be assumed to be locked into a complex pattern of interdependent relations with the other advanced industrial democracies. Institutionalism predicts that, under these conditions, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to institutionalise aspects of their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains from interaction. However, where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in the form of requiring considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they are likely to reject institutional options.

Institutionalists can present a significant body of evidence in support of their predictions with respect to Germany's state strategies since 1989. First, it is far from clear that a neorealist interpretation of Germany's behaviour within the unification process is satisfactory. Kohl expressly intended unification to be firmly anchored

within both the EC and NATO (Kohl, 1990; Muller, 1993:128). Moreover, Muller identifies that in the first quarter of 1990 alone, there were twenty nine meetings on German unity at head of state and ministerial level with Germany's European partners (Muller, 1993:128). Although Germany did not consult either Britain or France before engaging in negotiations with the Soviets, it did make sure that they had the backing of the United States before proceeding (Muller, 1993:128). Furthermore, the terms for unification negotiated by Kohl reflect a strongly multilateral orientation. It ensured continued German membership of NATO, limitations on the size and character of the Bundeswehr, and generous economic and technical assistance to the Soviets (Macardle Kelleher, 1993:20; Schlor, 1993:49). Germany became a signatory of the 1990 Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) treaty in which it limited the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 (Linnenkamp, 1993:95). Kohl took the further important step of renewing Germany's commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Muller, 1993:145). It is also possible that a neorealist interpretation of the Polish Border incident is far from unambiguous. Muller argues that Kohl's apparent hesitation to agree to this border had little to do with strategic posturing, but instead reflected domestic electoral considerations (Muller, 1993:147). Thus the argument that Germany's negotiations within the context of unification were conducted bilaterally tends to oversimplify the extent to which this process was heavily institutionalised. As Muller notes "given that the highest national interests were at stake, the unification process was embedded in an astonishing web of consultations and mutual adjustments" (Muller, 1993:129).

Germany's post-unification strategies may also be interpreted in the light of institutionalist theory. Over the 1990s Germany has displayed consistently strong public support for NATO as an essential feature of the European security architecture (Kinkel, 1992:3). Hyde-Price argues that NATO serves important functions for Germany. In particular, NATO provides Germany with a firm security guarantee, offers a visible demonstration of its continuing integration with the West, ensures a US commitment to European security and represents a tried and tested institutional framework (Hyde-Price, 1996:182). For these reasons, "(a)lthough the German government has collaborated with France in seeking to develop a European defence

and security identity ... this has not yet resulted in any significant weakening of Germany's commitment to NATO. Even with the end of the Cold War, therefore, the NATO alliance remains the bedrock of German security policy" (Hyde-Price, 1996:181-182; see also Gutjahr, 1995:308). Germany's support for expansion of the NATO framework into eastern Europe may also be understood in institutionalist terms with reference to the benefits this would provide for Germany in terms of stabilising its transition (Hyde-Price, 1996:183: Ruhe, 1993: 183). This process has occurred both through direct NATO expansion, and through the formation in October 1991 of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), now the Partnership for Peace (PfP) (Schlor 1994:46). NACC/PfP has instrumental value because it is able to act as a bridge between NATO and the wider European security framework provided by the OSCE/CSCE (Kinkel, 1992:5; Schlor, 1994:47). Finally, Germany has also been a consistent supporter of the CSCE/OSCE process itself over the post Cold War period (Hyde-Price, 1996:187). Although it is important to note that Germany does not see the CSCE/OSCE as a substitute for NATO, it does see it as an important complement to it. It provides numerous advantages to Germany in its key security aim of helping stabilise international relations on its eastern border through a degree of institutionalisation (Hyde Price, 1996:187-8; Muller, 1993:156-7). From an institutionalist perspective, Germany's commitment to multilateral European security institutions may be understood in terms of their value to Germany in terms of the benefits they bring to its security environment.

The evolution of Germany's attitudes towards use of its military force outside the NATO area over the post-Cold War period may also be interpreted as reflecting institutionalist predictions about Germany's behaviour. In an influential Foreign Affairs article, Hans Maull has argued that Germany is likely to remain a 'civilian power' in the post Cold War international order, in as much as it has developed a strong commitment to multilateralism and "the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument" (Maull, 1991:92). Maull's analysis challenges the neorealist prediction that, with the end of the Cold War, a united Germany in the centre of Europe will be under increasing pressure to 'normalise' its behaviour by adopting a

more independent and assertive attitude towards the use of its armed forces. In this sense, it has affinities with institutionalism's predictions that the multilateral frameworks in which Germany has become embedded since the 1950's will continue to have value for it after the Cold War. Maull suggests that Germany's reluctance to support the use of military force abroad over the 1990s supports his assessment of Germany's international behaviour. In his examination of Germany's behaviour during the Yugoslav crisis, Maull argues that "although the crisis has pushed Germany closer towards full UN military participation in UN and NATO missions, this in no way suggests a decisive move away from Bonn's (non-military) post-war foreign policy orientation" (Maull, 1995:126). Meirs identifies the benefits this brings to Germany by noting the way in which "when Germany takes a stronger policy line it raises suspicions amongst its allies that it is trying to establish German hegemony. To prevent misconceptions emerging .... (Germany is obliged to) pursue its polices and interests within the Euro-Atlantic framework" (Meiers, 1995:96-7). Furthermore, Germany's status as a civilian power also brought benefits to Germany in the form of providing an effective security guarantee, and limiting the financial expenditure and potential human costs of increased German military capacity overseas. Thus there is a significant body of literature stressing that Germany has continued to adopt a strongly multilateral orientation in the critical area of policy represented by its attitudes towards the use of military force abroad.

Germany's strategies with respect to international economic institutions at both global and regional levels may also be seen to support institutionalist claims. At a global level, there is strong evidence in favour of the institutionalist model presenting accurate predictions of Germany's post unification state strategies. Since unification, the German government has displayed a strong commitment to the GATT/WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and the G7. Despite tensions between French and American interests over the issue of agricultural and audio-visual trade liberalisation, Germany managed to broker a compromise agreement (Wood, 1995:231). Smyser notes that German trade relations with the Japanese have not been smooth, and highlights the automobile industry as being particularly sensitive for both countries (Smyser, 1992:224; see also Sato, 1993:378). However, Sato identifies that growth in trade and

investment between Germany and Japan are grounds for continued optimism about their economic relationship in the 1990s (Sato, 1993:367-375). Germany's role in the resolution of the conflict over Japanese aid to the Soviet Union in 1991 despite the outstanding issue of the possession of the Northern Territories by the USSR may also be interpreted in terms compatible with institutionalism. The logic that Germany appreciated the functional incentives for it to play a part in this diplomatic process is reflected in the analysis put forward by Katzenstein. Katzenstein notes that "Germany's willingness to broker the conflict between Japan and Russia expresses the awareness that substantial Japanese aid would help to stabilise conditions in Russia and enhance German security" (Katzenstein, 1993:79). Relatedly, Germany has continued to provide both political and economic support for Russia over the period since German unification, both through multilateral forums such as the G7, the EU and GATT, as well as on a bilateral basis (Zhurkin, 1996:212-216). Thus important aspects of Germany's economic strategies at a global level are potentially compatible with institutionalism's prediction that Germany, as a state with strong incentives to use international economic institutions, will tend to rely heavily upon them.

Aspects of Germany's support for the process of European integration also may be used as evidence in favour of a institutionalist interpretation of its state strategies. First, Germany has been instrumental in pushing for the deepening of European integration. With France and the European Commission it pushed for two Intergovernmental Conferences on economic, monetary and political union (Le Gloannec, 1993:256). These IGC's began in December 1990, and culminated a year later in the agreements reached at Maastricht in 1991. Second, Germany has been instrumental in pushing for the expansion of the EU to include both formerly EFTA states and states in eastern and east central Europe (Kirschner, 1996:169). It is important to stress that, in line with institutionalist predictions, Germany's trade and aid policies in the central and eastern European region are strongly multilateral in character because they are carried out within the institutional framework provided by the European Union (Katzenstein, 1997b:22). Moreover, there are clear and tangible benefits to Germany in both deepening and expanding the European Union, fitting the institutionalist hypothesis that international institutions can be effective in situations

where they have instrumental value and present absolute gains to the state concerned. The most obvious benefits of deepening the EU come in the form of the benefits of a single European currency for Germany's export led economy. The benefits of widening the European Union come in the stabilising effect this will have on the countries of east central Europe, and will also be apparent in the large gains Germany stands to make from its comparative advantages in trade with in this region (Smyser, 1992:195). Germany therefore has very strong incentives to encourage either of these strategies for European integration.

Despite this, however, there remain aspects of German strategies which are difficult to correlate with the predictions of the institutionalist model. Whilst it is true that Germany does indeed have strong incentives to either broaden or deepen the European Union, it is less clear that it remains in its direct interest to pursue *both* objectives simultaneously. This is not a point which has been stressed by analysts of German foreign policy sympathetic to institutionalist claims, although writing in the early 1990s Maull did recognise the potential contradictions posed by the simultaneous widening and deepening of the European Union for Germany's continued support for the integration process (Maull, 1991:105). However, the contradictions of Germany's pursuit of such a policy have become increasingly apparent over the 1990s as awareness has grown of the exponential increases in the size of the EU budget which would occur if the benefits of the CAP and Regional Development Fund were extended to new members (Tewes, 1998:123). It is important to recognise that institutionalism highlights the importance of the instrumental value of international institutions to states. It predicts that where commitment to institutions would create considerable costs to states, they will reject institutional options. Thus it would appear that the kind of behaviour predicted by institutionalism would be the advocacy by Germany of either some form of 'core Europe', or alternatively, a 'wider Europe' (see the classifications of positions within German foreign policy discourse offered by Gutjahr, 1994; Hellmann, 1996, Janning, 1996, Meyer, 1997). The former envisages a core of West European states pushing ahead with monetary and political union as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. The latter is understood to involve the extension of the EU eastwards as a free trade area. The instrumental logic of institutionalist

analysis therefore suggests that Germany should be making clearer strategic choices between broadening and deepening the EU than it appears to be at present.

Overall, it is possible to explain important features of German state strategies since 1989 from an institutionalist perspective. The institutionalist model offers plausible explanations of many aspects of German state strategies since 1989, including key aspects of the unification process, its commitment to Atlantic security institutions, its apparent reluctance to take on military commitments abroad, its participation in the global international economic system, and dimensions German strategies towards the process of European integration. Whilst institutionalism suggests that Germany is beginning to face important choices in its European integration strategies, there are strong signs of underlying continuity in Germany's use of international institutions over the post Cold War period. It is therefore plausible to make the argument that Germany's highly interdependent relations with other advanced industrial democracies has encouraged it to continue to value its institutional commitments over the 1990s.

Liberalism

Liberalism stresses the significance of states' foreign policy preferences, which in turn reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of state preferences in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines a set of predictions directly relevant to Germany's state strategies over the post cold war period. In particular, liberalism suggests the possibility of higher levels of institutionalisation of state behaviour than that anticipated by the institutionalist model. Institutions may take on intrinsic rather than instrumental value for states in as much as states define their portfolio of interests from a collective identification offered by institutional arrangements. Alternatively expressed, institutionalisation may provide normative frameworks which act as guides for policy choice and action for states, rather than being valued solely for the functional benefits they bring. This

does not, of course, mean that states do not formulate a conception of their own 'self-interest'. However, it does imply that institutionalised relationships may come to embody a diffuse form of reciprocity. Alternatively expressed, states which institutionalise their relationships in this way express their interests at a higher level of aggregation than the institutionalist model suggests is possible.

Important aspects of Germany's behaviour during the process of unification are compatible with the predictions offered by the liberal model. During the unification process, Germany not only reaffirmed but deepened its support for NATO and other broader Euro-Atlantic security institutions. The generosity of the terms of unification agreed within the Two-Plus-Four framework belies an interpretation of these policy measures which sees them as an instrumental function of Germany's interests in achieving continued membership of NATO. Katzenstein notes that the "political reassurance that Kohl and Genscher could offer indicated ... that the West German political leadership had ... internalised the norm of peaceful international co-operation. Kohl and Genscher repeatedly insisted in public that the terms they were negotiating with the Soviet Union would have to be acceptable not only to all of the Allied powers, but, more importantly, to all members of the CSCE and, in particular, to Poland. In their minds German unification was as much a European as a national issue" (Katzenstein, 1993:76). Second, the terms in which German politicians were thinking suggests that their use of NATO in this period reflected not merely the instrumental value of its preservation as institutionalism suggests, but rather its value as a normative framework within which to orientate its actions. Germany has played a leading role in pushing for change within NATO in order to adapt itself to the new post Cold War international environment. Hyde-Price notes that Germany was a "prime mover" behind NATO's London Declaration which envisaged a united Germany in an Atlantic alliance of free democracies (Hyde-Price, 1996:183; see also Ruhe 1993:130; and Linnenkamp, 1993:98 for details of the London Declaration). As Anderson and Goodman identify, "the question posed by German politicians was not *whether* to remain in the Atlantic Alliance but rather *how to adapt* the alliance, with due regard for the interests of other members, to the rapidly changed circumstances on the continent" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:29).

Similarly, during the 1989-90 period Germany actively deepened its support for the continuing process of European integration. In April 1990, Kohl announced his government's willingness to waive Community structural fund assistance for the soon to be former GDR (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:32).[3] Furthermore, "(i)n the face of domestic concerns about the dangers and risks of EMU, voiced principally by the Bundesbank and the Ministry Of Finance, the Chancellor committed his country to accelerated progress toward the twin and, as he maintained, inseparable, objectives of economic and political reform in the EC" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:33; Kohl, 1990). Thus in 1993 Katzenstein was able to write that "despite German unification, the expectations about the extent of political, economic and monetary integration far exceed those held when the EC92 process was launched in earnest in 1987-1988" (Katzenstein, 1993:77). Overall, increased German support for both the process of European integration and NATO during the process of German unification, indicates that its support for these institutions was not merely instrumental. Anderson and Goodman have concluded that during this period "institutions ... restructured and remoulded German interests, so that, in the eyes of German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy but normative frameworks for policy making. The development of reflexive support for institutions ... has played an important role in shaping German interests since unification" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:24). Drawing on Anderson and Goodman's analysis, Keohane *et al* have characterised Germany's foreign policy preferences between 1989 and 1991 as "*reflexively institutionalist*: its institutional ties were viewed as intrinsic to the German's view of themselves" (Keohane *et al*, 1993:10, emphasis added; see also Katzenstein, 1993:75)

Germany's foreign policy over the post-1991 period has continued to display a pattern of development compatible with Anderson and Goodman's initial characterisation of its strategic preferences. In terms of the development of the Atlantic Alliance framework, German statesmen have been adamant that development of a European defence identity complements NATO by providing it with a stronger 'European pillar'

---

[3] Anderson and Goodman note that the EC later refused to accept Kohl's offer.

of the Atlantic Alliance. In Former Defence Minister Ruhe's terms, "European integration and a trusting transatlantic partnership do not preclude each other. Europe and North America continue to be a community bound by common interests .... What we need now is a new partnership among equals - the United States as a partner that supports the shaping of a new Europe, and a Europe that assumes greater responsibility for itself and the promotion of world peace" (Ruhe, 1993:133; see also Schmidt, 1996). Ruhe's statement reflects Germany's conception of itself as an actor which defines its interests in terms of a collective security identity. Germany did not simply value NATO for the instrumental benefits it brings in terms of provision for Germany's security. Instead, Germany's multilateral commitments actively reshaped and remoulded the way in which it defined its portfolio of interests, thereby facilitating a process of norm-governed change. In particular, by altering the terms of Germany's participation within the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Ruhe reasoned that their underlying normative fabric can be maintained, the degree of reciprocity they embody increased, and their effectiveness thereby enhanced. In the early 1990s this pattern of behaviour was most clearly evident in Germany's participation in the formation of NACC/PfP. NACC/PfP came into existence through a joint German-American initiative in 1991 (Hyde-Price, 1996:183). This was despite the existence of very clear limitations of its effectiveness as a security institution, which Kinkel himself was careful to acknowledge (Kinkel, 1992:5; Schlor, 1993:47). However, the real significance of NACC to German statesmen lies not so much in its security benefits for Eastern Europe, but in its *Atlantic* connection. As Schlor notes, "NACC demonstrates Germany's commitment to NATO and can be used to deflect criticism about its involvement with the CSCE and West European defence integration" (Schlor, 1993:47). Thus NACC/PfP allows Germany to make its commitment to the North Atlantic framework transparent, and thereby provides the US with the trust and reassurance in Germany's strategic intentions it requires to allows it help to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Its instrumental value to Germany is minimal, but its intrinsic symbolic value for Germany is highly significant because it allowed Germany to preserve and develop a community of interests with the US. Thus perhaps more than any other single institution, NACC/PfP reflects Germany's

preference for actively developing institutional frameworks in a reflexive, norm governed fashion.

However, by far the most prominent example of this type of shift in German security policy has occurred with respect to its attitude towards the use of military force outside of the NATO area begun in 1993. Commentators have identified how the German government became increasingly aware of the limits of its cheque-book diplomacy during the Gulf conflict, and was finally prompted into action after the failure of its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia to effectively tackle the root causes of the Balkans conflict (Smith, 1995:52; Dorff, 1997:57). Indeed, in 1993, Ruhe stated that "adopting a passive role would harm vital German interests ... If Germany now hesitates to contribute adequately to international activities, it could be perceived as a sign of discontinuity of German policy towards the Alliance. In fact, there is no reason to doubt that Germany will fulfil its alliance commitments" (Ruhe, 1993:130). During the 1990s the German government has been attempting to increase the number of occasions when German troops play some military role - most notably in Somalia and Bosnia (Kaiser, 1995:7; Dorff, 1997:58-59; Ruhe, 1993:130). It has also undertaken "a major reorientation of ... defence planning" to deal with multilateral forms of international crisis management, prioritising flexibility and mobility to allow conflict resolution through military escalation and de-escalation (Linnenkamp, 1993:100; see also Ruhe, 1993:137; Gutjahr, 1995:311). Smith identifies that the German government's handling of the issue of the use of force abroad reflects its orientation towards what he explicitly refers to as its "reflexive multilateralism" (Smith, 1995:49). Germany acted only when it perceived that "multilateralism in general and Germany's support for it in particular could be at risk" (Smith, 1995:50). To achieve its aim Germany is deliberately overriding its post war non-military power orientation and in so doing exposed itself to significantly increased financial and human costs and risks. However, Germany was prepared to accept these costs and risks in order to preserve the basic normative fabric of the Atlantic Alliance security framework. Thus, given the nature and extent of the changes which have taken place in Germany with respect to its attitudes towards the use of military force abroad, it perhaps oversimplifies to interpret this development in the utilitarian terms suggested by

institutionalist analysis. A more nuanced assessment is provided by Hyde-Price, who suggests that "the end of the Cold War has given the united Germany the opportunity to define a new role for itself in the international system. This search for a new role and identity has clearly affected German security policy, which exhibits both elements of continuity and change" (Hyde Price, 1996:190). Only a focus on the intrinsic value of Atlantic security institutions for German policy makers can capture the reflexive, norm governed character of the development of their attitudes with respect to the use of force outside the NATO area over the 1990s.

A distinctive mix of change and continuity is also revealed in terms of the evolution of Germany's position with regard to the European integration process since 1991. Many constructivist analysts have been quick to stress the strong element of continuity in Germany's foreign policy preferences over this issue during the post Cold War period (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996; Katzenstein, 1997a, Bulmer, 1997; Banchoff, 1997). Contrary to institutionalist predictions, they see no necessary contradiction between Germany making commitments to both broaden and deepen the EU simultaneously. Bulmer and Paterson, for example, identified the 1996 IGC as an "important test of Germany's role, influence and policy in the European integration process" (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:9). In their assessment, German diplomacy during the run up to the IGC reflects the way in which "the dramatic changes of 1989 have not yet led to a correspondingly dramatic change in Germany's role (in the European integration process). .... The principle response has seen the FRG reiterate its European identity" (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:13). Despite pressures for the enlargement of the EU, they suggest that "(t)he co-ordination reflex developed over the years of European political co-operation ... continues to be the basis for German action in the post-Maastricht era" (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:17). Similarly, Pond and Schoenbaum see Germany's exaggerated level of support for European institutions as reflecting its Europeanised or "post-national identity" (Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996:180-181). Indeed, over the 1990s, Germany has been consistently generous in its financial support of the EU, continuing to fund 28% of the total EU budget (Pond and Schoenbaum, 1996:181-2). In practical terms, this has meant that "by 1996 the EU was costing the average

German twice as much as a Netherlander and four times as much as a Briton" (Kirshcner, 1996:159). Major specialists on Germany's foreign affairs therefore support the argument that there has been strong underlying continuity in Germany's policy preferences over the issue of Europe over the post Cold War period.

A related assessment is presented by Goetz, who links his analysis to the emerging literature on multi-level governance within the European Union. Goetz discusses Germany's integration policy in the run up to the 1996 IGC. He argues that "(t)he continued German commitment to a further deepening and widening of the EU is no longer primarily the result of a reasoned assessment of the costs and benefits of such a policy; rather, ... the political preference for further political integration has become part of the institutional logic of the German state. What was originally a rationally calculated policy priority has evolved into a fundamental value informing institutional behaviour" (Goetz, 1996:36). To support this argument, Goetz identifies important "structural, procedural and policy adaptations" made by the German state (Goetz, 1996: 36-37; see also Rometsch, 1996; Rometsch and Wessels, 1996). However, more fundamentally, he discusses the significance of constitutional changes that have taken place in Germany since the ratification of the Treaty On European Union which imply that "All German public institutions are obliged to pursue actively the development of the EU ... with the aim of creating a united Europe" (Goetz, 1996:38). He stresses the changes in Article 23 of Germany's Basic Law which have replaced its provisions for the Federal Government's jurisdiction over the German Lander with a commitment to participation in the establishment of a united Europe committed to federal principles and the principle of subsidiarity (Goetz, 1996:38). He argues that the pervasive nature of the process of institutional adaptation throughout the German state indicates the extent to which it has taken on an "in-built integrationist orientation" (Goetz, 1996:39). European policy in Germany has undergone a process of "internalisation" whereby domestic and integration policy display high levels of "interwoveness", a process which is intimately linked to the emergence of mutli-level tiers of governance encompassing the Lander and European institutions (Goetz, 1996:40). He refers to the process as the "Europeanisation" of the German state (Goetz, 1996:25) On Goetz's analysis, therefore, Germany's deeply internalised European identity is reflected in its

foreign policy preferences, and which lay behind its continued support for deepening the process integration in the run up to the 1996 IGC, despite the simultaneous pressures for enlargement.

However, more recently, a number of analysts sympathetic to the argument that Germany's distinctive foreign policy preferences over the issue of Europe have displayed underlying continuity over the 1990s have begun to modify their analysis in order to produce a more nuanced account of the evolution of Germany's strategies. In particular, Anderson, who was the first to characterise Germany's tendency towards multilateralism as reflexive, has identified tensions in Germany's European polices over the mid-late 1990s in three areas: competition policy, the CAP, and structural funds (Anderson, 1997). In each of these areas, Anderson documents the way in which German unification has led to an inability for Germany to maintain unconditional support for European polices, and the way in which this has given rise to increased German assertiveness. He suggests that "between 1990 and 1992, the German government attempted to conduct business as usual, and willingly submitted to - indeed, requested the application of - established procedures and related outcomes despite the huge costs imposed on domestic actors, especially those in the former German Democratic Republic .... (However,) (s)ince then, as a result of changes in domestic politics flowing from unification, the German government has shifted its approach to regulative polices in Brussels, paying more attention to issues of distribution and redistribution" (Anderson, 1997:82). Anderson does note policy continuity in one area, specifically over trade policy (Anderson, 1997:92-95). Thus overall he concludes that whilst "Unification did not precipitate a major domestic revaluation of Germany's role in Europe. ... (T)o describe the united Germany's relationship towards Europe in terms of seamless continuity would be inaccurate. ... (Overall) what emerges is a mixed pattern of change and continuity" (Anderson, 1997:104-105).

Tewes similarly acknowledges that since 1994 German statesmen have been addressing the potential tensions in their involvement in both deepening and widening the EU by attempting to develop a merger between these conflicting roles (Tewes,

1998:127; see also Letourneau and Rakel, 1997:122-125). This role merger first surfaced in proposals by leading members of the CDU in 1994 for a "variable geometry" Europe in which the "precondition for the enlargement towards the East was a tightly integrated core" (Tewes, 1998:127). Janning, who has himself been influential in the formulation of this approach to integration policy in Germany, puts forward the related concept of "differentiated integration: a mix of deeper integration, greater responsibilities for committed member states and the notion of sectoral cores for high integration areas such as monetary or security integration" (Janning, 1997:41). He notes that a strategy of differentiated integration "would lead to the concentration of leadership roles on those member states which are actively involved in all or most of these sectoral deepenings ... (In turn this would) open up new possibilities for active participation and a higher density of integration" (Janning, 1997:41). It might also be added that it would potentially strengthen the degree of reciprocity embodied by European institutions, which have been disproportionately funded by Germany in the past. Other analysts have identified the way in which German integration policy is informed by a pragmatic multilateralism in which a concept of institutional flexibility provides a "Gezamptkonzept" for the European order (Mayer, 1997:733-734; Hellmann, 1996:5). By pursuing differentiated integration and institutional flexibility, Germany would be able to sustain its deep commitment to multilateral institutional frameworks. Understood in these terms, the mix of continuity and change embodied in Germany's approach to European integration over the 1990s reflects its distinctive foreign policy preferences and identity. As Tewes notes, to understand Germany's attempt at role merger, "one .. has to look first at ... German identity and at the way it shaped foreign policy culture" (Tewes, 1998:130).

Paradoxically, therefore, analysts such as Katzenstein, Bulmer and Paterson, Pond and Goetz actually *underestimate* the extent to which Germany has internalised the norms European institutions embody. Goetz's stress on the Europeanisation of the German state provides a pertinent example of the case in point. Goetz highlights the importance of Germany's distinctive Europeanised identity in bringing about these developments, therefore drawing attention to underlying continuities in Germany's

integration policy preferences over the 1990s and the links which exist between this process and the emergence of multi-level structures of governance in Western Europe as a whole. However, he is wrong to suggest that there is a sharp dichotomy between Germany's assessment of the costs and befits of pursuit of both broadening and deepening the EU, and its internalisation of norms of integration. Instead, it has been precisely Germany's awareness of the costs of deepening and broadening the integration process simultaneously which has indicated the enormous extent to which it has internalised an orientation to multilateralism. It was the intrinsic value these institutions had to German policy makers which led them to develop a reflexive, norm governed response to the evolution of their policy preferences towards integration in order to preserve their underlying 'Europeanised' identity. In turn, this process of reflexive adaptation has actually strengthened Germany's involvement in the European integration process by increasing the degree of reciprocity embodied in European institutions. Furthermore, it has heightened Germany's participation in emerging patterns of multi-level governance in Europe by encouraging its further participation in a patchwork of overlapping tiers of European institutions along the lines suggested by the concept of variable geometry and differentiated integration.

Overall, therefore, only a liberal focus on Germany's distinctive foreign policy preferences over the 1990s can explain the particular mix of continuity and change its polices reflected during this period. Germany's distinctive foreign policy preferences have encouraged it to remain committed to a significantly higher level of institutionalised activity than might be expected from the perspective of neorealism and institutionalism. Both the Atlantic security framework and the process of European integration took an intrinsic rather than an instrumental value as normative frameworks for German policy makers during this period. Thus the characterisation offered by Anderson and Goodman in 1993 of Germany's foreign policy preferences during the unification period as reflexively institutionalist holds for its behaviour over the duration of the 1990s. What has become clear since the time at which they developed this characterisation, however, is the extent to which Germany had internalised multilateral norms. Germany's commitment to multilateral institutions was not simply a passive policy reflex inherited from the early post-war era, but

embodied active and reflexive adaptation to the changing circumstances of the post-Cold War period. However, such a conclusion merely raises the deeper and more fundamental issue of the extent to which Germany's strongly multilateral foreign policy orientation is sustainable in future. To do so requires an examination of the agenda for Germany's political choices in the contemporary international system.

Germany's Choices

In the literature on Germany's foreign affairs during the 1990s, five broad positions have emerged on the issue of the sustainability of its current foreign policy and the related issue of the strategic choices Germany is likely to face in the coming years. These positions may be understood as operating along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, neorealists anticipate a sharp break in the policies being pursued by the united Germany. Moving along the spectrum, the more moderate position adopted by conservative historians is similarly sceptical of the coherence of Germany's current strategies, and suggests Germany will find its polices increasingly constrained in future. In the middle of the spectrum, institutionalists argue that Germany has and will pursue a civilian power strategy, but to do so coherently it must in future make a clear strategic choice between pursuit of either broadening or deepening the European Union. Towards the other end of the spectrum, a fourth position associated with constructivist theory argues that the civilian power strategy which has been pursued by Germany remains viable, but maintains that Germany will not have to make a choice between broadening and deepening the EU. At the other extreme of the spectrum, a liberal position suggests that changes in Germany's attitude towards both the use of its military force abroad and its approach to European integration represent significant shifts in Germany's strategies. However, contrary to the views of both neorealists and conservative historians, the liberal position suggests that these shifts represent a coherent and sustainable attempt to respond to changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989. By reflexively adapting its foreign policy preferences in a norm governed manner, Germany has not undermined but has actually strengthened considerably its commitment to multilateralism, and has played a major part in reinvigorating these institutions for the post Cold War period. In this

section of the chapter, each of these five 'choices' for Germany will be discussed in turn, before returning to reflect on the appropriateness of the theme of 'second chances' as a metaphor for understanding Germany's process of adjustment to the post Cold War world.

The most extreme position in the debate over Germany's future strategic choices is adopted by neorealists. Most notably, Mearsheimer stresses the direct incentives generated by the changes in the structure of the international system over the post-Cold War period for a revival of German hypernationalism (Mearsheimer, 1990:21). On the basis of these arguments, he suggests that the security dilemma generated by the emergence of a reunified Germany in the centre of Europe "could spark a renewed sense of persecution amongst the Germans, and with it, a rebirth of German nationalism" (Mearsheimer, 1990:56). Moreover, according to the neorealist model, states which persistently fail to respond to the incentives for behaviour and constraints imposed by international structure will risk punishment and even possible elimination. Thus Germany's failure to adopt a much more tightly defined notion of its national interests since 1989, particularly in the wake of the costs of unification, might be expected to have had a major effect on the stability of German domestic politics. Indeed, some changes in German domestic politics over the post-Cold War period would seem to fit the pattern predicted by neorealism. Extreme parties of the so called 'new right', notably Schonhuber's Republikaners and Frey's DVU, have enjoyed a significant revival since German unification (Minkenberg, 1995; Heilbrun, 1996). The process of unification "reaffirmed a traditional sense of German nationhood ... (and) Bismarckian heritage" (Minkenberg, 1995:264; see also Heilbrun, 1995:49). Furthermore, as neorealists might expect, extended commitments to multilateral institutional frameworks combined with the problems of managing the unification have mounted a serious challenge to the health of the post war German economic model. Structural unemployment coupled with inflationary pressures has become a major feature of the unified German economy since unification, and became particularly acute during the 1993 recession (Dyson, 1996:201-202; see also Flockton, 1996). These economic pressures might be interpreted as reinforcing the electoral appeal of new right parties, especially when combined with waves of immigrants and

asylum seekers from eastern and southern Europe (Minkenberg, 1995:255). Heilbrun goes as far as to suggest that "the refusal of the Bonn political class to face Germany's new position was creating an opening for the new right" (Heilbrun, 1996:96). Finally, the extreme right's revisionism appears compatible with a neorealist assessment of its emergence. Its parties adopt a formerly revisionist outlook, and have campaigned on policies such as outward German expansion over the Oder-Neisse border with Poland (Minkenberg, 1995:266). They are also overtly nationalistic. They define themselves in opposition to the Western orientation, and in their assessment, Germany must "rethink its relationship to Europe and the United States" (Heilbrun, 1996:92). They appeal to the argument that "the self-effacing Bonn republic .... must be replaced by a self-confident Berlin republic that returns to nationalist doctrines respectable before the Nazi regime took power. A 'normal' Germany freed of the ... Nazi past will be able to assert its interests like any other nation" (Heilbrun, 1996:83).

However, whilst it is clear that a tendency towards a degree of right wing fundamentalism has been present in German politics since 1989, it is important not to overstate the case for such an extreme interpretation of changes in the nature of German domestic politics. Most commentators agree that, since unification, the West German three party system has, by and large, successfully transplanted itself eastwards to the German state, particularly when wider dealignment trends in party systems and voting behaviour in industrialised democracies are taken into account (see post unification election results in Kreile, 1993:64; see also 1994 election result in Smith, 1996:59). This is also reflected in the way in which extremist parties in Germany have not made real inroads into the mainstream party system (Conrandt, 1996:168-169; Smith, 1996:56-57). Similarly, the German economy remained robust over the 1990s. Dyson notes that "(t)he impact of the structural challenges to the German model, the 1993 recession and the Deutsche Mark appreciation of 1994-95 has to be put into perspective. Most strikingly, the German political economy has absorbed the challenges in a way that demonstrates its remarkable versatility and resilience. Notably, excessive budget deficits and inflationary pressures have been kept under control" (Dyson, 1996:208). Thus whilst it is important not to under-estimate the significance of the emergence of the new right in German politics since

1989, it is difficult to present a strong case in favour of neorealist claims about the direction within which Germany is being pushed in the wake of unification.

A second and significantly more moderate position on Germany's choices within the international system has been offered by a number of conservative historians, most notably Hans Peter Schwarz and Timothy Garton Ash (Schwarz, 1994; Garton Ash, 1995; see also Baring, 1994; Bluth, 1995; Gillessen, 1994; Joffe, 1994 and Schollgen, 1994 for similar views). This is a position held mainly by an intellectual elite, although it can also claim increasing support from the wider German public (Hellmann, 1996:19-20). It is important to recognise that, unlike neorealists and more extreme German historians such as Zitleman, these commentators generally accept that international institutions have an important role to play in the conduct of Germany foreign policy (Paterson, 1996:139; Pulzer, 1995:6-7). However, the views offered by these historians share in common with a neorealist perspective a sense of a deep unease at what they see as the unified Germany's reluctance to "articulate its interests in a changed political climate" (Schwarz, 1994:111; also Garton Ash, 1995:75). This has become most clearly apparent in Germany's European integration strategies. Garton Ash and Schwarz have been among the first to identify that the costs imposed on Germany by unification as well as attempting broadening and deepening the EU simultaneously means that it has strong incentives to reduce its overall level of institutional commitments by choosing between the two integration strategies (Schwarz, 1994:111; Garton Ash, 1995:76-79). However, they remain confident that by making a choice between competing integration strategies, Germany can continue to benefit from participation in European institutions, and recommend that Germany concentrates its efforts on broadening the EU as its most fruitful path forward (Schwarz, 1994:119; Garton Ash, 1995:82). Another area where these analysts highlight tensions in Germany's current policies is in its pursuit of security within both NATO and the WEU. Schwarz argues that "(i)n the final analysis, Germany will have to decide whether it is better served by a broadly based North Atlantic system of defence such as has existed up till now, or by a West European system in which the United States no longer plays a central role" (Schwarz, 1994:121). Similar logic could even be extended to Germany's evolving attitudes

towards the use of military force abroad. Analysts such as Garton Ash and Schwarz might reason that by not adjusting its attitudes towards the use of force abroad, Germany found that its diplomatic prestige and leverage in international affairs were limited in comparison to its new status within the international system. It therefore began to re-assert itself in this area of policy, without abandoning its commitment to NATO altogether. Indeed, writing in 1994, Schwarz argued that Germany's tendencies towards 'crypto-pacficism' were noticeably hampering Germany's ability to pursue its national interest in developing an effective NATO (Schwarz, 1994:123).

In Garton Ash's assessment, by attempting to maintain all the multilateral commitments it inherited from the pre-1989 period, Germany has attempted to "choose not to choose" (Garton Ash, 1995:82). However, in his view, the danger of such a strategy is that "with increased demands on limited resources ... to choose not to choose does not mean that you make no choices. It only means that the choices will be made reactively, as a response to the combination of unexpected external developments ... and internal pressures from political, published and public opinion" (Garton Ash, 1995:82). Similarly, Schwarz argues that "(i)n the future, Germany will find itself compelled on objective grounds to make its foreign policy, and also its European policy, more self centred and tightly budgeted and less flexible than it has been, all in the service of a relatively narrowly defined national interest ... (Germany must face the) objective constraints ...arising from changes in the international system and the cost of unification. A political establishment which prides itself on its international outlook and 'post-national and European' ideology is now coming to the painful realisation that both at home and abroad such attitudes are no longer effective" (Schwarz, 1994:117). Whilst such analyses differ considerably from some of neorealism's starker predictions about Germany's position in the new international order, it does support the claim that it is being pushed by changes in the international system towards a foreign policy orientation which is considerably more assertive, and that this will encourage it to behave more independently within multilateral institutions than it has in the past.

At the mid-point on the spectrum of opinions in the debate on Germany's future strategic choices, a third possible position accords with an institutionalist analysis. As has been noted, institutionalism suggests that the multilateral institutional frameworks within which Germany participated over the post-war period will continue to have instrumental value for it during the post-unification period. This position would advocate a civilian power strategy for Germany, but importantly would also accept the need for it to make choices of priorities over the process of European integration. Similarly, Germany might continue to gain net economic benefits from participation in the process of European integration if it is willing to make a choice between either broadening or deepening the European Union. Such polices are in line with the predictions of institutionalist international relations theory. They are also broadly compatible with many of the features of the body of expert and public opinion Hellmann categorises as favouring a form of 'pragmatic multilateralism' for Germany (Hellmann, 1996: 5-9). However it could not be categorised as being particularly representative the pragmatic multilateralism position, or as having a particularly strong base of domestic political support. The most plausible reason why this is the case is that it adopts a rather 'weak' formulation of a civilian power argument which concedes that whilst Germany might retain a strongly multilateral, non-military and economic orientation, it is likely to have to make important reductions in its level of commitment to continued European integration based on instrumental calculations of its interests. In practice, however, most advocates of a civilian power strategy for Germany are not inclined to accept that Germany might be compelled to reduce its commitment to the process of European integration over the post-Cold War period. Similarly, professional analysts of Germany's foreign policy who adopt this position tend not to rely on arguments compatible with the instrumental logic suggested by institutionalist international relations theory. In combination, the limited level of domestic support for this strategic option plus the lack of support for it in the professional literature indicate that it is unlikely that Germany is being pushed in this broad direction.

A fourth position in the debate over the strategic choices faced by the united Germany has therefore emerged which develops arguments which are broadly compatible with

constructivist international relations theory. This position suggests that a civilian power strategy remains viable, but maintains that Germany will not have to make a choice between broadening and deepening the EU. This is because Germany's power within the European Union is over its constitutive politics (the power to shape the rules, norms and framework of integration) rather than over its regulative politics (its specific policies) (Bulmer, 1997:50). In particular, the close correspondence between German and European political institutions grants Germany an indirect and unintended influence within the EU far greater than it might achieve through the exertion of its more tangible political resources in any specific policy area (Bulmer, 1997; Katzenstein, 1997a). According to Bulmer, a key example of the occurrence of this in practice is the way in which the Bundesbank's autonomy and its influence of interest rate decisions within the EU has put Germany in a strong position to influence both the terms of transition to the EMU and its subsequent evolution (Bulmer, 1997:74). Bulmer and Paterson have explicitly applied this reasoning to Germany's ability to engage in both broadening and deepening the EU simultaneously. They suggest that "Germany's role as the 'paymaster' of the EU is increasingly likely to be exploited to secure side-payments on other policy areas, for instance on eastward enlargement" (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:31). Similarly, writing from a Marxian perspective, Markovits and Reich note that the close fit which exists between Germany's non-military orientation and the primarily economic focus of European institutions has also been a source of constitutive power for it (Markovits and Reich, 1997; see also Markovits and Reich, 1991). They suggest that "armed forces are not the basis of Germany's influence and power. Power lies in the prominence of the German economy: the Deutsche Mark's strength ... ; the Bundesbank's role as de facto central bank for all Europe; the volume and profitability of German exports; the size of German foreign investment; and varied forms of foreign 'subsidies' ... .The costs and benefits are palpable. Germany makes the most, Germany pays the most - and on balance Germany wins" (Markovitz and Reich, 1997:180-181). Understood in these terms, Germany's lack of willingness to assert its interests independently of the framework of European institutions may become a source of empowerment, endowing Germany with the role of a 'gentle giant' rather than an emergent leader within the EU (Bulmer and Paterson, 1996:31-32). In Pond's analysis, "The Federal Republic is

leading the way towards the European future not only because it is converting its economic weight to political power, but also because it made the original conceptual leap to a post-national identity four decades ago" (Pond, 1992: 114).

In the literature on Germany's foreign policy over the 1990s, the chief focus of the debate about the coherence of its current strategies and its choices for the future has been between the conservative historians and those advocating some formulation of civilian power arguments (see Pulzer, 1995). By far the most prominent body of opinion amongst the wider German public has been provided by those who have adopted a 'strong' formulation of a civilian power strategy for Germany. There is an extremely strong domestic constituency opposed to significant changes in Germany's post-war foreign policy orientation. Hellmann notes that within Germany, attitudes "remain favourable toward European integration", and there is "support the further development of its institutions" (Hellmann, 1996:20). Similarly, he identifies that "the German population continues to hold serious reservations about the role of the military in general and the use of force in particular" (Hellmann, 1996:20). This reluctance to accept changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation could be interpreted by constructivists as signalling that Germany is being pushed further in the direction of a civilian power strategy by the nature of change in the post Cold War international system. In turn, this could be used to bolster the case against the analysts of trends in Germany's foreign policy presented by conservative historians. However, it is possible to identify important weaknesses in the positions adopted in both sides of this debate in as much as they are both significantly out of step with German statesmen's behaviour and preferences as they have been articulated over the 1990s.

Those who have adopted a strong formulation of civilian power arguments have indeed, as the conservative historians have suggested, underestimated the significance of the changes which have taken place in Germany's strategic orientation over the 1990s. As has been identified, Germany's attitudes towards the security institutions within which it operates has shifted in important ways over the 1990s, in terms of the upgrading of its support for the WEU and the closely related NACC/PfP initiative with the US, and in terms of its shifting attitudes towards the use of its military force

abroad. It has done so despite the increased economic and human costs and risks to which this would expose Germany, and in the face of considerable domestic opposition. Similarly, in the latter half of the 1990s it has also begun to take very seriously the potential costs to Germany of pursuing a strategy of both broadening and deepening the European Union simultaneously. Again, this is contrary to a strong body of domestic opinion which opposes changes in Germany's European integration strategies. These changes indicate that there has been a major shift in the manner in which Germany has constructed its interests over the 1990s. By inference the analysis of 'power' in the international system offered by constructivists and proponents of a strong formulation of a civilian power strategy are faced with important limitations in providing an account of Germany's behaviour during the post-Cold War period. Germany's 'constitutive power' within multilateral institutional frameworks has simply not provided it with enough leverage to prevent it from making choices about its overall pattern of institutional commitments based on some underlying conception of its 'hard' political and economic interests.

Nevertheless, as has been identified, the changes which have taken place in Germany's strategies over the 1990s have been highly successful in fulfilling Germany's aim of ensuring continuity in the underlying normative fabric of the multilateral frameworks within which it operates. Contrary to the analysis presented by conservative historians, this success points the way forward to a fifth possible position in the debate about Germany's future strategic choices compatible with the analysis presented by a liberal model of the international system. A liberal analysis suggests that the emphasis placed by constructivists on the importance of Germany's distinctive identity and preferences as an actor within multilateral institutions, and on its appreciation of the changing nature of power within the international system is not wholly displaced, but must also be modified and developed. Germany's identity and preferences as an actor are distinctive, and do demonstrate a deep commitment to multilateralism as constructivists suggest. However, it is important to recognise that Germany's identity and preferences have undergone important shifts over the post Cold War period as part of a reflexive process of norm governed adaptation. This has not in any way undermined its deep commitment to multilateralism. On the contrary,

it has revealed the great extent to which Germany has internalised multilateral norms, and has strengthened its participation in multilateral frameworks. A liberal analysis also retains the focus of constructivism on the changing nature of power in the international system. However, instead of emphasising the assertive or 'constitutive' aspects of Germany's power, it emphasises the active or 'generative' nature of Germany's power (see the use of the term 'generative power' made by Bertram, 1990:61). Germany today "requires a more active and sustained German approach to building partnerships than has been evident in the past" (Wallace, 1995:63). To realise its generative power, Germany must move from being a passive 'policy taker' to taking a more active policy maker role in the international order (see Anderson, 1997:105). This approach offers Germany's partners the reassurance which allows it to maintain the credibility of its institutional commitments whilst simultaneously altering the terms on which it participates in multilateral frameworks. In this way, sustaining the *trust* of others about its underlying strategic intentions has become a major source of power for Germany. It allows it flexibility in its relations with its partners which would not otherwise be available to it by strengthening the degree of reciprocity embodied in its institutional commitments. It thereby opens up the possibility of maintaining its pursuit of policies which would otherwise be incompatible such as developing a stronger European defence identity within the Atlantic Alliance framework, remilitarising significantly without provoking a negative reaction from other powers, and pursuing broadening and deepening the EU in tandem.

Indeed, over the 1990s it appears to have been German statesmen themselves who have been most aware of the significance of reflexively adapting their preferences and taking a more active approach to managing their relations. First, there has been a remarkable degree of consensus amongst Germany's foreign policy elite about the need for significant adaptations in order to preserve its basic multilateral commitments. Comparing a recent article by the spokesperson of the SPD's Foreign Policy Working Group with similar articles by CDU members reveals no fundamentally significant policy differences - even on the issue of Germany's role in multilateral intervention outside of NATO's sphere (Voigt, 1996; Kinkel, 1992; Ruhe,

1993, Stuth, 1992). Second, German statesmen have ensured that the nature of the changes which have taken place in Germany's foreign policy orientation have been highly transparent. From a very early stage the German government realised the importance of clearly and publicly conveying Germany's benign strategic intentions towards its old allies and new neighbours. As their post unification strategies took shape, members of the German government published articles in the professional foreign policy literature coinciding with their major strategic initiatives. In an article in *NATO Review* in 1992, the then Foreign Minister Kinkel announced the founding of NACC late the previous year (Kinkel, 1992:4-5). In 1993, former Defence Minister Ruhe published an article in the IISS journal *Survival* publicly declaring the introduction of a motion to the Federal Parliament to clarify Germany's constitutional provisions on the use of force abroad (Ruhe, 1993:130). Finally, in an article in *International Affairs* in 1997, a member of a leading German foreign policy think tank with close connections to government circles published an article outlining the concepts of differentiated integration and a variable geometry Europe (Janning, 1997:41; see also Meiers, 1997:711). German statesmen and strategists appeared to be using public and professional literature as a means of communicating their changing strategic objectives transparently to its partners. Indeed, the routine nature of this practice in the wake of major strategic developments indicates that they recognised that the reassurance and trust in Germany this could promote was a major source of power for Germany. As they reflexively developed their foreign policy orientation, German politicians appreciated that transparency was a major source of power for it. Thus its use of the public and professional foreign policy literature itself became part of its grand strategy and its more active approach to managing its partnerships.

By contrast to the smooth and transparent evolution of the views of the German foreign policy elite, the wider public debate in Germany about its changing foreign policy orientation has proved perhaps the most difficult aspect of its transition in the post Cold War international system. The problems of economic and political adjustment raised during Germany's transition in the post Cold War period have raised deeper and more fundamental questions about German national identity which were largely suppressed during the Cold War period due to the division between east

and west (Pulzer, 1996: 303). This has been reflected most acutely in the huge controversy caused by the public debate over Germany's use of military force abroad in the mid-1990s (Smith *et al*, 1996: 11; Meiers, 1995: 84; Dorff, 1997: 60-65). Germany's conception of itself as an actor within the international system is therefore in a process of profound change, and this has exposed Germany's crisis of identity in the post Cold War international system. As Glees identifies, the view that Germany can remain a 'post-national' democracy "sounds almost too good to be true. It *is* too good to be true. There is no real evidence that such a thing exists or could ever exist. German unification was a clear expression of German nationalism. No serious politician could hope to win power by seeking to rubbish nationalism, nor would they be believed, either at home or abroad, if they did so" (Glees, 1996:259). There is therefore a desperate need for Germany to go through a process of "reinventing" itself and its conception of its national identity (Glees, 1996:279). Similarly, Dorff notes the way in which debates between realists who suggest that Germany is becoming a normal actor and those who see Germany as still far from normal because of its exaggerated multilateralism set up a false dichotomy. He suggests that "it is worth considering that the two theses are not really mutually exclusive .... (because) what we understand normalcy to include ... may be changing" (Dorff, 1997:66-67). That is to say, in the emerging international system Germany's 'normalisation' as an actor with a legitimate sense of its national identity is an essential precondition of its deep commitment to multilateralism, not its antithesis. Today, Germany requires a reflexive reconstruction of its underlying sense of national identity as a prerequisite to its effective participation within the emerging international community.

However, over the 1990s, the German political elite has showed considerable skill in managing this process of identity transition. In particular, unlike many in the Japanese and Chinese foreign policy elites, they have identified that they do face a major crisis of identity in negotiating the changes taking place in post Cold War international order. In turn, this has enabled them to take important steps towards squarely addressing and finding workable solutions to the problems this has generated for them. It remains to be seen whether the new SPD/Green government which came into office in September 1998 will continue along the route charted by Kohl's CDU/FDP

coalition. Nevertheless, Germany has certainly gone a long way down the road towards a purging or catharsis of the historical legacy it inherited from its role in the global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. The progress Germany has made in this process of catharsis returns this chapter to the theme of 'second chances' introduced in the opening paragraphs. In an essay entitled, "Germany's New International Loneliness", Christoph Bertram personifies Germany as an individual struggling to avoid loneliness in a changing world. He suggests that "Germany's foreign policy establishment has been haunted by the nightmare that Germany might become isolated and singularised. All its efforts ... were devoted to avoiding international loneliness. But as international structures weaken and Western collective bodies lose cohesion, domestic priorities impose themselves over foreign policy considerations and foreign policy itself becomes a much less easily defined choreography; and Germany runs the risk of finding herself lonely again" (Bertram, 1994:91). In terms of the metaphor of second chances, Bertram identifies that Germany's post war separation and its aftermath created deep and long lasting anxieties which resulted in Germany's fear of greater 'international loneliness'. This has led to its attempts to avoid loneliness by embedding itself in a network of relationships with states in both the east and the west, the overall aim being to avoid isolation.

Bertram acknowledges that the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989 have caused "uneasiness and even anxiety" in both Germany and its closest partners (Bertram, 1994:101). Yet he is also optimistic that Germany has much to gain from making the adjustments in its collective personality and identity. He argues that "loneliness will not be Germany's choice. There will, on the contrary, be a deeply ingrained preference by present as well as future generations of political leaders to pursue Germany's interests within a collective framework" (Bertram, 1994:102). He concludes that Germany's fear of international loneliness is unlikely to return it to its violent past at the risk of antagonising its friends and partners. He argues instead that "the real problem for German power in the future will not be how to constrain but how to generate ways to use it, how to get Germans to think of their contribution as essential for the common good, and how to get them to accept

responsibility for leadership as the major power in West and Central Europe. This will require restraint and confidence at the same time: it needs recognition that leadership is most effective though persuasion, not imposition, and confidence that ... Germany has become a mature democracy like others, exposed to all the problems and dangers which this implies - except a return to the past" (Bertram, 1994:104-105). For Germany, therefore, going through a phase of introspection and loneliness provided it with the key to successfully reclaiming itself after its period of separation, and offered new opportunities for its self-development. This has created problems and risks, but has also opened up new opportunities for intimacy and self expression that were lacking in its previous relationships. As with a separated or divorced person, Germany needs moral courage to try new relationships and find new interests. As with a separated or divorced person, Germany needs to have the resolution to establish a new sense of its identity as a basis for its relations with others in order to grasp the opportunities available to it. Today, a reunited Germany has been presented with an unprecedented opportunity to make up for the errors of its past history - it has been presented with a 'second chance'. Germany needs the confidence in its own judgement and capacities to break decisively with the loneliness of its turbulent past. This process will not be simple or without anxiety for it, and will require great statesmanship and skill on the part of German politicians. Yet Germany shows every sign today that it has begun to establish the new sense of identity which is crucial to its ability to make full use of the new opportunities available to it in the post Cold War era.

CHAPTER FOUR

Japan: *Towards Self Reliance*?

Building on themes developed in previous chapters, this discussion of Japanese state strategies since 1989 will utilise a metaphor taken from the trials and tribulations of day-to-day life and personal experience in the contemporary world, as documented in Anthony Giddens' *Modernity And Self Identity*. In this book, Giddens discusses what he terms 'the trajectory of the self' under the conditions of late modernity. During late modernity, Giddens argues, the self becomes "a reflexive project, for which the individual is responsible. ... (W)hat the individual becomes is dependent on the reconstructive endeavours in which she or he engages" (Giddens, 1991:75). With the decay of sources of self-identity anchored in tradition, individuals must learn to negotiate a plurality of life choices in ways which are historically distinctive. The key to achieving this, he argues, is "building ... a coherent and rewarding sense of identity" (Giddens, 1991:75). Individuals must learn to become more *self-reliant* in terms of the way in which their personal identity is defined and understood - more able to make decisions for themselves which previously would have been passively inherited from pre-established social practices. Giddens notes that this process of change presents both opportunities and dangers to the individual. In terms of possibilities, it opens up the chance of establishing relationships on the basis of trust and mutual commitment. Thus "(l)etting go of the past, through the various techniques of becoming free of oppressive emotional habits, generates a multiplicity of opportunities for self-development. The world becomes full of potential ways of being and acting, in terms of the ... involvements which the individual is now able to initiate" (Giddens, 1991:78). On the other hand, however, "'(t)aking charge of ones own life' involves risk because it means confronting a diversity of open possibilities. The individual must be prepared to make a more or less complete break with the past, if necessary, and to contemplate novel sources of action that simply cannot be guided by established habits. Security attained through sticking with established patterns is brittle, and at some point will crack" (Giddens, 1991:73). As a result, "(t)he individual must confront novel hazards as a necessary part of breaking way from established

patterns of behaviour, including the risk that things could possibly get worse than they were before. ... (A) book on self therapy describes things in the following way: 'If your life is ever going to get better, you'll have to get out of your rut, meet new people, explore new ideas and move along unfamiliar pathways. In a way the risks of self-growth involve going into the unknown ... the paradox is that until we give up all that feels secure, we can never really trust the friend, mate or job that offers us something. True security does not come from without, it comes from within. When we are really secure, we must place total trust in ourselves'" (Giddens, 1991:78).

Many features of the literature on 'self-help' Giddens identifies as symptomatic of distinctive processes of self identity formation under late modernity resonate strongly with themes developed in the literature on the new position Japan finds itself in the post Cold War international system. Kenneth Pyle's "*The Japanese Question: Power And Purpose In A New Era*" is a suitable case in point. According to Pyle, the 'Japanese Question' concerns the manner in which Japan constructs its own sense of purpose in the emerging international system as the basis for its relations with others (Pyle, 1996:6-7). Japan's crisis of national purpose has its origins in the highly dependent manner in which it has defined its role in the international system. In the past "(t)he Cold War structure of international politics allowed Japan to rely on the United States to guarantee its security and at the same time to maintain the international free trade order, while Japan was free to follow the policies of economic nationalism" (Pyle, 1996:3-4). It was these geopolitical circumstances which, combined with the skilful opportunism of Japan's post-war diplomacy, underpinned what Pyle has termed the 'Yoshida Doctrine'. The Yoshida Doctrine had two broad components - one political, and one economic. In political terms, the Yoshida Doctrine accepted and worked within the parameters of Japan's post war constitution, Article 9 which was generally interpreted at renouncing Japan's sovereign right to declare war on other states (Pyle, 1996:10). For its security, Japan relied for its defence on the guarantees provided to Japan though the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) signed in the early 1950's with the United States (Pyle, 1996:29-30). In economic terms, the Yoshida strategy was underpinned by the pursuit of economic nationalism oriented towards Japan's economic rehabilitation (Pyle, 1996:25). The

principles of the Yoshida Doctrine, Pyle argues, provided "a sense of national purpose that has guided the country to the present" (Pyle, 1996:21). Underpinned by a powerful national consensus able to unite both the right and the pacifist left in its support, "(t)his strategy was a brilliant success. In contrast to every other major power, Japan was spared the domestic controversy and disruption that an active foreign policy would have engendered and was free to concentrate its resources and energies on achieving economic growth. ... (As a result), the nation achieved its century's old goal of overtaking the industrial powers of the West" (Pyle, 1996:4).

However, in Pyle's view, the resurgence of the Japanese Question today reflects the way in which the Yoshida strategy has become inappropriate to contemporary Japan. He suggests that Japan is increasingly unable to live in the past and must actively confront the present and future: "(t)he wartime experience did leave a radical legacy, but ... (it) has increasingly lost its vitality and taken more a form of isolationism and resistance to an activist role in the world" (Pyle, 1996:120). A strategy which once provided a coherent and successful basis for Japan's sense of purpose in the world has been thrown into question by the changes that have occurred in the international system over the post war period, and particularly since 1989. The definition of the 'Japanese Question' offered by Pyle is significant because it begs the question of whether or not it is a country faced with an identity crisis in the emerging post Cold War international system. Is a country which previously relied upon others for its sense of political purpose in the world whilst it focused exclusively on economic issues being faced with the task of constructing its own sense of identity in the world? Is Japan today faced with the task of achieving greater '*self-reliance*', in much the same way that Giddens suggests that individuals must in their personal relations?

Although realist and institutionalist accounts of international relations are reluctant to draw parallels between trends in interpersonal and international relations, the theme of Japan moving towards 'self reliance' could be interpreted as having strong realist overtones. Yet it is important to recognise the distinctive features of an understanding of the metaphor of 'self-reliance' from a perspective informed by Giddens analysis of self identity formation. In the realist account, the presence of mistrust in the international system means that asymmetries in power provide the basis for

relationships between actors. To Giddens, however, secure relationships are negotiated on the basis of mutual consent by equal and independent partners. 'Self-reliance' in this context means developing a sense of self-identity which allows relationships to be sustained on the basis of trust and equality, rather than mistrust and inequality.

This chapter seeks to examine the issue of whether or not Japan is becoming more 'self reliant' in the manner in which it constructs its identity as an actor in the international system. It does so by examining post Cold War Japanese state strategies with respect to the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models. Conclusions will then be drawn as to the validity of each of these theoretical perspectives before returning to reflect on whether Japan is moving 'towards self reliance' in the post Cold War period.

Neorealism

A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the behaviour of Japan in the post Cold War international system. Most notable of these have been Kenneth Waltz, and Christopher Layne (Waltz, 1993, Layne 1993; Layne, 1996). Both Waltz and Layne make similar predictions as to Japan's future role in the emerging structure of international politics. They both see Japan as locked into a defensively positional location in the post Cold War international power structure. They predict that its position within the structure of the post-Cold War international system will encourage it to define its interests within that system according to its relative power capabilities in order to ensure its continued security. The outcomes compatible with this behaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity within Asia as part of a more general pattern of such behaviour at a global level.

In the case of Japanese state strategies since 1989, there is a significant body of evidence which tends to weigh in favour of neorealist hypotheses and predictions. The basic evidence in support of neorealist claims offered is that Japan has undoubtedly acquired the potential capability to become a serious geopolitical rival to the United

States (Layne 1996:71; Waltz, 1993:55; Buzan, 1988:558). From this insight, neorealists build their analysis of both political and economic dimensions of Japan's post Cold War state strategies. In political terms, neorealists see Japan's status as a potential strategic rival to the US as leading to signs of relative gains tensions in the US-Japan security alliance. Thus instances of both Japan's failure to remilitarise leading to tensions within US-Japan relations, and signs of its increasingly active and independent political and military involvement in international affairs having the same effect will be discussed in the account which follows. This is not contradictory to the kind of behaviour predicted by the neorealist model which locates the source of conflict between the two states in terms of their *potential* military capabilities.

The Gulf War has been the most important single event which has highlighted the 'politics of burden-sharing' within the US-Japan security relationship (Pharr, 1993). Japan's most significant contribution came in the form a somewhat belated $9 billion contribution, in addition to their previous $4 billion of financial assistance to the allied efforts (Lincoln,1993:233 and 219-238; Itoh, 1995:285). This response was made largely because "Japan would be severely criticised by the United States if the nation did nothing" (Lincoln, 1993:233). Japan's 'cheque book diplomacy' provoked criticisms of freeloading from the US (Sasae, 1994: 30), which in turn prompted criticism of American ingratitude from the Japanese side (Inoguchi, 1993:253). Such tensions provide evidence of the relative gains problems that neorealists predict will come to dog the US-Japan relationship. In the course of the Gulf conflict, it was Japan's failure to contribute militarily which was at the root of the politics of burden sharing with the United States. However, there are also signs of strains emerging in the US-Japan relationship arising from increased Japanese political assertiveness. Hughes notes the way in which Japan has adopted an increasingly independent stance towards North Korea in response to indications that it is moving towards nuclear weapons capability (Hughes, 1996[b]). This has frustrated the attempts by the US to orchestrate sanctions against North Korea to help reduce the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the region (Yahuda, 1996:251). Developments such as these can be interpreted from a neorealist perspective as evidence of emerging tensions between

Japan and the United States which have their ultimate source in the changed structure of the international system in 1989.

Furthermore, there is significant evidence that the 'politics of burden sharing' with the US interacts with Japan's relations with its East Asian counterparts. Buzan and Segal identify the reduction in US forces in the region in the early 1990s as at the root of a significant arms build-up in East Asia, although they do not see this as having yet become a regional arms race (Buzan and Segal, 1994:7). They identify Sino-Japanese relations as central to this arms dynamic, and indeed there have been signs of significant tensions emerging between China and Japan. These tensions have been most apparent over Chinese nuclear testing, China's moves towards acquiring a blue-water naval capability, and growing support in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan (Garrett and Glaser, 1997:397; Calder, 1996:144; see also Green and Self, 1996:36-37). By the same token, there is particular concern in China over the possible acquisition by Japan of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system which may allow it to neutralise China's nuclear deterrence system (Garrett and Glaser, 1997:392-4). Tensions between Japan and China also interact with the question of policy towards the two Koreas, particularly in response to indications that North Korea is moving towards nuclear weapons capability (Buzan and Segal, 1994:10). Moreover, there are signs that Japan's attempt to normalise relations with North Korea in order to secure a more independent political influence in the region has strained relations with South Korea (Ahn, 1993:270-272). These developments may all be interpreted by neorealists as emerging as a result of the withdrawal of the bipolar Cold War overlay.

There is also evidence that the presence of local rivalries and animosities within the East Asian security complex are likely to reinforce the structural incentives for Japan to play its part within the emerging regional arms dynamic. Japan is in direct territorial dispute with both China over the Senkaku Islands and Russia over ownership of the Northern Territories, and relations over these issues have both shown some signs of deterioration over the 1990s (for the former see Garrettt and Glaser, 1997: 397; Pyle, 1998:135; for the latter see Carlile, 1994:421; Berton, 1993:32-42). Indeed, until Germany brokered a compromise, the Japanese were very reluctant to

participate in the IMF's economic assistance package to the Soviet Union in 1991 because of the way in which this issue rebounded over the Northern Territories dispute (Saito, 1993:278).There are also important indirect sources of geopolitical dispute within the region which have had implications for Japan. Closer Japanese ties with Taiwan have become a source of tension with China, and conversely Chinese military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 have heightened concerns in Japan (Garrettt and Glaser, 1997:397-9; Yahuda, 1996:250). The prospect of Korean unification is a central underlying source of concern to Japan (Pyle, 1998:133), particularly when combined with the prospect of nuclear proliferation in this area. Disputes between China and ASEAN members over the Spratly Islands also have implications for Japan though its acute vulnerability to its oil supply from the Middle East and precedents set in international law (Calder, 1996:144; Er, 1996:998-1001). It is plausible to suggest that it is this which lies behind Japan's attempt to broker tensions over China's erection of structures on Mischief Reef in the Spratleys in 1995 (Er, 1996:1005). Moreover, the complexity of these disputes is reinforced by the legacy of Japanese imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in East Asia, notably in China and the Koreas (Buzan and Segal, 1994:4). This legacy could be understood by neorealists as lying at the source of the outstanding issue of Japan's failure to formally apologise for the atrocities committed under imperial Japan, especially during the Second World War. The sheer number as well as the historical and geopolitical complexity of these signs of emerging tensions between Japan and other regional players can be cited as evidence of relative gains problems resulting from the structural change in the distribution of power at a global level.

Japan's apparently contradictory stance with respect to its involvement with the United Nations is also amenable to a neorealist analysis. Since the early 1990s Japan has displayed an inconsistency in its behaviour towards the United Nations which suggests that it places its own vital interests and policy making autonomy over the wishes of the international community. Since 1994, Japan has made demands for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Itoh, 1995:283). However, unlike Germany, Japan has not to date reinterpreted its constitution so as to allow Self Defence Forces (SDF) participation in the multilateral use of force in an international

context in response to the criticism it sustained during the Gulf crisis. In 1992, Japan did establish a law allowing SDF participation in non-combat UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), and since that time has participated in a number of such activities, notably in Cambodia (Itoh, 1995). However, as George comments, "the successful launching of the PKO proposal ... did not represent a unilateral, ... unprompted gesture ...; the Gulf War dictated its timing, while external pressures largely shaped its content" (George, 1993:563). Akaha brings out the contradiction in Japan's stance to the UN when he notes that "(t)here is a near consensus among the Japanese that they deserve such a status ... . However, there is widespread concern that this would be contingent on Japan's willingness to participate in ... combat activities but that this would require a currently impossible revision of the constitution" (Akaha, 1995:68). Such views fit well with a neorealist account which emphasises the tendency of Japan to seek to obtain the benefits of membership in international institutions (such as the power of veto and the prestige of a permanent UNSC Seat) without incurring the associated costs of membership. . Moreover, it is not contradictory for neorealists to interpret Japan's PKO legislation as a first step on the road to Japan's remilitarisation, as well as being a reluctant response to the pressures imposed by the international community. From this perspective, Japan may be pursuing both these strategies simultaneously, using diplomacy and brinkmanship in order to maximise its interests whilst minimising its commitments.

Economic dimensions of Japan's state strategies also provide considerable evidence in favour of neorealist predictions about its behaviour within the post Cold War international system. Once again, most importantly there have been signs of increased economic tensions emerging in US-Japan relations since 1989. Realists such as Gilpin identify the underlying cause of these emerging tensions as Japan's structural status as a potential economic rival to the United States: "the long term problem for the United States ... is the repayment of the vast accumulated US debt ... to the Japanese. ... To accomplish this task, the United States will have to devalue the dollar even more substantially than it has already and achieve a trade surplus ... (Yet this would in turn) require appreciation of the Yen and Japanese importation of huge quantities of foreign products" (Gilpin, 1989:339). Examples of US-Japanese economic conflicts which

may be interpreted in this light have included the US's unilateral Super 301 provision of the 1989 US Trade Act, the bilateral US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) talks in 1990, and disputes over sharing technology over the codevelopment of the FS-X fighter aircraft for Japan (see Mastanduno, 1991:84-101; Lincoln, 1990:2; Inoguchi, 1993:80; Sasae, 1994:22-23). Bhagwati also documents the increased tensions between the US and Japan over trade in the automobiles industry during the 1990s (Bhagwati, 1996). Most importantly, however, throughout the 1990s there has been a tendency of the Japanese only to make concessions to open their relatively highly restricted markets in response to what they have termed "*gaitsu*" or foreign pressure. In a study of a key strategic sector of Japan's trade liberalisation, Mulgan notes that "the consensus amongst analysts of Japan's agricultural trade policy is that foreign pressure (particularly US pressure) has been the single most important factor accounting for market opening" (Mulgan, 1997:171). Such behaviour would seem characteristic of the kind of relative gains seeking behaviour predicted by the neorealist model.

Japan's economic relations with the EEC/EU also provide significant evidence in favour of neorealist predictions about its behaviour in the post Cold War international system. Inoguchi notes that relations between Japan and Europe, have also been dogged by disputes over trade (Inoguchi, 1991). Once again, industrial competition has been particularly fierce in the automobiles industry (Lehmann, 1992). Furthermore, it is important to recognise the ways in which developments in relations between Japan and Europe have fed back into further corroding US-Japanese relationships. For example, Nuttall notes the de facto alliance between the Europeans and the Japanese which emerged during the US-Japan car parts dispute (Nuttal, 1996:120). Similarly, over the development of the FS-X fighter, Europeans have displayed a willingness to undercut the US by selling Japan advanced equipment cheaply in order to capture the emerging weapons market in Pacific Asia (Inoguchi, 1993:80). Signs of tensions in Japan's increasingly independent relations with Europe, and the way this can be seen as in turn further exacerbating US-Japanese tensions once again may all be cited as evidence of emerging structural conflict within the international system.

Furthermore, Japan's economic strategies with respect to East Asian countries have displayed strong mercantilist tendencies. Its polices towards foreign investment, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) all reflect this pattern. In terms of foreign investment, East Asia has become the prime focus of Japan's attention. As Pyle notes, "(w)hat began to emerge in the 1990s were polices involving close business-government co-operation and the use of private investment and official aid to help Japanese multinationals build vertically integrated production networks throughout Asia". This in turn helped give Japanese industry great leverage in Asian markets (Pyle, 1998:128). This foreign investment strategy has been supported by Japan's use of ODA and its role in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Japan's aid policy, which has been one of the largest in the world over the 1990s, has a "strongly commercial orientation" and its aid is donated largely on a bilateral basis (Lincoln, 1993:111 and 118). Japan plays a relatively low key role in both global and regional multilateral development banks, with the exception of the Asian Development Bank, within which it plays a leading role. Lincoln notes that although technically the US and Japan share equal voting rights within the ADB, "Japan actually has the dominant voice at the bank" (Lincoln, 1993:134; also Yasutomo, 1993). This tendency towards mercantilism in the East Asia region could again be used to support the neorealist arguments about emerging structural tensions within the international order.

Indeed, such behaviour has begun to attract the criticism that Japan is moving towards establishing economic hegemony within an Asian context. Such accusations became particularly strong in the wake of Malaysia's calls in 1991 for the formation of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) to be led by Japan. Unlike other regional economic institutions, the proposal would have included Japan but excluded the US from the grouping. In the event, Japan distanced itself from the proposal (Buzan, 1998:82-83). Nevertheless, Lincoln notes that "Japanese government officials ... talked openly in the early 1990s about emerging regionalism under Japan's leadership" (Lincoln, 1993:1658). Indeed, Hall has argued that he "suspect(s) that the Japanese - avoiding offence to America by letting others do the talking - have been

very much behind Malaysia's proposal" (Hall, 1994:24). He sees this as part of Japan's "'cultural gap' ploy ... to encourage and amplify the recent postulation by certain Asians of a monolithic set of common values under attack" (Hall, 1994:22). Further evidence for such a 'cultural gap' ploy is available in the form of Japan's policies with respect to human rights in an Asian context. Arase notes that a "pattern of Japanese effort to shield Asian governments from Western pressure emerges when one examines Japanese responses to the other major cases of flagrant violence against unarmed civilians demonstrated by East Asian regimes" (Arase, 1993:945). Overall, although no firm evidence exists for or against whether or not Japan lies behind proposals for an EAEG, it remains a distinct possibility, especially given Japan's broader attempts to enhance its links with East Asian states. These developments could be interpreted by neorealists as evidence of an incipient Japanese strategy for the achievement of regional economic hegemony in East Asia, especially given the pronounced tendency for mercantilism in the region displayed by Japan.

Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of evidence which would favour a neorealist interpretation of Japan's state strategies since 1989. Important aspects of Japan's political and economic behaviour during this period indicate that Japan has begun to pursue a more active, self-assertive and narrowly self-interested role in both global and regional affairs.

Institutionalism

According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to institutionalise aspects of their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains from interaction. However, where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in the form of requiring considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they are likely to reject institutional options. Within institutionalist theory, the conditions under which institutions can become valued by states are those of complex interdependence. Japan's relations with states in North America and Western Europe may be regarded as fitting broadly within this ideal typical situation. However, it is

important to recognise that Japan's integration into the world economy varies across the regional and global levels in a way which reverses the situation in which Germany finds itself. Unlike Germany, Japan is more tightly integrated into the US and the wider global economy than it is in a regional context, despite the economic emergence of East Asia during the 1980's and 1990s. Thus whilst roughly 50% of Germany's exports are intra-regional, this figure is only around 35% for Japan, and whilst 30% of Japan's exports are to the US, this is the destination for only 10% of Germany's exports (see Figure 9.1 in Grieco, 1999:326; also Gangopadhyay, 1998:14). This trend is also reflected in patterns of Direct Foreign Investment made by Japan. Despite Japan's deep and growing involvement in intra-regional investment, Japan continues to invest more in the United States in both relative and absolute terms (Lincoln, 1993:175-181). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognised that a situation of complex interdependence may not be said to exist between many states in an Asian context. It is for this reason that the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defence in 1995, recommended that the US maintain a strong forward US defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region (Office For International Security Affairs, 1995; see also Nye, 1995). Whilst not fully substituting for a well developed pattern of interdependent relations in an East Asian context, Nye suggests that by maintaining its forward defence presence in East Asia the US can provide some of the preconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value for states such as Japan.

Important aspects of Japanese political and economic strategies since 1989 are amenable to an institutionalist interpretation. In political terms, institutionalists could point to evidence that counters neorealist claims about US-Japanese relations. In particular, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty has shown signs of endurance in the post Cold War period. Firm US commitment to Japan was made concrete by the 1995 US Department Of Defence report supervised by Nye. This development could be linked by institutionalists to debates over the status of Japan as a 'civilian power' in the post Cold War international system (Maull, 1990; also Funabashi, 1991, 1992, and 1995; Nye, 1992-3). Pyle notes important ways in which the "commonly heard

assertion that Japan has the world's third or fourth largest defence budget gives a wholly mistaken impression" (Pyle, 1996:126). However, the strongest evidence of Japan's civilian power status comes from the lack of any significant remilitarisation by Japan in the post Cold War period. The 1995 National Defence Program Outline (NDPO), published shortly after the Nye Report, indicates no significant change in Japan's long term defence planning strategy. Whilst it does suggest the strengthening of Japan's theatre missile defence capabilities which, as has been noted, has caused some alarm in China, what is most remarkable about the NDPO is that it suggests a possible *reduction* in the level of its SDF personnel from the current 180,000 to 150,000 (Sasae, 1994:17). Thus institutionalists can point to significant evidence to argue that, despite some 'transitional' tensions in the post 1989 US-Japan relationship, its underlying centrality to both countries remains intact. This would strongly support Nye's claim that the way in which "The United States and Japan have become interdependent on many levels" can underpin a strong US-Japanese relationship even in the absence of a common Soviet threat (Nye, 1992-3:99).

Institutionalists could also point to Japan's involvement in emerging regional security institutions in East Asia, notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to bolster their arguments about the degree to which Japan's response to regional security dynamics is contained by its relationship with the United States. The ARF was founded in 1994 as a forum for the discussion of security issues pertaining to the East Asia region (Mak, 1998:116). Its membership is exceptionally broad, including amongst others India, the European Union and the US as well as both Japan and China (see Buzan, 1998:75). Japan played an instrumental role in the establishment of the ARF (Yahuda, 1996:248). What Yahuda characterises as the "preventive diplomacy" aims of the institution are modest (Yahuda, 1996:274), and the ARF has been criticised for its weakness and vulnerability, particularly to China (Segal, 1998:325). Nevertheless, institutionalists could identify Japan's support for the ARF as an indication that its wider global commitments are tempering its response to emerging patterns of local tension in the East Asia region in the post Cold War period, and that it has the orientation towards multilateralism characteristic of a civilian power. Such arguments could be supported further by Japan's increased involvement in European regional

security institutions through its acquisition of observership status in both NATO and the CSCE (now OSCE) in the early 1990s (Inoguchi, 1992:83-84). Again, such developments could be seen as reflecting Japan's strong and increasing linkages with the wider world, and its interest in participating within multilateral security forums.

'Civilian power' type arguments could also, in principle, be extended to explaining constitutional debates within Japan over the extent and scale of its wider military role in the world, notably its extreme reluctance to revise the dominant interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution limiting the external involvement of the SDF in overseas conflicts, its non-military involvement in the Gulf conflict and its subsequent acceptance of a degree of involvement in UNPKO. However, it is revealing that neither of these interpretations are endorsed by advocates of a civilian power position such as Nye and Funabashi. Even prominent institutionalists appear cautious about adopting a benign interpretation of Japan's standing on this issue.

Nevertheless, institutionalists can supplement the evidence they present about Japan's political and military strategies with argument's deriving from Japan's global and regional economic strategies since 1989. Central to institutionalist arguments in this regard has been Japan's use of formal global and regional international economic institutions during this period. At the global level, Japan has continued its membership in major economic co-ordination institutions such as GATT, the G7 and the OECD. Inoguchi argues that Japan's role in international trade, money and technology transfers is essentially that of a "supporter" rather than a leader (Inoguchi, 1993:58-62). This accords with institutionalist claims that under situations of complex interdependence, the presence of international institutions can help secure policy co-ordination by different actors. Such arguments may be supplemented by institutionalists by examining Japan's recent role in emergent regional economic institutions in East Asia, notably its involvement in Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Established in 1989, APEC is the dominant regional international institution with an economic focus (Yahuda, 1996:276). As with the ARF, Japan, together with the United States, was instrumental in bringing this institution into being (Yahuda, 1996:248). Like the ARF, its function as merely a forum for

discussion makes it a relatively weak institution, and it also suffers from the problem that its is overshadowed by GATT/WTO (Segal, 1998:325). Nevertheless, at APEC's first meeting in 1989, ministers issued a declaration which stressed their firm commitment to timely completion of GATT's Uruguay Round (Soesastro, 1995:480). Japan's formal resistance to the EAEG proposal takes on particular significance in this regard because its decision was crucial in determining the failure of this institutional option. This could be seen as providing a strong signal about Japan's commitments to an open East Asia within the global trading system. Similarly, Japan's participation in the emerging Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) institution since its first meeting in 1996 provides further evidence of Japan's commitment to open economic multilateralism in the face of its growing dependence on world trade (Smith, 1998). Such developments bolster institutionalists' case that Japan's integration into the global economy has placed limits on the fungability of its political power, and reduced its incentives to attain regional hegemony over the emerging East Asian economy. They support the view that Japan has adopted a 'trading state' function in the international system as part of a broader civilian power strategy which prioritises economic security goals.

Finally, it is possible for institutionalists to offer an interpretation of Japan's aid and investment policies which attempts to stress the non-political incentives for pursuing such strategies. Inada, for example, has made the argument that strategic considerations are "not the only factor behind the provision of aid. Japan's own desire to maintain good relations with the country in question and to demonstrate its readiness to fulfil its political responsibilities also come into play" (Inada, 1989:412). He sees Japan's aid policy "as a hybrid that reflects both its reconfiguration of the forces of realpolitik and its striving for a world of 'complex interdependence'" (Inada, 1989:412). With regard to its policies on overseas investment, Japan has showed some signs of increased involvement with MDB's at the global and extra regional levels. Its share of voting rights in both the IMF and the World Bank increased in the early 1990s (Lincoln, 1993:133-134). Similarly, in 1989, Japan announced its decision to join the then newly established European Bank For Reconstruction And Development (EBRD) as part of a more general process of strengthening trilateral relations between the US, Europe and Japan (Yasutomo, 1993:330). From an institutionalist perspective,

these developments could support the view that Japan is responding to increased functional incentives to co-operate at a global level created by its interdependence with the world economy, and in doing so it is adopting an economics oriented 'civilian power' foreign policy.

Overall, there would seem to be significant evidence that Japan's use of international institutions reflects the way in which its economic interdependence varies across regional and global levels. At the level of the global economy, within which Japan is tightly integrated, Japan makes extensive use of both international security and economic institutions. At a regional level, its use of institutions is weaker, but still significant. Indeed, in important respects, the account offered by institutionalism is more convincing than that offered by the neorealist model, at least in regard to the policies Japan has so far pursued since 1989. Whilst neorealism can highlight signs of tensions in Japan's relationships with other powers, institutionalists could respond by arguing that Japan's incentives to remain committed to the global international institutions would appear to be strong on the basis of its recent and present behaviour.

Liberalism

Liberalism stresses the significance of states' foreign policy preferences, which in turn reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of preferences in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines a set of predictions directly relevant to Japan's state strategies over the post Cold War period. First, it opens up the possibility that Japan can pursue strategies which fall outside the ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the influence of its domestic politics on its foreign policy behaviour. Second, in the case of Japan it is important to recognise that patterns of *non-liberal* behaviour are entirely compatible with the predictions of the liberal model. Such behaviour can be explained with reference to the articulation of non-liberal political preferences within the international system as a direct function of a state's underlying political identity as an actor.

There is strong evidence that Japan's political preferences have influenced its behaviour in the post Cold War international system in a way which poses significant anomalies to both neorealist and institutionalist models. First, Japan's failure to remilitarise is problematic from the point of view of neorealism. It is difficult for neorealists to sustain an overall interpretation of Japan's state strategies in the light of its failure to revise its defence planning commitments in 1995. Unlike Japan's attitudes towards its involvement in the Gulf and UNPKO, for Japan to pursue a 'free-riding' strategy with regard to potential direct threats to its own security from East Asia requires it to run definite risks, and by implication involves significant costs for Japan. As neorealists themselves identify, Japan finds itself in a regional context in which potential instability looms large (Layne, 1996). To some extent, the conclusions of the Nye Report could help persuade Japanese policy makers that there is still a strong US commitment to the East Asia region. However, as Buzan recognises, "(F)or Japan, this raises the possibility that the guarantee might be hollow, and would not be honoured if Japan got into difficulties with a regional neighbour"(Buzan, 1995:33). Under these circumstances, Japan's tight interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution is no longer a convenient diplomatic fig leaf for Japan, but becomes a major liability for it. Yet in the face of these highly consequential risks, Japan is not responding in the way neorealists predict by moving away from a reliance on the US for its defence capabilities. On the contrary, as the NDPO indicates "there is little evidence that Japanese planners are thinking seriously about a defence strategy independent of US forces" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:193).

Similarly, as Heginbotham and Samuels note, "(p)erhaps the oddest thing from the perspective of structural realism .... has been the Japanese failure to exhibit a sensitivity to the relative distribution of gains that have accrued to China from its economic relations with Japan" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:195). As neorealists identify, China is Japan's strongest potential military rival in the East Asia region. Yet "Japan has done little to stifle China's economic growth. To the contrary, Japan has competed vigorously for a major investment presence in China. It has used its influence in the Asian Development Bank and elsewhere to argue actively for the

early lifting of the sanctions imposed on China after the suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrators in 1989, and Japanese business leaders visited China within months to reaffirm the commercial relationship. Today, more Japanese ODA goes to China than to any other country. As a partial consequence of Japanese ... investments, the Chinese economy has grown at a double digit pace for over a decade" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:195). Yet this economic growth has enabled China to create a credible blue water navy and improve its airforce substantially. Furthermore, in the face of the signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in East Asia, Japan's 1991 announcement that in future Japan's ODA decisions would be tied to political criteria has proved a hollow one: "the Japanese government announced in 1994 that annual economic aid for the three year period after 1996 would be increased by more than 40%" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:21-2). Such behaviour runs heavily against the grain of neorealist predictions about Japan's behaviour within the post Cold War international system.

Equally, the nature of Japan's economic relationships poses significant problems for institutionalist predictions. Institutionalist arguments tend to gloss over the significance of Japan's troubled economic relations with industrialised states and the role played by *gaitsu* as a general feature of Japan's economic relations with the West. They also suffer from the limitation that Japan's aid and investment strategies are strongly bilateral and oriented in favour of Japanese business interests rather than free trade. Indeed, the degree of politicisation of Japan's investment strategies in the ADB, the major international institution used by Japan with regard to its investment in China, is so strong that Wan has interpreted it as evidence that it has taken on intrinsic rather than instrumental value for Japanese policy makers (Wan, 1995-6:526). Such behaviour is beyond explanation using institutionalism's functionalist logic, and in Wan's view reflects Japan's preferences for multilateralism. He insists that "This cannot be explained away simply as a coincidence of what Japan wants and what the ADB wants. One may argue that Japan defines what it wants in the light of what the bank wants in the first place" (Wan, 1995-6:527). Wan's argument that Japan's preferences over its investment strategies in East Asia are fundamentally multilateral in orientation, however, remains an unconvincing one. Japan's use of the ADB is

highly distinctive when compared with its use of all other regional and global MDB's (Yasutomo, 1993). This can only cast doubt on Japan's motives for using the ADB in the manner that it does. Nevertheless, Wan's account does serve to identify the limitations of an institutionalist account of its economic strategies in China and East Asia more generally by bringing out the importance of Japan's distinctive political preferences in determining its aid and investment policies.

Heginbotham and Samuels have developed a characterisation of Japan's foreign policy preferences which is capable of explaining the anomalies faced by both neorealist and instititionalist accounts of Japan's post Cold War state strategies. They argue that Japan's strategies in the post Cold War international system reflect 'mercantile realist' preferences on the part of the Japanese state. Meracantile realism shares several common elements with other forms of realism, including the assumption that states are the most important actors in world politics, that states seek to maximise their power, and that states are in competition for relative power and security (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:198). However, unlike other forms of realism, mercantile realism stresses the primacy of techno-economic strategic goals in the making of foreign policy decisions. Importantly Heginbotham and Samuels argue that a state with mercantile realist preferences may pursue techno-economic interests at the expense of politico-military interests (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:200-201). It will define its strength in the international system in terms of its wealth and technology, and its position in terms of its industrial structure. As a result, mercantile realists will balance against wealthy states endowed with strong, technology intensive industries, and simultaneously will not see states with different industrial structures to its own as threatening (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:200).

A mercantile realist characterisation of Japanese state preferences can explain the distinctive features of Japan's foreign policy behaviour within the post Cold War international system. First, Japan's failure to remilitarise significantly fits well into a mercantile realist explanation of its state strategies. From a mercantile realist perspective, "the debates over the role of Japan's conventional forces and on whether or not Japan should become a 'normal' nation is coloured by economic considerations

and the exigencies of economic diplomacy" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:205). That is to say, it reflects the priority Japan gives to techno-economic rather than politico-military priorities in the formulation of its national security interests. This explains why Japan does not appear to be particularly concerned about the political risks involved in pursuing such a strategy. It is not that Japan is 'free riding' on US politico-military capability as neorealists might suggest, but rather that politico-military risks simply do not receive a high priority in terms of its techno-economic foreign policy decision making calculus. Furthermore, the concept of mercantile realism can also explain aspects of Japan's relations with China which are anomalous to neorealism. Unlike the US and Japan, China and Japan have very different industrial structures, and so from a mercantile realist perspective are not rivals and may develop a complementary relationship.

The concept of mercantile realism also explains why there are also anomalies in using Japan's failure to remilitarise in interpreting its strategies in institutionalist terms. The concept of mercantile realism shares with institutionalism the prediction that states will give highest priority to their economic interests. In this sense they both predict that Japan will adopt a non-military response to the end of the Cold War. However, institutionalism cannot explain the particular manner in which Japan has gone about pursuing an essentially non-military strategy. As has been noted, Japanese economic relations with Asia in general and China in particular fit poorly with the predictions of the institutionalist model because they are highly politicised. Yet it is precisely such tendencies which fit well with the idea that Japan has mercantile realist preferences. At the same time Japan's economic relations with its Asian neighbours have been good whilst those with the Western powers continue to be troubled. Again, this fits the pattern of behaviour suggested by mercantile realism. States which adopt mercantile realist preferences will balance against rivals with similar industrial structures, whereas institutionalism will predict that states which share advanced industrial structures will be encouraged to cooperate to achieve absolute gains from economic interaction.

Thus, unlike both neorealism and institutionalism, a focus on Japan's mercantile realist state preferences can develop a single consistent account of the characteristic way in which Japan prioritises techno-economic over politico-military goals. From a mercantile realist perspective, these different aspects of Japan's strategies are not only more amenable to a single overall explanation, but are also mutually reinforcing. Indeed, other specialists on Japan's foreign policy have also identified these general characteristics of its state strategies over the post Cold War period (Blaker, 1993; Pyle, 1998:122-124). Even the prominent neorealist Joseph Grieco is prepared to accept that Japan's distinctive foreign policy preferences present anomalies to neorealist explanation of Japan's post Cold War state strategies (Grieco, 1999). More fundamentally, however, a characterisation of Japan's foreign policy preferences as mercantile realist accords remarkably with the fundamental tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine - a low political profile for the Japanese state combined with economic nationalism. Noting that the break-up of the Soviet Union has "elicited no sharp changes" in Japan's security policies, Katzenstein and Okawara conclude that "(w)hen international structures change as rapidly as they have in the late 1980's, Japanese policy makers have defined the objectives and modalities of their political strategies partly in response to the cues that domestic structures provide and in part accord with the standards of appropriateness that the normative context for action suggest to them" (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993:116 and 117; see also Macleod, 1997:110). Despite dramatic changes in the structure of the international system, Japan appears to be continuing to articulate today the strategic preferences that it developed during the post war period.

Overall, then, it would seem that a strong case can be made for the prediction of the liberal model. This is not to claim that Japan itself has articulated a broadly liberal set of foreign policy preferences, but rather that its foreign policy preferences fall outside the ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the strong influence of the distinctive characteristics of Japanese domestic politics on its international behaviour. As a result, a mercantile realist characterisation of Japan's political preferences provides the most consistent overall account of patterns of behaviour which are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist models, notably

the way it combines a non-military, non-political orientation with strong elements of economic nationalism. Moreover, it enables what are otherwise contradictory elements of Japan's foreign policy to be seen as mutually reinforcing aspects of a single underlying strategy. This strategy, which has its origins in the post-war Yoshida Doctrine, strongly reflects domestic structures and norms which grew up during the period of the Cold War, and in this sense Japan's post Cold War foreign policy would seem to be marked by a high degree of continuity. However, such a conclusion merely raises the deeper and more fundamental issue of the extent to which the course upon which Japan is currently set appears to be proving a sustainable one. To do so requires an examination of the way domestic and international politics have interacted so as to define the agenda for Japan's political choices in the contemporary international system.

Japan's Choices

In 1989, Van Wolferen famously made a case for seeing Japan's distinctive political characteristics as both sustainable, and also as presenting a viable and coherent way forward for it within the emerging international system (Van Wolferen, 1990). After noting that the argument is often made that fundamental changes are in store for Japan, he argued that "(t)oday (it) ... is stuck at the same crossroads as twenty-five years ago: one where the Japanese people are expected to choose a new approach to the world, helped along by the supposed changes in their own society, but always in a direction mapped out by Westerners" (Van Wolferen, 1990:16). What the 'Japan at the crossroads' argument failed to take into account, according to Van Wolferen, was that "(t)he systematic deprivation of choice in practically all realms of life bearing on the political organisation of Japan is essential for keeping the (Japanese political) System on an even keel." (Van Wolferen, 1990:409). Notably, he identified absence of choice in the Japanese party system, and in its highly integrated, *kieretsu* dominated economy (Van Wolferen, 1990:409). Van Wolferen concluded that despite the changes forecast by many in the late 1980's in the wake of mounting international pressures, "nothing ... has made me want to revise my assessment of the basic working of the Japanese power system" (Van Wolferen, 1990:434)

Developments in Japan in the 1990s call radically into question Van Wolferen's assessment of the prospects for underlying continuity of the Japanese domestic 'System' in the face of international change. Two have been particularly important in this regard: changes in Japan's party system, and changes in the structure of its domestic economy. In 1993, Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) found itself unable to sustain a large enough majority in the Diet to form a government for the first time since it was founded in 1955 (Pyle, 1996:147). Pyle has identified that "(a)lthough issues of electoral reform were the proximate cause of the vote of no confidence ... the primary motive force was change in the international system" in the form of mounting pressure for the abandonment of the Yoshida strategy (Pyle, 1996:149). Moreover, this fluid situation in Japanese party policies has continued to the present day (Jain, 1997). Changes in the structure of Japan's economy have been more recent, but equally dramatic. After years of slow down, Japan's economy went into recession in 1998. Japan's economic problems are structural rather than cyclical, and concern its basic system of economic management (Funabashi, 1998a:28). In combination, these dramatic changes have seriously challenged the very aspects of the Japanese 'System' identified by Van Wolferen only in 1989 as being so distinctive and durable.

Such developments have equally important implications for the future viability of the pursuit of mercantile realist strategies by Japan. In the conclusions to their article, Heginbotham and Samuels speculate briefly on this issue (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:207-209). Citing the precedent of fifteenth-century Venice, they argue that skilful use of statecraft and diplomacy may allow Japan to succeed and even prosper in its pursuit of mercantile realist axioms: "Japan may ultimately pay a high penalty for its apparent adherence to a different causal model of what makes states succeed or fail. Then again, by following a different, equally rational strategy, it may avoid these costs and emerge stronger and safer than before" (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999:208). Indeed, Tadokoro identifies a high degree of domestic support in Japan for what he refers to as a 'conservative' position whose "adherents are reluctant to change Japan's existing stance on foreign policy and domestic economic policy ... (and

whose) appeal lies in their promise of stability in politics and people's daily lives" (Tadokoro, 1994:1011). However, he also recognises that conservatives in Japan face severe difficulties in the face of the changes their country confronts because "their approach would perpetuate the kind of difficulties Japan now faces" (Tadokoro, 1994: 1011; see also Blaker, 1993:31). Further pursuit of the kind of policies favoured by conservatives would only exacerbate Japan's political and economic difficulties, and thereby increase the pressures for fundamental reform. In this way, the political and economic changes taking place within Japan have undermined the very basis of the Yoshida strategy, which presupposed that both a politically reactive international role and economic nationalism could be pursued simultaneously. In the present context it would seem that both pillars of Japanese foreign policy have been seriously undermined, and at least one of them has to give.

Institutionalists could interpret the domestic changes taking place in Japan as evidence that Japan is being pushed in the direction of a more fully developed civilian power strategy within the emerging international system. For Japan to take on a civilian power international role would require it to undertake both significant domestic political and economic adjustments. In political terms it must "evolve into a wholly new type of power that helps furnish international public goods such as refugee resettlement, natural disaster relief, development of economic infrastructure, and human resources improvements. It must also exercise leadership in guaranteeing human rights and cleaning up the Earth's environment" (Funabashi, 1992:37; see also Funabashi, 1995; Lincoln, 1993:258-266). Such a strategy is potentially attractive for Japan because it allows it to respond to international pressures for it to play a larger political role in the world whilst not engaging in remilitarisation which would, it is argued, necessarily "stimulate fears and countermeasures by its Asian neighbours that would limit any advantages of rearming" (Nye, 1992-3:107). In economic terms, a civilian power strategy would mean a move away from the economic nationalism of the past, towards a more active and fully supportive role in managing the international economy. Institutionalists could argue that Japan's economic difficulties suggest that it "cannot continue to sustain its position as a global economic power while maintaining a keiretsu-organised domestic economy" (Inoguchi and Jain, 1997:3-4).

As Nye notes, "(s)mall states may be able to act as free riders, but a country of Japan's size cannot" (Nye, 1992-3:108). The failure of Japan's tightly integrated economy is likely to make it unable to continue to afford to pursue expensive overseas aid and investment strategies. Moreover, the tightly integrated domestic economic base which these policies presuppose for their effectiveness has been severely eroded in the wake of internationalising trends, leading to over-investment and poor returns (Funabashi, 1998a:27). Institutionalists could also identify a significant group of civilian power advocates within Japan as evidence that there is substance to their arguments (Tadokoro, 1994:1013).

However, an institutionalist interpretation of the domestic changes taking place in Japan faces two important difficulties. The first has already been touched upon - Japan's failure to remilitarise requires it to run significant security risks and leaves it dependent on the US for its security. The second is that advocating a civilian power strategy for Japan plays directly into the hands of conservatives who oppose fundamental change in its international outlook. As Pyle notes, Japan's postwar diplomats were careful to stress Japan's commitment to internationalist goals as a pretext for their more genuine concern with the exclusive pursuit of economic nationalism (Pyle, 1996:122). Thus it is not surprising that "(d)ie hard adherents to the Yoshida strategy were elated by the Nye report" (Pyle, 1996:173). The inadequacy of an institutionalist interpretation of domestic change in Japan is reflected even in the very language they use in their discussion of Japan's post Cold War foreign policy. The title of Nye's 1992 article in Foreign Policy, "*Coping With Japan*", provides an excellent example of the case in point. In Nye's analysis, Japan is a source of potential difficulties which it is the burden of the US to cope with. This language underscores the degree to which institutionalists implicitly accept deeply held assumptions about the nature of the 'international system' that they share in common with neorealists - that, in the context of international anarchy, Japan is incapable of being trusted by the US. Although, unlike neorealists, they would argue that it is precisely for this reason that the current US-Japan security alliance must be preserved, institutionalists do not recognise the essential contradiction involved in adopting such a position. It is *precisely* this outlook which actively discourages a more internationalist Japanese

orientation, so undermining the credibility of an institutionalist interpretation of domestic trends in Japan. Furthermore, by restricting themselves to the view that it is the United States, rather than Japan itself, which must shoulder Japan's security problems, institutionalists foreclose debate about Japan's current international position in a number of important ways. First, institutionalists are limited to making the argument that the US-Japan bilateral security alliance as it currently stands must remain the central focus of Japan's security polices since it represents the only way in which it can provide for its own protection whilst not triggering regional geopolitical instability. Second, they allow Japanese statesmen to continue to support a civilian power orientation for Japan in public whilst in practice they pursue mercantile realist strategies (see statement by PM Kaifu, 1991). In turn this produces a lack of transparency in the articulation of Japan's foreign policy preferences. Thirdly, institutionalists restrict the possibility of seeing Japan's changing role in the world as providing new *opportunities* for a stronger, US-Japan security alliance which has been renegotiated on the basis of greater equality. Thus an institutionalist interpretation of domestic trends in Japanese society is not only internally contradictory, but places political debate about Japan's future within the intellectual straightjacket provided by core neorealist assumptions.

A third possible interpretation of domestic change in Japan can be provided by neorealist analysis. From a neorealist perspective, Japan's failure to respond to the incentives provided by structural change in the international system since 1989 is not necessarily problematic. Rather, neorealism predicts that Japan will be punished for failing to respond to the incentives for behaviour provided by the emerging structure. Neorealists could therefore interpret the dramatic domestic changes in Japan as signalling that it is being reluctantly edged towards shaking off the shackles imposed on it by its position within Cold War bipolarity. Changes in its party system could be understood as indicating that it is beginning to overcome the political passivity inherent in the Yoshida strategy. As has been discussed, Japan has shown significant signs of greater political independence and assertiveness in its post Cold War foreign policy, and moreover these incidents have caused alarm at both the regional and global levels. It might also be argued that Japan's current economic difficulties have

left it exposed and vulnerable within the international economy. Contrary to the logic of institutionalist analysis, neorealists could suggest that these pressures are likely to lead to increased domestic incentives for the pursuit of mercantilism and closed regionalism by Japan. Contrary to mercantile realism, Japan's economic difficulties would mean that Japan's aid and investment strategies with respect to China would become tighter as limitations on Japan's finances encourage it to prioritise between potential recipients of its assistance within the region. In turn, these economic developments would be likely to reinforce Sino-Japanese political rivalries in the East Asia region, and in the longer term spark a contest between these two powers for regional hegemony. Finally, such developments would play to a definite domestic constituency within Japan - that of 'traditional nationalism' (Tadokoro, 1994:1014). Although at present this is not a position which has gained much popularity amongst reformers, neorealists could argue that support for such a political standpoint is likely to grow in the future. Neorealists could supplement this argument by pointing to the lessons provided by history for states which persistently ignore the incentives provided by the structure of the international system. An obvious historical parallel is the Anglo-Dutch conflict in the Seventeenth century, in which the Dutch were drawn reluctantly and unexpectedly into a war which they were to lose between their trading partners and former allies in the face of protectionist trade legislation (Hisahiko, 1990:16). However skilful Japanese statesmanship and diplomacy is, from a neorealist perspective, there are strong precedents to indicate that Japan runs a high risk of being eliminated as a significant actor within that system if it fails to respond to the structural changes in the international system taking place.

Nevertheless, the largest and most influential domestic constituency within Japan pushing for political reform is neither the traditional nationalists nor the advocates of a civilian power role for Japan. Instead they are proponents of what Tadokoro refers to as Japan as a 'normal state' (Tadokoro, 1994:1012). These reformists are at present spearheaded by Ichiro Ozawa's New Frontier Party (NFP), formed in late 1994 (Jain, 1997:23). The emergence of Ozawa's party has been interpreted as a direct response to the "mounting external pressures and internal demands that Japan contributes more fully to the *multilateral* solution of regional and global problems" (Inoguchi and Jain,

1997:10, emphasis added; see also Fukushima, 1996:55). By 'normal nation', it is not meant that Japan is to become a highly centralised state which responds as any other to the incentives of the international system's anarchic structure, as might be implied by neorealist analysis. Contrary to neorealism, 'normalisation' is actually associated with the cause of a major decentralisation of political power towards local authorities (Nakano, 1998:508; see also Ozawa, 1994:62-90). Moroever, it represents a desire to become a normal member of international society and thereby "actively participate in the international community" in both economic *and* political terms (Jain, 1997:27; see also Nanako, 1998:510). Neorealists assume, and institutionalists tacitly accept, that any such desire is inherently contradictory because their analysis suggests that, by remilitarising to any significant degree, Japan will trigger responses by other powers which will undercut its ability to contribute to global multilateral institutions. However, it is important to consider the possibility that the emergence of the 'normal nation' school of thought in Japanese politics is not merely a temporary anomaly, but rather represents a coherent and direct response to *systemic pressures* at the international level. Indeed, even institutionalist analysts who have advocated a civilian power strategy for Japan have recently begun to acknowledge that its structural inability to respond effectively with the East Asian economic crisis and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia in the late 1990s has highlighted its deep need to exercise political leadership in the international community (Funabashi, 1998a). However, this would involve a shift away from Japan's predominantly economic orientation without triggering fear and alarm in East Asia about its increasing independence and political assertiveness. It therefore implies a third possible interpretation of the international sources of domestic changes in Japan since 1989 to counter those put forward by both institutionalists and neorealists.

It is the thorny issue of Japan's ability to engage in a significant degree of remilitarisation without triggering a regional balance of power struggle within East Asia which is the central obstacle to seeing Japan's pursuit of 'normal nation' polices as a coherent response to its new position within the post Cold War international system. In this context, Buzan's recent suggestion that "a policy of non-offensive defence (NOD) could solve many of the difficult defence questions that Japan now

faces" (Buzan, 1995:25) is suggestive because it fits poorly within both neorealist and institutionalist positions. This is because a NOD policy challenges the assumption of a direct link between the existence of international anarchy and automatic mistrust of a Japan which engages in significant militarisation. A NOD strategy for Japan would contain the following four ingredients: a robust capacity for self-defence; a high sensitivity to the concerns of neighbours; a capability to play a significant role in international aid and peacekeeping; and a capability for recessed deterrence (Buzan, 1995:40-41). Neorealists would no doubt criticise the plausibility of such a strategy by making the argument that in strategic terms it is fundamentally problematic to engage in a 'non-offensive' form of remilitarisation. For example, Buzan suggests that for Japan to acquire a 'robust capability for territorial defence' it must acquire tactical missile defence (TMD) systems.[1] As has been noted, the possibility of precisely this development has sparked concerns in China. It is at this stage, however, that the full significance of Buzan's advocacy of a NOD strategy for Japan becomes apparent. That Buzan questions the existence of a direct link between international anarchy and mistrust within the international system begs the question of identifying the underlying reasons *why* NOD might be applicable to Japan's strategic situation.

Buzan's suggestion of NOD for Japan scratches the surface of deeper underlying issues facing Japan in the world today. In particular, it touches upon the idea that sustaining *trust* about Japan's strategic intentions has become a major source of potential *power* for it within the emerging international system. The case of Japan's acquisition of TMD itself provides a good example of precisely this point. Buzan suggests that for Japan to acquire a TMD system need not spark serious anxiety in Japan's neighbours "(s)o long as it was not combined with an offensive capability", and is reinforced by reassurance diplomacy which is sensitive to the security concerns of neighbours (Buzan, 1995:40). In other words, through self-restraint and reassurance

[1]Christensen notes that, after five years of US pressure over TMD, the Japanese have recently agreed to joint TMD research with the Untied States after the launch of a North Korean rocket across Japanese territory on August 31st 1998 (Christensen, 1999:64). He also identifies that the initial US proposal for joint TMD development with Japan came in 1993, and was subsequently "folded into" the Nye initiative. Japan's five year procrastination over the issue and its reactive response to the North Korean rocket incident in 1998 indicate the way in which the proposals for joint TMD development are incompatible with the general thrust of the Nye Report. By maintaining a strong US forward defence presence in East Asia, the US invites and encourages Japanese passivity on security issues.

to others, Japan will be able to take measures *which it otherwise would not be able to do*. Buzan generalises this principle to broader aspects of Japan's post Cold War state strategies. He argues that NOD would make Japan able to deal with the possibility of regional military threats even in the absence of US support, whilst at the same time it would not intimidate its East Asian neighbours. It would also allow Japan to achieve this whilst remaining non-nuclear, and in this way remain compatible with mainstream domestic public option in Japan (Buzan, 1995:39-40). Furthermore, NOD would actually help *strengthen* an increasingly brittle US-Japan security alliance because it would "make Japan more self-reliant ... thereby allowing the United States to reduce its commitments to Japan" (Buzan, 1995:40). Others have echoed the insight that trust about its strategic intentions has become a major source of power for it within the international system when they identify the importance of transparency measures for Japan's regional security policy (Hughes, 1996[a]:244; Kawasaki, 1996:494). Both neorealist and institutionalist models suggest that in a regional context where levels of interdependence are low and unevenly distributed, transparency measures should be difficult to implement and ill suited to diffuse reciprocity. Yet this is precisely what makes their identification highly significant from a liberal perspective. It suggests that the international *system* has taken on distinctive properties which make information about states' intentions important for determining outcomes, and as such an important source of power for Japan.

In as much as it suggests that by becoming more self reliant Japan might strengthen its relations with its partners, Buzan's discussion of the relevance of NOD for Japan also has important implications for the degree of *equality* its relationships embody. This has become most acutely apparent in Japan's interactions with the United States over the 1990s, as has been highlighted by the most extensive recent analysis of the US-Japan security alliance (Mochizuki *et al*, 1998; see also Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 1998; Spruyt, 1998). In the attempt to outline their "liberal vision" for their security alliance, Mochizuki *et al* recommend that the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty be restructured in order to strengthen its foundations. They advocate the removal of US marine combat forces from bases on Okinawa by 2003 (whilst leaving air force force and naval units plus logistical supports), reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution

to allow it to participate in collective self defence, and cooperative US-Japanese research into TMD systems (Mochizuki *et al*, 1998:195-196, 196-198, and 201-202). These steps would imply major shifts from the US strategy recommended by the Nye report through a significant reduction in the US's forward defence posture in East Asia. Mochizuki *et al* argue that such measures would strengthen the US-Japan security relationship by making it a "more reciprocal partnership". It would encourage Japan to become an "active ally" rather than a "passive partner" (Mochizuki *et al*, 1998:7 and 8). Moreover, Mochizuki also identifies that such a vision of the US-Japan alliance could strengthen the prospects of engaging China successfully. By reducing the US forward defence presence against China, it could decrease the overall threat to China's security posed by the alliance "without weakening (its overall) ... deterrent capabilities" (Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 1998:128). Furthermore, in as much as it would be founded on a community of interests, it would provide a stronger long term framework for broadening the security treaty from a bilateral to a multilateral basis (Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, 1998:133). Sato has extended this analysis further, noting the way in which greater equality in the US-Japan relationship would strengthen a strategy aimed at the engagement with China. In particular, it would allow the US and Japan to formulate a more consistent set of principles for China's engagement. This, he suggests, would allow the West to convey their benign intentions more transparently to China, and reduce the scope for China to play off the US and Japan against one another to achieve its own objectives (Sato, 1998). Indeed, in their critique of the conclusions of the Nye report, Johnson and Keehn go as far as to make the argument that "a United States that continues to distrust Japan's ability to act as a true ally" is a greater threat to security in East Asia than a rising China (Johnson and Keehne, 1995:110). As well as providing a more flexible basis for Japan's relations with the US, a more equal US-Japan security relationship might also strengthen Japan's relations with China.

The principle of negotiating its relationships on the basis of trust and equality therefore has a general strategic significance for it in terms of its more routine interactions with other major powers in the international system. Yunling identifies the positive sum triangular structure of strategic interaction which he sees emerging

between the US, Japan and China in East Asia. He argues that it is possible for Japan to "(m)aintain the US-Japan Alliance while developing stable relations with China. The critical issue here is how Japan handles the US-Japan alliance. If Japan uses its alliance to confront China, the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations will become antagonistic ... . If Japan demonstrates that it will not take advantage of the US-Japanese alliance in its dealing with China, Sino-Japanese friendship will increase" (Yunling, 1997:463). Yunling's logic starts from the proposition that Japan must renegotiate the basis of the US-Japan Security Treaty on the basis of greater independence from and equality with the United States. This requires the United States to trust Japan not to abuse this new degree of strategic latitude. In turn, however, renegotiating the US-Japan security alliance provides the key to Japan simultaneously developing stable relations with China by having the effect of reducing the forward US defence presence against China in East Asia. In this way, establishing its relationships with the United States and China on the basis of trust between equal and independent partners will allow Japan to do something it would not otherwise have been able to do - develop relations with them both *simultaneously*. In a separate analysis, Wang reinforces Yunling's claim by suggesting that a similar logic works the other way around i.e. in the way in which Sino-Japanese relations interact with US-Japan relations. Again, however, both stress that this presupposes a more independent and proactive Japanese role in this chain of relationships (Wang, 1994:181). Interestingly, the themes of transparency, trust and 'equilateralism' have also emerged prominently in the twin track diplomacy being conducted between the US, Japan and China as part of the ARF dialogue (Abramowitz, 1998:40; Jisi, 1998:22, 23 and 29; Funabashi, 1998b:53; see also the summary of these debates in China chapter:186 below).

The principle of negotiating its relationships with other powers on the basis of trust between equal partners provides a strong possible alternative to a neorealist interpretation of the increasing independence Japan has shown in its post Cold War foreign policy behaviour. It has been noted that neorealists have stressed the significance of the ways in which Japan has been (somewhat reluctantly) encouraged to negotiate its relations with the US, Europe, China, Russia and the Koreas on a more

active basis. Yet the identification of trust as a source of potential empowerment for Japan suggests that its relations with these states may not necessarily lead directly to zero sum system conflict between them. Rather, strategic interaction between them may be mutually reinforcing and increase the incentives for them to establish their relations on the basis of equality and reciprocity. Bridges notes the way in which Japan must "rebalance" its relations with Europe within the "skewed triangle" of US-Japan-Europe relations in order to strengthen this structure of relationships (Bridges, 1992:230). However, perhaps the best example is provided by instances where this has *not* occurred, such as Japan's disputes with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories in 1991. On the surface, Japanese intransigence over this issue might seem to confirm a neorealist analysis.[2] However, Carlile suggests that Japan's response was shaped more by its dependent relations with the US than structural conflict with the Soviet Union (Carlile, 1994:415). That is to say, Japan's reliance on the US for its polices towards the Soviet Union prevented it from using the opportunity presented by a softening of the Soviet's line on this issue to establish relations with them on a more independent basis. Menon similarly proposes that Japan's response reflects the increasingly outdated focus of the US-Japan security alliance on the containment of Russia (Menon, 1996:74). The subsequent way in which, after German mediation, Japan decided economic assistance to the Soviets was in its interests after all, despite the outstanding issue of the territorial dispute, reinforces Carlile's analysis (Germany chapter: 90). Such inconsistency would seem to highlight the way in which its policy responses were not structurally determined, but rather reflect its preference for maintaining a low political profile. Moreover, the way in which Germany took the diplomatic credit for bringing about Japan's change of heart over the issue of economic assistance to the Soviet Union also contains lessons for Japan. The general principle implied is that adopting a more active political stance may allow Japan to encourage a more flexible response from what is now Russia, which may allow it to begin to renegotiate the future of these islands. Japan may actually strengthen its relations with Russia by developing them on a more independent footing.

[2]Although given the rapid decline in Russia's position in the global distribution of power, one might also expect an improvement in its relations with Japan as part of a strategy of balancing against a rising China.

This focus on the way in which Japan sustains its relations with other states in the international system is of crucial importance because it raises the issue of trust in relation to what Buzan refers to as "Japan's relationship with itself" (Buzan, 1995:38). The question of degree to which Japan can be trusted within the international system weighs perhaps more heavily on Japan itself than on its neighbours and partners. Buzan recognises that pursuit of a NOD strategy "would require Japan to get serious about constructing its image as a great power with a low military profile" (Buzan, 1995:40). Again, however, the issue of the construction of Japan's image touches on much deeper and more general aspects of Japan's position in the post Cold War international order. The clearest expression of this has been its severe difficulties in coming to terms with the atrocities it committed during its imperial past, which in turn have rebounded on the way in which it has handled the issues of remilitarisation and of apologising to the victims of its wartime aggression. Berger traces Japan's reluctance to remilitarise since 1989 to its domestic politics, and in particular what he refers to as its "anti-military culture" (Berger, 1993:131). Similarly, it is possible to challenge a neorealist interpretation of Japan's failure to apologise for its past atrocities as being symptomatic of emerging structural conflict within the international system. Instead this may be seen as what Mukae characterises as "a symbolic manifestation of the ongoing identity crisis in the Japanese political system today" (Mukae, 1995:1030). Horlemann, a German diplomat, traces Japan's failure to apologise for its past atrocities to the way in which "Japan lacks a catharsis of the kind experienced by Germany" (Horlemann, 1995:392; also Berger, 1993:145). Moreover, contrary to neorealist analysis, the issue of apologies for its imperial legacy may be identified as a major source of potential power for Japan within the international system. Horlemann notes that facing the past would open up new opportunities for Japan because "(o)nly (its) ... constructive engagement in the region - this has been shown by Germany's experience with regard to European integration - will overcome the deep rooted fear among Asian neighbours of an all too powerful Japan and relieve Japan of the burdens of its imperial past" (Horlemann, 1995:385). It is at this stage, however, that the full extent of Japan's identity crisis in the post Cold War international system is revealed. Japan's refusal to face its recent past strongly affects even apparently mundane aspects of daily life in Japan such as the content of school

textbooks on Japanese history (Ienaga, 1993). Furthermore, deeply ingrained attitudes persist in Japan even when this means that Japan itself which pays the highest price of all for failing to address the issues they raise. As Mukae notes in his discussion of Japan's failure to apologise for its wartime atrocities in the Diet Resolution on the 50th Anniversary of the Pacific War, rather than manifesting Japan's extreme identity crisis, the incident "might instead have been a rare opportunity to turn around that very crisis .... In that sense, the Japanese government failed not only other nations but also its own" (Mukae, 1995:1030).

At the source of this crisis is a search for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role in the world (Buzan, 1988:560-562). Japan is "divided and confused about what its national self-image should be and how it should project its identity into the international system" (Buzan, 1988:561). Japan requires a new sense of national identity compatible with both political co-operation with its partners and an increasingly open and liberalised domestic economy. It is searching for a sense of national identity compatible with full participation in the international community and trends towards decentralisation arising from its increased participation in the global economy (Nakano, 1998). In turn, it is important to recognise that these shifts in the underlying structure of Japan's political identity are intimately related to the changes that are taking place in the international system. As Pyle suggests, the domestic adjustments within Japanese politics represent a search for a new sense of Japanese national purpose appropriate for the post Cold War period. He notes that "assertions of Japan's inability to play a broader role in the international community are now losing much of their persuasive power as a result of changes in the international system. Japan's emergence as an economic power and the end of the Cold War have ... raised questions about Japan's future national purpose, its policies towards collective security arrangements, and its capacity to change from a country intent solely on its own mercantilist aims to one capable of international leadership" (Pyle, 1996:121). Pyle gives full accord to the dominant causal role played by change within the international system in producing domestic adjustments. However, his analysis challenges neorealist assumptions about the nature and trajectory of systemic level change in post Cold War international relations. Far from pushing Japan away

from the international community, Pyle sees systemic level change as providing it with strong incentives to actively participate in strengthening it. He notes that "(e)ngagement in multilateral organisations offers not only a way to respond to foreign suspicions as well as criticism of its self-absorption but also a way of overcoming domestic resistance to a more active international role" (Pyle, 1996:170). Thus, on Pyle's interpretation, it is mounting pressure to take a full economic and political role within the international system which lies at the origin of Japan's current crisis of national purpose.

Pyle's analysis of Japan's struggle for a new sense of national purpose in the post Cold War era returns this chapter to the theme of 'towards self reliance' introduced in the opening section. As was noted, Pyle's very definition of the 'Japanese question' is bound up with the idea that Japan today faces a crisis of national purpose. His diagnosis for the position Japan finds itself in is for it to build a more coherent and rewarding sense of identity within the international system by establishing a new sense of national purpose. In as much as this would provide Japan with the key to developing its relationships with others on a more equal and independent basis, Pyle's analysis suggests that Japan must become more *self reliant* in the way its identity within the international system is constructed and sustained. The Japanese political system, which less than ten years ago Van Wolferen identified as characterised by 'the systematic deprivation of choice' in almost all arenas, is now faced with the task of making decisions for itself which will enormously affect the future well-being of its citizens throughout its society. This involves Japan actively confronting a diversity of open possibilities which it has not previously faced, and in so doing presents it with both dangers and opportunities. It must let go of the deference and dependency that characterised its relationships in the past, or run the risk that these relationships will become brittle and at some point crack. On the other hand, by actively confronting the situation in which it finds itself, Japan has the opportunity to negotiate its relationships with others on the basis of trust and mutual commitment rather than inequality and dependency. To achieve this, however, requires Japan to break with established patterns of behaviour and move along unfamiliar pathways. More fundamentally, the idea that Japan is moving towards self reliance in terms of the way

its defines its national purpose within the international system has even greater implications for the extent to which it is able to trust *itself*. In Ozawa's words, "Japan's most pressing need is a change in the consciousness of our people. Let us begin by removing the fences and educating the people to their own responsibility for themselves" (Ozawa, cited Stockwin, 1997:75). Until Japan has learned to develop its relations with other powers on a more equal and autonomous basis, it will not be able to break down the fences preventing it from achieving a true sense of security within the emerging international system.

CHAPTER FIVE

China: *Mid-Life Crisis*?

As with previous chapters, this discussion of China's state strategies after the Cold War will utilise a metaphor taken from transformations in aspects of personal experience documented by Anthony Giddens' *Modernity And Self Identity* (1991). In this book, Giddens discusses the replacement of a traditional life cycle structured around rites of passage with the emergence of a 'lifespan' understood in terms of a reflexively organised biographical narrative of self-identity. Under conditions of late modernity, "the lifespan becomes more and more freed from externalities associated with pre-established ties to other individuals and groups. .... Lacking external referents provided by others, the lifespan again emerges as a trajectory which relates above all to the individual's projects and plans" (Giddens, 1991:147). In consequence, "(t)he lifespan becomes structured around 'open experience thresholds', rather than ritualised passages. ... Each phase of transition tends to become an identity crisis - and is often reflexively known to the individual as such. The lifespan is, in fact, constructed in terms of the anticipated need to confront and resolve such crisis phases, at least where an individual's reflexive awareness is highly developed" (Giddens, 1991:148). Thus, "(n)egotiating a significant transition in life, leaving home, getting a new job, facing up to unemployment, forming a new relationship, moving between different areas or routines, confronting illness, beginning therapy - all mean running consciously entertained risks in order to grasp the new opportunities which personal crises open up. It is not only in terms of the absence of rites that life passages differ from comparable processes in traditional contexts. More important is that such transitions are drawn into, and surmounted by means of, the reflexively mobilised trajectory of self-actualisation" (Giddens, 1991:79). Failing to reflexively confront and resolve such crises can result in what Giddens refers to as ontological insecurity. Drawing on the work of a social psychologist, Giddens notes that "the ontologically insecure individual ... tends to display one or more of the following characteristics. In the first place, he or she may lack a consistent feeling of biographical continuity. ... Second, in an external environment full of changes, the person is obsessively

preoccupied with apprehension of possible risks to his or her existence, and is paralysed in terms of practical action. ... Thirdly, the person fails to develop or sustain trust in his own self-integrity. The individual feels morally 'empty' because he lacks ... 'self regard'. Quite often, paradoxically, the actor subjects his behaviour and thoughts to constant scrutiny" (Giddens, 1991:53-54)

As with the other cases analysed, it is possible to identify themes in the literature on China's new position in the post Cold War international system that resonate strongly with features of Giddens' discussion of self-identity formation over the lifespan. In a book published shortly after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, David Goodman and Gerald Segal discuss the possibility that China is faced with the task of negotiating a significant transition in its development, and pose the question: "Is China at forty having a mid-life crisis?". They suggest that China is having such a crisis "in the sense that the rulers recognise that the policies of the past are insufficient to cope with the major challenges of the future and they are not agreed on what needs to be done as a result" (Goodman and Segal, 1989:1). Segal has elaborated on this point in a more recent study, locating the origins of China's 'mid-life crisis' in the failings of communism as a unifying ideology around which it could project itself onto the world stage. In the immediate post war era, Segal suggests, communist ideology was able to underpin the emergence for the first time in history of a strong and nationally unified Chinese state (Segal, 1994:9). However, the unity provided by this ideology came increasingly under threat for two reasons. Firstly, the split with the Soviet Union which became apparent from the early 1950's onwards, and particularly acute from the early 1970's, meant that "nationalism was never far removed from the rhetoric of (Chinese) communism" (Segal, 1994:9). Second, after the death of Mao Tse Tung in 1976, the Chinese leadership increasingly came to accept the need for economic reform, a process which inevitably raised questions about political reform that went to the heart of China's socialist identity (Segal, 1994:9). According to Segal, these developments came to a head in the late 1980's, such that "by the 1990s, China had reached a crisis of self-definition. ... (It) seemed to be losing its already suspect and recently forged national identity at a time of major change at home and abroad". Indeed, Segal goes as far as to note that "(f)ailure to meet these challenges may put in

jeopardy the very fabric of the Chinese state" (Segal, 1994:10). Segal's analysis begs the question of whether China is faced with an identity crisis in its attempt to negotiate the transition to the post-Cold War world. Is a country which previously relied on Communist ideology to provide it with a sense of domestic and international purpose now faced with the task of sustaining its political development in a more open environment increasingly free from both pre-established frameworks and external referents?

This chapter seeks to examine China's post Cold War state strategies in the light of neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system in order to shed light on how seriously the metaphor of 'mid-life crisis' can be taken when applied to its current situation. After reviewing each of these theoretical perspectives, the chapter shall return to reflect on whether China is facing a crisis of identity transition in the post Cold War period.

Neorealism

A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the behaviour of China in the post Cold War international system. Most notably Waltz, and Layne see China as a 'rising power' within the contemporary international system (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1996). Writing in 1993, Waltz suggested that if China "managed to sustain an effective government and a measure of economic freedom for its industrious people, within a decade it will be in the great power ranks" (Waltz, 1993:68). As Waltz has proposed, there are strong reasons to believe that China is rapidly acquiring the potential capabilities to become a serious geopolitical rival to both Japan and the United States. Dibb identifies the general consensus that "China can sustain growth rates of 6-9% per year, implying a doubling of its GDP every 8-11 years", a development which would "herald the emergence of a new international power" (Dibb, 1995:27). Other major analysts have echoed this view (Roy, 1994:149; Layne, 1996:69; Bernstein and Munro, 1997:18; Nye, 1997:70). Neorealists predict that China's position within the emerging structure of international politics will encourage it to define its interests according to its rising relative power capabilities.

The outcomes compatible with this behaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity within Asia as part of a more general pattern of such behaviour at a global level.

Indeed, neorealists could identify the way in which over the 1990s the rise of China's economic status has been accompanied by the modernisation of its military infrastructure. Estimates of increases in China's defence expenditures over the 1990s vary widely and are the subject of a considerable divergence of opinion (Mak, 1998:99). Some have suggested that trends in China's defence expenditure should not be over-estimated (Nathan and Ross, 1997:146-148). Yet even prominent institutionalists have cautioned against too sanguine an interpretation of China's military modernisation programme. After discussing the arguments put forward by Nathan and Ross, Nye warns that "even after stripping way the hyperbole and exaggeration, the rise of the Chinese military ... power must be taken seriously as a new factor in the (East Asia) region" (Nye, 1997:70). Indeed, all areas of China's defence capabilities have been significantly upgraded over the 1990s. In terms of its nuclear strategy, there is evidence that China is upgrading its nuclear defence doctrine so as to allow a more flexible response to escalation, moving from a strategy of 'minimum' to 'limited' deterrence (Godwin, 1996:180 and p.183; see also Johnston, 1995). The PLA's armed forces have been dramatically downsized as part of a process of qualitative upgrading (Godwin, 1998:179; Godwin, 1996:482). The PLA Navy (PLAN) and Airforce (PLAAF) are paying attention to increasing their power projection capabilities. The PLAN's aim has become "an offshore-capable navy by 2000, and a 'blue water' navy ... by 2050" (Godwin, 1998:179). As well as establishing military bases in the South China Sea the PLAN's fleets of major surface combatants and submarines are undergoing generational change (Ji, 1997:79 and 80 respectively). This has been supplemented by major purchases of military hardware such as advanced fighter aircraft, diesel-electric submarines and destroyers from Russia (Godwin, 1998:181). These purchases were accompanied by reports of possible future deals over aerial refuelling and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft (Godwin, 1998:181). Bernstein and Munro go as far as to argue that "(w)hatever the exact figures, China is now engaged in one of the most extensive and rapid military build-ups in the world" (Bernstein and Munro, 1997:25-26). Whilst

such claims may be exaggerated, there is certainly available evidence to support the neorealist prediction that China's rapid economic rise has encouraged it to pursue an increasingly threatening military posture.

Moreover, in line with neorealist theory, China's defence policies over this period have been linked directly to a conception of its role as a rising power within an emerging global multipolar structure. Major analysts have identified that "China feels it is fully within its rights to change the territorial status quo (within East Asia), even though most other countries view such action as aggressive and dangerous" (Buzan and Segal, 1994:6; see also Dibb, 1995:26). This revisionism can be related to China's elites' analysis of the nature of change in the international system. Tow notes that "Chinese analysts have concluded that 'the original bipolar pattern (of global security politics) is being replaced by a multipolar one'" in which it plays a more influential role (Tow, 1994:146; see also Godwin, 1998:177; Jisi, 1997:14). Whilst this is a long term trend dating from the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970's neorealists could argue that this trend has persisted in the 1990s. In particular, Robinson notes that concern over the need to balance against US unipolarity in the wake of the Gulf War was a particularly strong factor influencing China's defence modernisation programme in the 1990s (Robinson, 1994:597). There is also evidence that China's rising strategic capability is generating anxieties in line with neorealist predictions. Godwin identifies that "Beijing is now fully aware that it has become the focus of the (East Asia) region's long-term security concerns" (Godwin, 1998:186; see also Roy, 1998a:149). Moreover, it is also the case that "anxiety is fuelled by the lack of transparency in Beijing's strategic thinking" (To, 1997:252; see also Hughes, 1996:241). Such behaviour could be understood as being compatible with the neorealist prediction that states will seek to minimise their diplomatic commitments in line with a defensively positional diplomatic outlook. Thus in line with neorealist predictions, China's defence policies over the 1990s may be related to both its self-conception as a 'rising power' and to emerging security tensions in the East Asia region.

As well as its defence policies over the 1990s, a major area that neorealists could identify as compatible with their predictions is evidence of direct political tensions

emerging between China and other states in the post Cold War international system. China's relations with the United States provide perhaps the clearest signs of emerging structural conflict of the kind anticipated by neorealists. This first became apparent in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. The US responded to this development by leading Western economic sanctions against China which were lifted only gradually over a three year period (Robinson, 1994:589). This was a clear signal that "(t)he end of the Cold War ... (has) ended the special exception from human rights criticism that China had enjoyed as a prospective US ally against the Soviet Union" (Roy, 1998a:150). It is important to recognise that China's abstention with regard to UN Security Council Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of force against Iraq during the Gulf conflict must be understood in the context of its post-Tiananmen isolation. Thus the way in which "China managed to extract maximum payoffs from the United States with minimum support" (Kim, 1995:423) fits squarely within a neorealist analysis of China's behaviour during the Gulf conflict. Moreover, conflict over human rights between China and the US has continued throughout the 1990s. America has continued to make either an explicit or an implicit linkage between human rights and China's trade status and has maintained diplomatic pressure on China on this issue over this period (Wan, 1997:240-242). China has viewed this pressure as "interference in China's internal affairs" (Seymour, 1998:221; see also Yi, 1994:687), and elites concerns over separatism within the provinces has meant that "China's leaders now openly attack the United States" over this issue (Jisi, 1997:11). In line with neorealist logic, therefore, the collapse of Cold War bipolarity has resulted in increased tensions between the US and China over human rights issues which were at best plastered over during the Gulf conflict.

Important security issues within the East-Asia region have also impacted on Sino-US political relations and may be seen to provide evidence in favour of neorealist predictions. One such area is over the US forward defence presence in East Asia. Roy identifies that "(i)n the 1990s ... many Chinese elites openly questioned the desirability of US military bases in Asia. ... The direction in which Chinese opinion is evolving ... suggests that the PRC will probably be a strong opponent of US Asian bases in the first decade of the twenty-first century" (Roy, 1998[b]:141-2). Bernstein

and Munro note that the prospect of Korean unification could be an important factor in changing China's strategic attitude to the US military presence in Northeast Asia (Bernstein and Munro, 1997:30). Such a shift in strategic attitudes in China would be in line with the neorealist prediction that as China's power rises, and as geopolitical circumstances change, it is likely to be brought into structural conflict with the political status quo in the region. However, it is the future of Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC) which is considered by Beijing to be "the major issue between the United States and China" (Levine, 1998:100). The PRC's 1993 'White Paper' on China's reunification publicly reiterated its claim to sovereignty over the ROC (Cooper, 1995). Gu identifies the zero-sum nature of Chinese claims to sovereignty over Taiwan (Gu, 1996:199). Such a stance fits squarely with neorealist predictions about the significance of relative gains problems in the settlement of territorial disputes. Given China's rising military capabilities, neorealism predicts increasing Chinese assertiveness over this issue. Indeed, in March 1996, just prior to Taiwan's first presidential elections, the PRC carried out large scale offensive military exercises, including test firing live missiles in Taiwan's coastal waters, a development resulting in the US dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area (Levine, 1998:102). In the aftermath of this development, Rachman noted that "(e)ven if the present crisis in Taiwan blows over ... simple realism suggests that a huge, increasingly prosperous nation is likely to want to throw its weight around" (Rachman, 1996:132). Friedman draws parallels between China's behaviour during the Taiwan missile crisis and Germany's behaviour as a rising power in the inter-war period (Friedman, 1997:233). It is therefore the case that, over the important issues of US security concern in East Asia, there are signs that China's growing power is encouraging it to challenge the regional status quo as suggested by neorealist logic.

Many of the emerging problems within the Sino-US relationship find echoes in developments in relations between China and Japan. In the wake of the 1996 'revitalisation' of the Mutual Security Treaty, "the Chinese have become increasingly concerned that the alliance is aimed at ... containing China" (Garrett and Glaser, 1997:384; see also Klein, 1998:144). A particular point of tension for China is the possibility that the US could encourage Japan to deploy a theatre missile defence

system which may significantly undermine China's capacity for nuclear deterrence (Garret and Glaser, 1997:392). Moreover, more general indications that Japan is becoming more assertive have caused concerns within China. Significant here have been the freezing of Japan's aid grant to China in response to its continued nuclear testing, the Japanese government's toleration of extremist activities on the disputed Diaoyo/Senkaku islands in 1996, growing political backing in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan, increases in Japan's defence expenditure and Japan's participation in UNPKO (Garret and Glaser, 1997:397; Roy, 1994:163). China's worries about Japan are similarly reflected in Japanese anxieties over China's reiteration of its ownership of the Senkaku Islands, and the expansion in China's power projection capabilities. Prior to its stern response to China's nuclear testing in 1995, Japan had also expressed concern over China's possible acquisition of in-flight refuelling technology and it publicly warned it against purchasing an aircraft carrier (Roy, 1994:163; Segal, 1993:30). Though they stress that there is not yet an arms race in East Asia, Buzan and Segal identify the relationship between China and Japan as central to an emerging regional arms dynamic (Buzan/Segal, 1994:8-9). Trends such as these may be identified as fitting into neorealist predictions about emerging structural conflict between Japan and China within the international system.

China's role in wider regional geopolitical dynamics within Asia provides further evidence which reinforces a neorealist interpretation of its post Cold War state strategies. China has displayed a zero-sum view of its sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao in negotiations with Britain and Portugal (Hinton, 1994:353). Moreover, China has been insistent that negotiations over the future of these territories are conducted on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis (Yahuda, 1996b:14; Neves, 1995). In line with neorealism, China's stance enables it to maintain maximum diplomatic leverage in its negotiations over the future of these territories. China's policies over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Seas may also be understood as providing evidence of incipient neorealist behaviour. In 1992 China passed a Law On Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas that formalised its claim to sovereignty over these territories, as well as the Senkaku islands disputed with Japan (Valencia, 1995:13). Furthermore, it granted an oil concession in the

Paracels, pledging to protect rights to the concession with force (Valencia, 1995:13). In 1995, shortly after the withdrawal of US military forces from the Philippines, Chinese structures were discovered on Mischief Reef (Roy, 1998a:147). These developments have heightened concerns about China's strategic intentions amongst ASEAN states (Leifer, 1997:160) as well as Japan and the US (Godwin, 1998:176). Moreover, China resolutely refuses to discuss possible solutions to the competing territorial claims within the region in international forums, and fudged its agreement in 1995 that the UN Conference On The Law Of The Sea would form the basis for the resolutions of conflicting territorial claims over the islands (Valencia, 1995:12 and Foot, 1998:433 respectively). The possibility that large deposits of oil and gas lie beneath the South China Sea greatly increases the incentive for China to stake a territorial claim to this area because of China's increased dependence on oil imports (Salameh, 1995:133; Valencia, 1995:15-16). Furthermore, this series of territorial rivalries is exacerbated by the historical animosities that have developed between China and other states in the region (Buzan and Segal, 1994:4). The number and historical and geopolitical complexity of the territorial disputes in which China finds itself embroiled in East Asia may be cited by neorealists as symptomatic of deeper structural tensions emerging from China's increasingly revisionist stance within the post-Cold War international system.

Developments in China's relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and states in Africa over the 1990s are also amenable to neorealist explanation. As neorealism predicts, with the rapid decline in the threat posed to China by Russia, Sino-Russian relations have improved dramatically in a number of areas (Goo, 1993:293; Garver, 1998:119-129; Paik, 1996). Moreover, Sino-Russian détente could be seen in terms of the effects of an emerging multipolar structure "in which a 'continental' Russia-Chinese bloc balances a 'maritime' American-Japanese bloc" (Garver, 1998:131; see also Bilveer, 1998). China's relations with states in South Asia reinforces support for neorealist claims about China's post-Cold War behaviour. Sino-Indian relations thawed considerably in the early 1990s, culminating in an agreement over their disputed Himalayan border signed in 1993 (Malik, 1995:317 Roy, 1998:171). However, this improvement occurred in the wake of Beijing's diplomatic isolation

after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Malik, 1995:325). There is evidence that underlying geopolitical tensions remain between the two powers in South Asia. In particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union, India's traditional ally against China and Pakistan, provides strong incentives for India to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability. Malik notes that "(i)t is the adversarial nature of the Sino-Indian relationship which has driven India's, and in turn, Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme" (Malik, 1995:346). It is this political logic, neorealists could argue, which lies behind the recent wave of nuclear testing in South Asia. Other issues, notably Tibet, continued to complicate the Sino-Indian relationship over the 1990s (Roy, 1998b:171). Finally, China's relations with its traditional clients in Africa have also changed in line with shifts in international structure. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, China engaged in a major diplomatic offensive in Africa (Snow, 1994:293). However, with China's continued economic modernisation, these contacts have become increasingly obsolete (Snow, 1994:320). The overall pattern of China's relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and African states, may therefore be understood in terms of neorealist predictions. China deals favourably with these states when marginalised from global geopolitics, but as its marginalisation wanes its policies reflect interests derived from its changing capabilities within the international power structure.

Important aspects of China's behaviour with respect to international institutions also provide evidence which fits the predictions of the neorealist model. There is strong evidence to suggest that China's behaviour with respect to the issue of UN peacekeeping merely reflects its underlying geostrategic interests. In October 1991 China participated in a UNSC authorised deployment of a force to oversee elections in Cambodia (Tow, 1994:151), and brought pressure on the Khmer Rouge not to disrupt the peace-process (Yahuda, 1996a:214). However, it is important to recognise that these actions coincided with its own geostrategic interest in the area in the light of the cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam leading to Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Yahuda, 1996a:214). Moreover, in order not to create awkward future legal precedents for itself, China rejected the suggestion of bringing the perpetrators of Cambodian genocide to an international tribunal (Seymour, 1998:229). With respect to its general stance towards UNPKO over the 1990s China has upheld the principle

of respect for state sovereignty with regard to UN intervention and as such has "*consistently* opposed non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping" (Fravel, 1996:1117, author's emphasis). China's stance over UNPKO may be understood as reflecting the way in which the Chinese leadership fears that multilateralism "may limit China's diplomatic leverage or even directly challenge China's claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea" (Fravel, 1996:118). Thus China's behaviour with respect to UNPKO over the 1990s has been compatible with neorealist predictions about its international behaviour.

Aspects of China's stance with regard to international nuclear non-proliferation issues and regimes may be interpreted as reflecting behaviour compatible with neorealism. China acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, to the NPT extension in 1995, to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994 (Godement, 1997). In 1995 China also co-operated with the Untied States in exerting pressure on North Korea over the issue of nuclear proliferation (Yahuda, 1996a:214). However, each of these developments may be explained in a manner consistent with neorealist theory. The NPT and the NPT extension "in no way constrained China's ability to develop its nuclear weapons" and therefore does not conflict with China's security needs (Godement, 1997:103). China's actions to control North Korean proliferation are entirely compatible with neorealist predictions because of its interest in taking such measures. Moreover, China did not endorse economic sanctions imposed by the UNSC, but instead insisted on bilateral action so as to make its efforts "contingent upon American concessions on the human rights issue and upon unconditional extension of the most-favoured nation (MFN) arrangement so vital for China's exports to the United States" (Gu, 1995:312). Such behaviour may be understood as reflecting neorealism's prediction that China will prefer to work outside of an institutional framework to maximise its diplomatic leverage. At a superficial level, China's decision to join the MTCR may seem surprising from a neorealist perspective because this regime was targeted at China after allegations that it provided missile technology to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Syria (Mullins, 1995:138). However, China only joined when the US agreed to rescind sanctions in the high technology area, and has since stressed that its pledge is by no means irreversible and is

dependent on others not imposing sanctions on China for whatever political motivation (Godement, 1997:102). Moreover, allegations have continued to be made that China is violating the rules of the regime (Mullins, 1995:138). Thus in line with neorealist predictions, the MCTR is either so weak that it imposes no real constraints on China's missile transfers, or the regime is likely to be ineffective.

Finally, aspects of China's international economic behaviour provides evidence which can be used to support neorealist predictions. China's trade surplus with the US now rivals Japan's, in the face of which China has come under increasing pressure from the US to cut trade barriers and increase the transparency of its legal system (Levine, 1998:104-105). China's attempts to gain admission to GATT/WTO have been persistently blocked by the United States on the grounds that China needs to liberalise its economy more extensively, a problem further complicated by China's desire to join this organisation with developing country status (Feeny, 1998:257-259). It has been argued that the US has covertly discriminated against China. Harris identifies that "(t)he US is the one major trading country not unconditionally applying MFN treatment to China ... (because) its capacity to do so is limited by the Jackson-Vanik amendment that requires that the President extend MFN treatment annually to communist countries" (Harris, 1997:147). Between 1992 and 1994, the Clinton administration linked the granting of MFN status to China's progress regarding human rights issues (Levine, 1998:106). Yet this can be seen as unfair trade competition by the US (Ferdinand and Cable, 1994:255). Such debates could be interpreted as signs of emerging relative gains tensions between the two states. Furthermore, there is evidence that China uses mercantilist strategies to encourage trade and investment competition both between Europe, Japan and the US, as well as amongst European states (Klein, 1998; Maull, 1997; Moller, 1996). Such behaviour could be understood in terms compatible with the emerging structural conflict anticipated by the neorealist model.

Overall, it would appear that there is a significant body of evidence which favours a neorealist interpretation of China's state strategies since 1989. Important aspects of China's political and economic behaviour over the 1990s are compatible with

neorealist predictions. Furthermore, in line with China's rising economic power, it has begun to pursue an increasingly revisionist agenda at both the regional and global levels over the post-Cold War period, and in turn this has led to emerging patterns of structural conflict with other powers in the international system.

Institutionalism

According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states. Consequently, states will be encouraged to institutionalise aspects of their inter-relations so as to maximise their absolute gains from interaction. However, where institutionalisation imposes net costs on states in the form of requiring considerable flexibility, accommodation and adjustment on a their behalf, they are likely to reject institutional options. When considering the implications of institutionalist theory for China's post Cold War foreign policy behaviour, it is important to recognise that there are important qualitative differences between China and either Germany or Japan in terms of its integration into the world economy. In particular, unlike Germany and Japan, China could not be said to have developed complex patterns of interdependence with other states in the international system. In terms of absolute levels of interdependence, China's economy has indeed developed important ties. Over the last twenty years, China's economic interdependence with the world has risen dramatically, both in terms of trade and foreign investment. China's exports and imports as a percentage of GDP rose from less than 10% in 1978 to over 35% in 1996. (Robinson, 1998:204; see also Funabashi *et al*, 1994:35). Moreover, China has become the world's largest recipient of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Levels of contracted DFI have risen from between 3 and 7 US$ billion per year between 1979 and 1990 to 100 US$ billion in 1993 (Funabashi *et al*, 1994:36). However, in terms of its distribution, China's economic interdependence with the outside world is highly uneven across both geographic regions within China and economic sectors (Robinson, 1998:206; see also Segal, 1994:34-52). In consequence, Robinson concludes that "in the mid-late 1990s, China was not highly interdependent in many arenas that influenced its foreign policy" (Robinson, 1998:210). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognised that a situation of complex

interdependence may not be said to exist between many states in an Asian context. It is for this reason that the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defence in 1995, recommended that the US maintain a strong forward US defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region (Office For International Security Affairs, 1995). Whilst not fully substituting for a well developed pattern of interdependent relations in an East Asian context, Nye suggests that by maintaining its forward defence presence in East Asia the US can provide some of the preconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value for states such as China.

Aspects of China's political and economic strategies since 1989 are amenable to an institutionalist interpretation. In political terms, institutionalists could identify evidence that China has moderated its international behaviour significantly, even in core areas of its security strategies. Firstly, institutionalists have argued that China has pragmatically accepted a degree of toleration of the US-Japan MST because it checks an expansion in Japan's military role in the Asia-Pacific region. In Nye's words, "(i)n the absence of other institutions, Washington's presence in East Asia provides stability. As long as the US exercises its power reasonably so that other countries (including China) continue to benefit from its stabilising influence ... no country or coalition is likely to challenge it" (Nye, 1997:77). Thus institutionalists could argue that the MST has helped to moderate China's behaviour and reshape its expectations about regional security arrangements. Related to this argument, institutionalists could suggest that, as well as being economically costly to China, its use of force to settle regional territorial disputes entails major military hazards. Gallager applies this logic to the Spratly's dispute (Gallager, 1994). Segal is less inclined to support any such claim with regard to the Spratly's case, yet he concludes from China's failure to resort to its threats of unilateral action over Hong Kong that "Chinese behaviour was to some extent constrained" in its actions (Segal, 1996:21). Perhaps most significantly, similar arguments can be made with respect to the issue of Taiwan. The PRC's future economic vitality is linked closely to its extensive and rapidly growing trade and investment links with Taiwan (Roy, 1998b:205-206). Most importantly, invading or blockading Taiwan would be extremely risky militarily, especially given the

continuation of the US forward military presence in the region and the US-Japan alliance (Nye, 1997:75-77; see also Shinn, 1996:75). Overall, therefore, it is possible for institutionalists to downplay the significance of signs of rising Chinese assertiveness in the East Asia region.

It is also possible for institutionalists to identify China's growing participation in regional multilateral security arrangements to bolster their claims. Notable here is China's participation as a founding member in the ARF regional security dialogue since 1993 (Yahuda, 1996a:215). It is important to recognise that China uses the ARF as a purely consultative institution (Garrett and Glaser, 1994:21). Nevertheless, Foot identifies a number of specific achievements it has made in relation to the moderation of China's security behaviour. Firstly, it has encouraged Chinese officials to make public statements which have "reiterated their government's commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes within the region", albeit with the notable exception of the Taiwan issue (Foot, 1998:429). Second, discussion within the ARF has led to China's "acceptance that some level of transparency does contribute to security" (Foot, 1998:430; see also Garrett and Glaser, 1994:28). As well as participating in high level military exchanges, in late 1995 China issued its first defence white paper (Godwin, 1998:187). Godwin notes that "though far from meeting the (desired) standards for openness ... (this action) was a first step" (Godwin, 1998:187). Furthermore, Chinese international relations specialists are participating in track two diplomacy with their US and Japanese counterparts (Abramowitz *et al*, 1998). Finally, Foot identifies that working within the ARF does impose constraints on China's international actions because "(t)he image costs associated with any transgression of embryonic norms or obstructionist behaviour once items reach the agenda are steadily increasing" (Foot, 1998:439). There is thus some evidence that the ARF has had a significant moderating effect on China's strategic behaviour and expectations, albeit of a limited kind.

China's stance with regard to international non-proliferation regimes may also be interpreted as compatible with institutionalist predictions. Firstly, institutionalists could construct counter arguments to neorealist claims about China's use of both the NPT and the MTCR. The NPT can reduce the likelihood that China's neighbours will

acquire nuclear weapons and thereby moderate its expectations about the nuclear proliferation in the region (Garrett and Glaser, 1995:76). With regard to the MCTR, Rynhold similarly suggests that "(t)he Chinese appear to perceive the proliferation issue as a bargaining chip negotiable in the context of China's overall relationship with the US, either as a means to smooth over the relationship, or to extract concessions on more vital matters such as Taiwan" (Rynhold, 1996:109; see also Wallerstein, 1996:64). Such behaviour on the part of the Chinese would seem to reflect the way in which the norms of the MTCR are tacitly recognised by China, and in this sense help 'moderate' China's overall strategic behaviour. Second, whilst the issue remains an open one, it could also be argued that the case of China's accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in June 1996 provides even stronger evidence in favour of institutionalist predictions. Whilst China did carry out a nuclear test in 1995, the acceptance of a zero-level CTBT has the effect of freezing China's nuclear capabilities, and as such "signing, ratifying and implementing a CTBT would constitute an unmistakable signal of Chinese acceptance, however limited, of security interdependence" (Garrett and Glaser, 1995:76). Commentators have explained China's acceptance of the CTBT by pointing to the way in which the Chinese "see security gains for China in a test ban that further discourages nuclear proliferation, freezes the gap in nuclear weapons development between China and India, and prevents the gap between Russia and the United States from widening (Garrett and Glaser, 1995-6:76; see also Mak, 1998:106). Furthermore, the CTBT allows China to elevate its status to that of a 'Second World' power such as France or Russia (Godement, 1997:104). However, such explanations involve China running the risk of facing proliferation in South Asia, as has indeed recently occurred. Indeed, in line with neorealist theory, Carpenter suggests that any Chinese attempt to lock India into the status quo using the CTBT framework furthers India's incentives to close the widening gap between its capabilities and those of China by engaging in nuclear testing (Carpenter, 1998:2-3). China's accession to the Treaty is therefore notable from an institutionalist perspective, all the more so if it continues to abide by its terms in the face of recent developments.

Finally, over the 1990s China has made important adaptations to the norms of the major global and regional international economic regimes. In 1994 and 1996 China took major steps to comply with IMF exchange rates procedures and rules (Feeny, 1998:244). Moreover, China "has been singularly successful over the 1990s in gaining World Bank financial assistance for its modernisation program" (Feeny, 1998:245-248). It has pushed throughout the 1990s for membership of GATT and the WTO, progressively lowering its tariffs and making adjustments to meet standards on economic transparency (Harris, 1997:139-140). This has been despite Taiwan's 'customs territory' status within this institution, and the significant adjustment costs associated with membership (Roy, 1998b:92-94). China's use of regional international economic institutions over the post-Cold War period also provides evidence in favour of institutionalists' predictions, notably China's involvement since 1991 in APEC (Yahuda, 1996a:215). As well as enhancing China's international status, China "has seen APEC ... as a means of pursuing its WTO accession objectives, and especially to put pressure on the US with respect to non-discrimination (MFN)" (Harris, 1997:138). APEC commitments "have been less specific than for the WTO but they have generally required constructive and co-operative participation" in its activities (Harris, 1997:142). Nevertheless, this has required China to become involved in routine dialogue with APEC members, including Taiwan under the name of Chinese Taipei (Funabashi *et al*, 1994:44; Yahuda, 1996a:215). Institutionalists also make the policy prescription that investment and ODA could be used to provide incentives to China to participate further in regional and global international institutions (Funabashi *et al*, 1994:76-77). Lastly, China's participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process since its first meeting in 1996 could be identified as further evidence by institutionalists as strengthening its ties to the emerging East Asian economy as part of its more general integration into the world economy (Smith, 1998; Maull *et al*, 1998:183-197). China's extensive use of and anticipatory adaptation towards the rules of global and regional economic regimes over the 1990s could be interpreted by institutionalists as evidence that the constraints on China imposed by interdependence are affecting significantly its behaviour with regard to international economic institutions.

Overall, however, it is important to note that certain general qualifications must be made concerning the strengths of an institutionalist interpretation of China's post Cold War state strategies. Firstly, the evidence in favour of institutionalists predictions is at best ambiguous. It is far from clear that China has moderated its behaviour in core areas of its foreign policy. As has been noted neorealists can present highly convincing evidence that directly counters institutionalist claims, particularly with regard to signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in its security strategies. Second, institutionalism suggests that, at best, it is only at the margins of change that China's international behaviour has been significantly moderated. Yet any such argument in effect concedes that underlying trends in China's foreign policy behaviour over the 1990s lie beyond the scope of an institutionalist explanation. This is not to claim that there is no evidence favouring institutionalist hypotheses in the case of China's foreign policy since 1989. Indeed, as has been discussed, there is available evidence that international institutions have affected important aspects of post Cold War China's foreign policy behaviour. However, it is equally important to recognise that it is difficult to make a convincing *positive* case that underlying features of China's post-1989 strategies have been shaped by international institutions. The case for institutionalism relies on the negative argument that whilst China has shown signs of increasing assertiveness, its assertiveness may have been tempered in significant ways by institutional frameworks.

Liberalism

Liberalism stresses the significance of states foreign policy preferences, which in turn reflect an underlying political identity, as a factor in determining international behaviour and outcomes. Liberalism's precise predictions vary according to the preferences of the particular state under analysis and the configuration of preferences in the international system as a whole. However, the liberal model defines a set of predictions directly relevant to China's state strategies over the post Cold War period. Firstly, it opens up the possibility that Japan can pursue strategies which fall outside the ranges predicted by both neorealist and institutionalist models due to the influence of its domestic politics on its foreign policy behaviour. Second, in the case of China it

is important to recognise that patterns of *non-liberal* behaviour are entirely compatible with the predictions of the liberal model. Such behaviour can be explained with reference to the articulation of non-liberal political preferences within the international system as a direct function of a state's underlying political identity as an actor.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence that neorealism and institutionalism fail to account for important dimensions of China's post-Cold War state strategies. Neorealism and institutionalism share a common focus on the way in which a state's foreign policy behaviour will primarily be driven by the way in which external developments can enhance its international *status*. In this view, states are motivated primarily by their relative or absolute positions within the international system. A liberal model of international relations draws attention to the way in which explaining China's foreign policy motivations may be primarily influenced by domestic political considerations. Kim, for instance, comments that China's "defining feature .... is the high level of *internal* threats to the government's security and legitimacy. External events ... are seen primarily in terms of how they affect the state's internal stability and legitimacy" (Kim, 1998:19, author's emphasis). His analysis suggests that China's concern with its relative or absolute status had yielded to a more immediate and pressing consideration with its domestic cohesion as a source of motivation for its international behaviour.

In terms of its internal political organisation, China faces profound changes at all levels of society that threaten to undermine the very existence of its domestic regime. These changes are of three broad types - economic, social and ideological. In economic terms, China's pursuit of an export-led growth strategy has been associated with the devolution of "(f)unctional and executive control over the economy and foreign trade ... from ... central ministries ... to provincial, municipal and even county levels" (Segal, 1994:12). In consequence of this process of regionalisation, the Chinese executive has lost much of its authority over core areas of economic planning such as taxation policy and control of the money supply (Segal, 1994:14; see also Kitano, 1994:154). Economic decentralisation has also been associated with wider

social changes which have seriously undermined the hierarchical organisation of the Chinese state. China is undergoing a "general transition to a new generation of civilian and military elites" (Swaine, 1995:1). This has been accompanied by a rise in social and political mobilisation in the form of "increased ability and desire of social groups to influence domestic and foreign policy issues" (Swaine, 1995:1). These developments have impacted on core areas of security concern to the Chinese state. Most obviously, they have directly affected the succession politics surrounding the death of Deng Xioping in 1996. Deng Xioping's successor, Jiang Zemin, must "rely primarily on instruments of power other than personal authority" such as his institutional positions within the Chinese executive and/or support from bureaucratic groupings, notably the PLA (Joffe, 1997:56). Yet even the PLA itself is no longer the cohesive entity it once was because widespread corruption and its extensive involvement in non-military sectors of China's export economy have severely undermined military discipline and professionalism. (Segal, 1994:26; Joffe, 1997:31). Segal goes so far as to note that "(t)he PLA is no stronger than the rest of Chinese society as a whole, at least not in the long term" (Segal, 1994:27). In combination, therefore, economic change and social modernisation within China threaten core aspects of the CCP's internal sovereignty.

A third challenge to the integrity of the Chinese state are the increasing threats brought to the legitimacy of Communist ideology by economic and social change. Analysts have depicted this development in terms of the 'legitimation crisis' or a 'crisis of faith' in Communism (Hamrin, 1994:94; Harding, 1993:38). As a consequence of this development, Levine identifies a shift from what he terms formal ideology (Communism) to "(i)nformal ideology ... (in the from of) a generic Chinese nationalism rooted in a sense of Chinese national identity" (Levine, 1994:43). However, even here Chinese authorities are facing mounting problems. Firstly, as Pye notes, it is difficult for Chinese authorities to bridge the gap between communism and nationalism "because for forty years the party has been denouncing just about every feature of Chinese culture as a feudal abomination that should be obliterated. (Moreover,) ... it is not easy to articulate what exactly are the Chinese qualities that should be defended ... (except) the belief that leaders have a claim to moral superiority

as the defenders of the moral order, even if this means acting in erratic and arbitrary ways" (Pye, 1991:63). Second, the Communist party's attempt to appeal to nationalism to underpin social cohesion is dogged by troubles arising from the way in which regionalisation within China has been associated with the emergence of a severe nationalities problem, particularly in China's outer provinces. Separatist disturbances in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have been widespread, and have been taken very seriously indeed by China's ruling elite (Segal, 1994:30-31). Overall, therefore, China's state elite faces an ideological vacuum at the heart of its attempts to consolidate its sovereign authority.

Many of these pressures on China's political regime have their roots in the liberalisation that began in the 1970's. However, it is only after the developments in Tiananmen Square in 1989 that the full scale of the challenges that the Chinese state faced became apparent. Tiananmen "dramatised China's neiluan (internal disorder) for both domestic and global audiences" (Kim and Dittmer, 1993:258). It was "(o)nly after the 4th June 1989 ... (that) CCP hardliners attempted to address the accumulated ideological problems of the past decade. Unfortunately, no ready solution was at hand. Having drained the fouled oil of Maoist identity from the crankcase of Communist power, Deng and his associates had nothing to replace it with. So after the 4th June they poured the oily sludge back in, hoping the engine would still run" (Levine, 1994:32). In this way, Tiananmen forced the Chinese elite to recognise the problems posed to their own legitimacy by the modernisation strategy. Yet, in so doing it only made them aware of the necessity of continuing with this strategy to preserve their own position in power. Thus in the wake of the Beijing massacre, "many observers expected China to back away from economic reforms for fear it would lead to the collapse of Communist Part rule in China. Deng Xioping drew precisely the opposite conclusion. ... His solution was to speed up economic reform in order to reinforce the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party" (Segal, 1994:13). Furthermore, it is important not to underestimate the extent of China's crisis of political identity. Given the scope of the social changes taking place in contemporary China, there is no easy way out of its predicament without widespread political upheaval affecting the whole of Chinese society. As Segal notes, "this is not just a crisis of the regime; it has

important elements of a crisis of national identity" (Segal, 1994:62). However, it is only since 1989 that the Chinese elite itself became fully aware of the political significance of the changes taking place inside their country. In Kim and Dittmer's words, "(m)ore than any other event, the 1989 Tiananmen massacre reflected and affected a profound crisis of national self-definition" for China (Kim and Dittmer, 1989:257).

One major analyst has attempted to develop a conceptual framework which is able to relate China's ongoing internal political crisis during the 1990s to its behaviour in the emerging international system. Johnston argues that China has adopted what he refers to as '*identity realism*' as an underlying set of foreign policy preferences. Identity realism suggests that "Chinese leaders believe the primary dangers in their environment come from ... challenges to the cohesiveness of internal order. One consequence is that the Chinese leadership has tried to intensify popular identification with the regime and the nation-state, with the result that we have seen a ... hardening of realpolitik discourse and behaviour" (Johnston, 1999:263-264). The concept of identity realism "flows from work in social constructivism and social psychology on group identity formation and intergroup conflict. ... (T)his literature ... holds that the creation of in-group identities leads directly to the devaluation of outgroups. This in turn leads to competitive interpretations of the relationship with the outgroup" (Johnston, 1999:288). Johnston stresses that "the ingroup does not resent or distrust the outgroup because of some tangible threat to ingroup interests (as neorealism/realism would posit ...). Rather it is socialised and learned whether or not a tangible threat exists" (Johnston, 1999:288). Thus "the causal arrow runs the other way (to the direction suggested by neorealism): identity construction - and its intensity - determine anarchy and how much fear and competition results" (Johnston, 1999:289). Under these circumstances, "the group .... needs to provide arguments about the competitiveness of the environment in order to reinforce ingroup identification. This is what realpolitik as ideology does" (Johnston, 1999:291). The notion of identity realism therefore postulates that realism can become a means of self-identification for states within the international system, rather than being imposed by external structures of constraint.

Johnston argues that "efforts to increase the intensity of identification with the Chinese state - while never absent in post-1949 history, of course - picked up ... after June 4, 1989" (Johnston, 1999:294). He notes that Tiananmen "provided information to Chinese leaders that suggested more work needed to be done to intensify ingroup identification ... and ... that differences with the outgroup were ... more pressing ... than they had previously acknowledged" (Johnston, 1999:293-294). Furthermore, Johnston stresses that "the regime does not believe the crisis in internal legitimacy has passed. The crisis has been accentuated ... by American pressure on China ...(and) by a deep concern about ... processes of identity creation or consolidation within China" (Johnston, 1999:294). Finally, Johnston is clear that the critical shift in the intensity of ingroup identification occurred in response to the Tiananmen incident in 1989 rather than the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and is therefore "not a product of (structural changes associated with) the end of the Cold War" (Johnston, 1999:295). Nevertheless, Johnston also recognises that the end of the Cold War has been extremely important for China's crisis of identity. This is because the end of the Cold War has "reinforced information about ingroup-outgroup differences that were made especially apparent with June 4th" by reducing US incentives to downplay political differences with China (Johnston, 1999:295). Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced China's vulnerability to a direct large scale invasion of its territory, such that "(f)or the first time in the history of the People's Republic ... China does not face an identifying or pressing external threat" (Shambaugh, 1994:48). As Segal notes, under these circumstances "central government ... (has) more difficulty appealing to the myth of national unity" (Segal, 1994:10). Thus paradoxically, the relatively benign systemic context poses a threat to the domestic legitimacy of the ruling elite. In this way, the close coincidence of the Tiananmen incident of 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had similar and mutually reinforcing effects. Together they starkly revealed the fragility of the regime's domestic legitimacy so that, within the space of a few years, Chinese elites dramatically changed perception of the strength of their political authority, both domestically and internationally.

The literature on China's foreign policy frequently develops themes which resonate strongly with the motivational logic suggested by the concept of identity realism. For example, Johnston points out that although China's defence modernisation drive "persists under near unipolarity, it is not because the Chinese believe this structural condition is especially dangerous for China at the moment - indeed Chinese assessments condition the post-Cold War period as the most benign period in Chinese strategic security since at least 1949" (Johnston, 1999:263; see also Kim, 1992:151-152). Other analysts recognise that one way to explain China's aggressive stance over its territorial claims in the South China Sea is to recognise the way in which "economic reforms .... have put China's conservatives on the defensive, and they are using nationalistic issues, like sovereignty over the Spratly's, to assert themselves" (Valencia, 1995:18; see also Segal, 1994:45). Austin argues that it is China's public order crisis which lies behind increasingly assertive Chinese rhetoric over its disputes over Taiwan and Hong Kong and with Japan (Austin, 1995:15). More generally, Shambaugh comments that "(t)he end of the Cold War and the absence of an overt threat ... belies a complex picture. China still feels insecure despite an unprecedented peaceful national security environment. This gives rise to an increasingly assertive nationalism and military build-up." (Shambaugh, 1994:55; see also Shambaugh, 1992:89). Overall, then, the concept of identity realism suggests that it is plausible that the domestic pressures faced by the Chinese state have led it to pursue a foreign policy which, whilst superficially resembling neorealist type behaviour, is actually underpinned by a very distinctive kind of political realism.

Moreover, the concept of identity realism is capable of providing a consistent overall explanation of apparently contradictory features of China's post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour. As has been noted, whilst China has displayed a pronounced tendency towards a predominantly 'realist' oriented foreign policy, it has also made significant use of international institutions over the 1990s. However, it is important to recognise that China's significant use of international institutional frameworks has *not* been motivated by a mix of pragmatic acceptance and functional incentives as institutionalism suggests. Instead, this behaviour arises because the regime has found that some form of engagement with the outside world through international

institutional frameworks has become a *necessary* component of its foreign policy. As Yahuda identifies, "it is not that the entanglement with the outside world has tied their hands ... or taught them the value of co-operative approaches to security, but rather that the harsh realities of the problems of maintaining their rule at home has persuaded China's rulers of the imperatives of deepening economic engagement with the outside world" (Yahauda, 1997:7; see also Roy, 1998b:104). Thus in line with identity realist behaviour, it has been the over-riding concern of the ruling elites with their internal *sovereignty* which has led them into participation in international institutions. In this way, an identity realist explanation of China's post-Cold War foreign policy reveals structural tensions at the core of China's management of its interdependent relations with the outside world. Whilst the elite have become reliant on certain levels of interdependence with the outside world for their continued legitimacy, it is this very interdependence which increasingly poses a threat to their sovereign authority. Under these circumstances, elites adopt realpolitik discourse and behaviour as the only means available to them to strengthen in-group identification. In turn, however, this generates deep problems in China's relations with the West which are crucial to sustaining regime legitimacy.

Indeed, Johnson himself identifies the structural tensions at the core of China's diplomatic conduct. He notes that "China's self-identification has undergone ... a blurring. The traditional sovereign-centric, autonomous major power identity ... has been uneasily linked to a newer identity ... (associated with responsible) participation in institutions ... . This linkage has created a tension in diplomacy between China's desire to show itself as an active, involved participant in international institutions (even those that offer no obvious material costs or benefits, or indeed are somewhat costly), and the desire to minimise commitments and constraints that are required by this participation" (Johnston, 1998:77). Similarly, Robinson recognises the way in which as China's interdependence has risen, "Beijing's foreign policy could only become highly interactive, participatory and co-operative. But these attitudes by themselves did not spell interdependence. Rather a complex mix of dependence, autonomy (termed independence by the leadership), and interdependence ensued. There was no objective way to arrive at some bottom line as to the balance between

the three in China's foreign relations" (Robinson, 1998:40). This mix of inconsistent motivations is impossible to capture through a focus on China's relative or absolute status as neorealism and institutionalism explanations suggest. As Beylerian and Canivet conclude, "when conceiving of their countries international roles, China's leaders real preoccupation (over the 1990s) was not with status ... but with identity" (Beylerian and Cavinet, 1997:222). Thus, unlike neorealist and institutionalist alternatives, the concept of identity realism neatly captures the distinctive way in which China's foreign policy reflects the complexity of the relationship between its regime's domestic authority and its external environment.

Overall, therefore, a convincing case can be made for the prediction of the liberal model with respect to China's post-Cold War state strategies. Unlike either neorealism or institutionalism, an identity realist characterisation of China's foreign policy preferences provides a plausible explanation of its predominantly realist orientation whilst simultaneously being able to account for the deep tensions introduced into its diplomatic conduct by interdependence. Indeed, because it suggests that China's realist diplomatic conduct arises precisely because of the way in which its ruling elite is both deeply reliant on the benefits of interdependence and fears its consequences, the concept of identity realism is able to explain apparently contradictory elements of China's preferences as consistent dimensions of a single underlying strategic identity. However, the conclusion that China's foreign policy behaviour may be explained as a consequence of its regime's structural inability to manage the impact of interdependence on its domestic politics raises the deeper question of the extent to which China will be able to continue along its present path in future. In turn this requires an examination of the way in which the relationship between China's domestic and international politics is likely to develop so as to define the agenda for China's political choices in the emerging international system.

China's Choices

In the English language literature, the 'engagement-containment debate' has provided the most prominent way of framing the discussion about China's political choices in

the post-Cold War international system. This debate is concerned primarily with how the United States and the West more generally should conduct their relations with a 'rising China'. However, more fundamentally it raises the issue of what strategic options China is likely to take in the post-Cold War world. The engagement school follows institutionalist logic in advocating "enmeshing China in as many international regimes and binding commitments as possible so as to minimise its potential for disruptive behaviour and maximise the smooth integration of China into the international order" (Shambaugh, 1996:184). The most comprehensive statement of this position has come from Shinn who argues for extensive engagement with China on a wide range of economic and security issues (Shinn, 1996:9). By contrast, the containment school follows neorealism in regarding conflict with China as either inevitable or highly likely in the face of its rising relative capabilities. They see China "as a disruptive threat to regional security and the international system, and advocate balance of power tactics to either 'deter', 'contain' or 'constrain' China" (Shambaugh, 1996:184-185). For example, using neorealist analysis, Layne advocates that the Untied States adopt an offshore balancing strategy for dealing with the challenges posed by the East Asian region in the post-Cold War period, including the threat of a rising China (Layne, 1996:73-75).

As a way of discussing the strategic options faced by China today, the debate between engagement and containment is highly problematic. However apparently polarised positions in the debate are, in practice, their views are difficult to distinguish. For example, the realist Segal proposes that the positions in the debate are "often unsophisticated", and suggests that "(c)ontainment can work, but its neighbours and powers further afield need to appreciate that they must .... use elements from a strategy of engagement as well as the balance of power" (Segal, 1996:134). Similarly, on Shinn's formulation, it is necessary to pursue a strategy of 'conditional engagement' as a more sophisticated alternative to unconditional engagement and pre-emptive containment (Shinn, 1996:3-4). What this blurring between the positions reflects is that in the absence of information about China's underlying strategic intentions, its response to Western polices is extremely difficult to anticipate. Advocates of either position must therefore qualify their policy prescriptions by

making them in some way dependent or 'conditional' on certain types of Chinese behaviour. Sophisticated commentators therefore broadly agree that "(t)he important thing is to aim at the reduction of China's potential 'intent' (not its present or potential 'capability') to initiate aggressive military hostilities" (Sato, 1998:18). As Shambaugh identifies, "(o)ften missing in the (engagement-containment) debate ... is a consideration of China's potential responses to these polarised polices and consideration of the domestic variables inside China that will condition its external orientation. ... The Western debate over the relative merits of engagement versus containment seemingly treats China as a static entity that will simply have to adjust to whatever policy the other nations pursue" (Shambaugh, 1996:182).

Johnston provides an alternative framework for analysing China's strategic choices in the post-Cold War international system which is more amenable to consideration of domestic political factors within China. In his widely cited analysis of recent Chinese arms control policies, Johnston draws a distinction between learning and adaptation as qualitatively different possible responses China can make to its changing international environment. According to Johnston, "learning occurs if change in policy is due to shifts in the central paradigm held by the policy makers ... as new information about the external environment is internalised by the decision-makers. In contrast, in the adaptation model, a change in policy is due to tactical adjustment to changing external conditions. We should therefore expect to see no change in paradigm but rather a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of previous tactics in ... as exogenous conditions change" (Johnston, 1996:31). Some proponents of engagement have made the argument that China has engaged in social learning in response to the rising impact of interdependence on its foreign policy, and that this model could provide a basis for China's future behaviour in the international system. For example, Harris argues that in the economic realm, "(i)t does seem clear ... that China did undergo a major learning process ... . Chinese policy thinkers abandoned many deeply rooted assumptions ... (and) came to accept and internalise the reality of one world market with capitalism as the prevalent force, and with the need for economic co-operation globally and in the Asia-Pacific region" (Harris, 1997:150). Harris is explicit that such behaviour could be seen as evidence that China has engaged in "global socialisation"

towards liberal norms of behaviour (Harris, 1997:151). However, such a view is oversimplistic because it presumes a direct relationship between China's use of international economic institutions and change in its underlying strategic preferences. Harris' argument fails to identify the way in which Chinese elites have embraced interdependence above all else to preserve their domestic authority. Indeed, China's identity realist preferences have led it not only to avoid institutionalising behaviour wherever feasible, but to actively adopt policy discourse and practices compatible with realism to compensate for the paradoxical way in which interdependence simultaneously poses a real threat to its domestic regime's legitimacy. Thus, even in the economic arena where it has made the most extensive use of international institutions, China's behaviour must be understood in terms of adaptation rather than learning. What is notable about China's approach to interdependence is its *failure* to either engage in learning and thereby fundamentally alter the cognitive framework within which it operates within the international system, or even adopt adaptive behaviour above and beyond what is minimally required to prop up the legitimacy of the ruling communist elite. However, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated version of the argument that China today faces intense systemic pressures to fundamentally change the central paradigm held by foreign policy makers. On this formulation, it is precisely China's distinctive inability to fully appreciate the consequences of its interdependence for its domestic and international political behaviour which is at the source of its deep and ongoing crisis of national identity.

One possible response the Chinese elite could make to this predicament is a shift towards 'neoconservatism'. Whilst a neoconservative revival in China may encourage it to adopt a more hard-line version of *realpolitik* behaviour, its possibility should not be understood in structural realist terms. Rather, neoconservatism may be seen as a response to the intensification of China's crisis of national identity since the late 1980's. Fewsmith notes that in the post-Tiananmen era, neoconservatism must be seen as a reaction to the way in which "the question is not so much whether to reform as how to hold on the face of reform" (Fewsmith, 1995:635). Neoconservatism shares the orientation of traditional conservatism towards maintaining cohesion in Chinese society (Fewsmith, 1995:637-638). However, it is distinctive in the degree to which it

breaks from central socialist values. Thus in terms of economic management neoconservatism is characterised by "an acceptance of a much broader and more important role for market forces than traditional conservative thinking ever contemplated" (Fewsmith, 1995:640). Similarly, neoconservatism suggests that "a patriotic appeal would be more effective than traditional socialist ideology" in providing social integration (Fewsmith, 1995:642). However, neoconservatism has important limitations as a viable long term political course for China because it "has not yet presented any convincing arguments to address effectively the problems in Chinese society that it has identified. ... (In particular,) neconservatives have not explained how their sense of nationalism can match China's evident need to continue importing capital and exporting goods" (Fewsmith, 1995:649). Indeed, it is likely that a neoconservative shift would only exacerbate China's current problems and so speed up the process of regime transition. For this reason, Fewsmith concludes that "(t)he neoconservative ... (option for China) is only one of many possible outcomes, and perhaps not the most likely" (Fewsmith, 1995:650).

A second possible course for the Chinese regime would be to continue with its present stance and adopt a pragmatic approach to dealing with its ongoing legitimacy crisis. Such an approach would be characterised by incremental responses to the challenges faced by the Chinese state, rather than the regime accepting fundamental political change. This strategy should therefore be seen as a form of 'muddling through' or adaptation in the face of change, rather than in terms of learning by the Chinese elite. However, as with the neoconservative course for China, there are fundamental question marks about the sustainability of any such course for China. Indeed, Harding uses the term "decay" to describe this possible future direction for China (Harding, 1993:36; see also Harding, 1994). The case of the hand over of Hong Kong to China provides a useful cue to a discussion of why this might be the case. Yahuda notes that "(w)hen China resumes sovereignty of Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 it will begin an undertaking of enormous significance for the future of China itself. The way in which it lives up to its promises and legal obligations will not only determine the fate of the former British colony ... , but it will also shape the evolution of China's political identity and its integration into the international community" (Yahuda, 1996b:1).

Yahuda identifies that there are many functional incentives to the Chinese regime that would follow from it demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law in Hong Kong. For example, it would ease China's entry into the WTO, and would provide a strong precedent for the success of a 'one country two systems' settlement for the peaceful integration of Taiwan into the PRC (Yahuda, 1996b:3-4). However, he also stresses that "the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will pose many problems to China itself. If the actual process of the transfer of sovereignty could be successfully managed, Hong Kong could then pose further challenges to the Chinese Communist government ... (because) it would serve as an attractive model for all those in China who seek the benefits of a greater legality and an increased democratic accountability" (Yahuda, 1996b:4). Thus, to Yahuda, the handover of Hong Kong represents a "turning point" for China, because it points up the limitations of China accepting adaptation for the functional benefits this brings without addressing the more fundamental political issues this raises for the Chinese state (Yahuda, 1996b:135).

The challenge that is posed by Hong Kong to China must be understood in the context of much deeper decentralising dynamics that question core features of China's formal political identity. Segal suggests that regionalisation in China has meant that it "might best be seen as evolving a distinctive type of informal federalism where power is managed in different ways at different levels, and even varies in form at the same level" (Segal, 1994:63; see also Zheng, 1994:321). Moreover, trends towards informal federalisation in China take on even further significance when set in a wider global context. Segal pushes his discussion of informal federalism in China as far as to suggest explicitly that "(w)hether (or not) one adopts the Euro-speak of 'subsidiarity' and 'variable geometry' ... the reality in China is tending towards increasingly devolved power" (Segal, 1994:63). The implication of this suggestion is that the Chinese state can be seen as undergoing a series of structural changes that are tantamount to the emergence of an informal form of what, in a German and/or European context, is termed multi-level governance. Thus the Chinese state finds that it is devolving power both 'upwards' over its handling of ostensibly 'international' issues such as its sovereignty over Hong Kong, Macao, and perhaps in future Taiwan, and is (albeit informally) ceding power 'downwards' with regard to ostensibly

'domestic' questions such as its control over the outer provinces. The parallels between decentralising trends in both Germany and China are even more striking given the enormous political differences between these two states and the regions within which they are situated. Unlike Germany, the Chinese state is authoritarian in character, and in contrast to Europe, the network of formal regional international institutions in East Asia is highly underdeveloped. That a meaningful comparison can be made between political decentralisation in Germany and China therefore raises the question of what pressures have encouraged them to engage in similar patterns of behaviour despite their radically different political characteristics and regional settings.

A plausible explanation of the parallels in trends towards political decentralisation in both Germany and China is that these states are responding to pressures arising from the international system. In the case of both Germany and China, trends towards 'multi-level governance' are directly related to the deep-seated shifts in the identity structure of the states concerned. In turn these shifts in identity structure are intimately linked to overall patterns of change taking place within the international system. It is the German state's distinctive national/international identity that has led it to devolve power upwards and downwards as part of a process of Europeanisation (Germany chapter: 98). Similarly, informal federalisation in China may be understood as symptomatic of the Chinese state's ongoing crisis of national identity within the international system. Indeed, at least one analyst expresses the view that China's foreign policy reflects the shifting nature of the relationship between domestic and international politics. In a statement that could equally be applied to Germany, Kim suggests that in China's case, "the most salient impact of globalisation dynamics on the state is the intensification of domestic and external linkages. As a result, the conventional realist divide between domestic and external linkage factors is substantially blurred, if not totally erased. With the increasing associated interactions between security and economic policies, the factors that influence ... foreign policy behaviour no longer fall neatly into the dichotomous categories of domestic/international and external/systemic variables. Both sets of variables ... interact during the decision making process" (Kim, 1998:22; Roy, 1998[b]:243 makes

similar comments). It is, however, possible to take Kim's analyses one stage further by suggesting that the intensification of internal and external linkages he identifies is itself a distinctive feature of the emerging international system. On this view, trends towards 'multi-level governance' in both Germany and China reflect the way in which the international system has come to embody a complex, two way interaction between internal and external dimensions of politics. Such an analysis suggests that the reason why the viability of either a shift towards neoconservatism or a continuation of pragmatic adaptation are questionable is because China faces intense pressures on its internal identity structure arising from the international system.

Given the challenges it faces, an alternative to either neoconservatism or a continuation of pragmatic adaptation, would be for it to adopt a fundamental shift in its political identity. Such a response would require a basic change in the cognitive framework informing its policy choices, and as such would represent social learning rather than adaptation. Once again, the issue of Hong Kong's handover exemplifies China's predicament. Whilst Hong Kong currently poses a potentially enormous threat to the sovereignty of the current Chinese regime, the problems posed to the Chinese regime by its acquisition arise because the elite is reluctant to formally recognise processes of decentralisation that are occurring. Accepting a federal solution could be of great benefit to China, although as Segal identifies it is important to stress that at present "it is unlikely that China will adopt a formally federal structure" (Segal, 1994:63). As has been noted, there are important functional incentives for China to accept a 'one country, two systems' approach to the integration of Hong Kong. Yet more fundamentally, such a solution would perhaps provide a more sustainable basis on which to enhance the long term political legitimacy of the Chinese state than its present authoritarianism. Whilst the regime would clearly have to run the risk that it would face greatly increased separatist pressures from the provinces, it is equally important to recognise that pressures for decentralisation are unlikely to wane unless and until a viable long term solution to its structural cause is found. Thus, as Yahuda notes, "(t)he recovery of Hong Kong ... is occurring at a time when it could play an exceptional role in easing China's painful transition" (Yahuda, 1996b:142). Moreover, the case of Hong Kong provides a principle which can be generalised to other aspects

of Beijing's management of the regionalisation process. Segal, for example, suggests that by acknowledging some decentralising trends, Chinese authorities "might make a formal break-up (of the PRC) less likely" (Segal, 1994:64). In this sense, rather than being a source of fundamental political problems for the Chinese state, adopting a shift in its basic political identity China could become a major source of 'power' for it, allowing it to strengthen its domestic legitimacy in ways in which it could not otherwise do.

It is also possible that adopting a fundamental shift in its underlying political identity could be a major source of power for China in terms of its routine dealings with the Western powers. China's realist self-identification currently encourages it to behave in a largely non-transparent manner with regard to other states in the international system. At the same time, the debate over engagement versus containment of China taking place in the West reflects fundamental uncertainties about China's strategic preferences or intentions within the emerging international system. Indeed, precisely this issue has been raised by the US contributor to the track II diplomatic dialogue being conducted between the US, Japan and China (Abramowitz, 1998:40). In response, the Chinese representative notes that debates between proponents of engagement and containment of China in the West have meant that "further clarification of Japanese and American intentions is imperative. ... (Western powers) should show adequate transparency ... in specifying their own concerns and plans" (Jisi, 1998:29). However, it is the Japanese representative who identifies the issue lying at the core of this debate. He notes the key to developing strong trilateral relations between China, Japan and the US is that "partners in individual bilateral relationships should make their specific policy intentions and policy trends transparent to the third party (in order) ... to promote *trust* ... (and) *recognise trust strengthening as a goal*" (Funabashi, 1998:53, emphasis added). In this way, Funabashi identifies that developing its relationships on the basis of trust has become a major potential source of power for China in the emerging international system. In particular, sustaining the trust of others provides China with the key to developing a positive sum structure of strategic interaction between itself and the Western powers. As Yunling suggests, if the premise of Chinese behaviour is averting confrontation

with the great powers, a possible strategy for China is "(s)imultaneously developing relations with the US and Japan, confronting neither" (Yunling, 1997:464). Yet to clarify its underlying strategic intentions also requires China to undertake a fundamental shift in its foreign policy identity. In China's case, adaptation is not enough because of the way in which interdependence threatens the legitimacy of the current Chinese regime, leading it further towards non-transparent 'realist' behaviour. Only a response involving a basic shift in the central paradigm held by Chinese policy makers - or learning - would provide it with a cognitive framework consistent with communicating a benign set of strategic intentions to the outside world.

Moreover, whilst the West clearly has grounds to criticise China's particularly opaque foreign policy objectives, it is equally important that it recognises that it may be its own lack of transparency which has led to major problems in its dealings within China. Probably the single most significant political conflict with China during the 1990s, the 1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis, provides a suitable case in point. Prior to this incident, the basic objectives of the first Clinton administration's policy towards China had been extremely poorly defined and on numerous occasions had sent highly ambiguous signals about the US's strategic intentions towards China (Lampton, 1997:1102). Tellingly, the Clinton administration itself seems to have recognised its own role in precipitating the crisis by the way in which it has subsequently made major changes to its engagement strategy. Documents reflecting present US policy towards China recognise that "(a) persistent problem of (then) current US strategy is its fundamental ambiguity; Beijing seems to understand neither the overall strategy nor the relative importance of American goals." (Shinn, 1996:14). Indeed, the US is explicit that, using the new principles of conditional engagement it has publicly set out, "Washington will be able to communicate better its policy objectives to China" (Shinn, 1996:14). Thus it is important not to accept at face value a neorealist interpretation of the Taiwan Straits missile crisis. Instead, there is strong evidence that lack of transparency in US policy towards China was its root cause. Furthermore, the identification of trust as a central feature of China's relations with other states also implies that principles of engagement are applied in a consistent and co-ordinated way not only by the United States, but also by Japan and Europe. Sato

notes the ways in which the unequal nature of the US-Japanese alliance has sent confusing signals to Beijing and as such weakened their influence over China's behaviour (Sato, 1997:1). Maull notes that the unequal nature of the US-Europe relationship has led to similar problems of policy co-ordination (Maull, 1997:469-476). Moller identifies the ways in which economic competition between various European states, has both sent inconsistent messages to China and also allowed it to gain from internal political divisions amongst them (Moller, 1996). Moreover, as previous chapters have stressed, it is important not to interpret asymmetries in relations between the US and Europe/Japan in terms of emerging patterns of structural conflict within the international system. There is therefore considerable scope for increased transparency in the West's engagement strategy with respect to China, which would be likely to smooth the way towards stronger relations with it in future. In turn this reflects the way in which China can promote its own equality with Western powers by reciprocally recognising the importance of transparency and trust in its relations with them. It is in this sense that its relations with others is becoming "more equal" or increasingly "equilateral" (Jisi, 1998:22 and 23 respectively).

However, whilst the West can take significant steps to facilitate China's smooth integration into the emerging international system, it is ultimately China itself which must make the most crucial decisions about its future international role. It is clear that since 1989, China's political future has been radically open and increasingly a product of historical contingency (Whyte, 1992:70). The current elite's stop-gap approach to dealing with change is unsustainable as a viable long term basis for China's domestic and international political behaviour. As Segal notes, regardless of the regime's stance, "(t)he signs that China is changing shape are increasingly clear. A closer look at its national identity reveals fissures and pressures that have long been masked by an official determination to uphold the myth of national unity" (Segal, 1994:54). In the face of this predicament, China could move in any one of a number of radically different political directions. Both a shift towards neoconservatism or a compete break up of China are options which should not be ruled out. This wide variety of possible future directions for China arises because ultimately "(t)he fate of China ... will depend critically on how ... (the Chinese) manage their reforms" (Segal, 1994:62). In

negotiating the transition to the post-Cold War world, it is the elite's distinctive political identity which is currently the major obstacle preventing China from adopting a 'learning' response to the challenges it today faces. Whilst the elite continues to block off fundamental political change, the most probable path forward for the medium term will be a continuation of the present policy of pragmatic adaptation. As Segal recognises, "(t)he most likely outcome (for China) is a prolonged crisis of identity, where changes short of a complete collapse have an important impact on the lives of the Chinese and its neighbours" (Segal, 1994:62).

Segal's analysis of the ongoing problems China has faced over the 1990s returns the chapter to the theme of 'mid-life crisis' introduced in the opening pages. As was noted, over the forty or so years since the foundation of the PRC, communist ideology provided a viable framework within which China's regime could sustain its domestic and international political identity. However, since the late 1980's, China has been presented with the problem of negotiating the transition to the post-Cold War world at a time when its Communist ideology no longer provides it with the sense of domestic and international purpose it was once able to. This situation presents China with both opportunities and dangers. In order to grasp the new opportunities its crisis opens up, China must be willing to run consciously entertained risks, and in particular, it must be prepared to confront reflexively and resolve the way in which its existing political identity is no longer able to deal effectively with the new challenges it faces. Nevertheless, this requires China's ruling elite to take the unlikely course of accepting fundamental political change. However unlikely in the short to medium term, China's failure to take this course can only further exacerbate China's sense of 'ontological insecurity' within the emerging international system by intensifying its crisis of national identity. As with an individual displaying ontological insecurity, China lacks a consistent feeling of biographical continuity in the sense that Communism has not been replaced by an ideology which is effectively able to restore a legitimate sense of national cohesion. As with an ontologically insecure individual, in an external environment full of changes, the Chinese regime is preoccupied by possible risks to its existence, and is paralysed in terms of practical action. Finally, as with an ontologically insecure individual, China feels morally 'empty' and lacks 'self-regard'

in the sense that the regime is fundamentally unsure about the very basis for its existence. Moreover, under these conditions the regime finds that it subjects its behaviour to constant scrutiny. Indeed, the essence of China's 'mid-life crisis' is that, somewhat paradoxically, it is the Chinese regime's intensification since 1989 of its traditionally 'realist' foreign policy orientation which increasingly lies at the root of its deep sense of insecurity in the world. Until the regime comes to recognise that its ongoing sense of insecurity derives from the way in which the sense of identity which sustained its past development has become inadequate to this context in which it today finds itself, China will continue to face a crisis of identity transition as it negotiates the political changes taking place in the post-Cold War world.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions

This thesis has utilised the 'real world laboratory' provided by the end of the Cold War to assess neo- or structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system. Each of the theories examined makes very different predictions about the key variable affecting state behaviour, the levels and type of institutionalisation which will take place between states, and the sources of power for states in the post Cold War international system. By applying these models to examining the strategies pursued by Germany, Japan and China since 1989, this thesis aims to account for how states have adjusted to the end of the Cold War, and make general statements about the overall nature of international change in the post Cold War period. The conclusions which follow summarise the empirical findings of the thesis with respect to the strategic behaviour of units, the structure of interaction which exists between them, and the process through which the structure of interaction feeds back into altering units' preferences. They demonstrate how the distinctive patterns of behaviour observed may be explained with reference to a liberal model of the international system. The section on the strategic behaviour of units highlights the significance of states' domestic preferences as the key variable determining their behaviour and outcomes at the international level. The section on the structure of interaction which exists between the units supports liberal claims about the level and type of institutionalisation taking place, and the sources of power for states in the post Cold War international system. The section on reflexivity supports liberal claims about the distinctive process of identity construction and socialisation that has taken place. Finally, the relationship between the process of change in the international system identified and the methodological status of the foreign policy literature upon which this thesis is based is examined. This follows from the overtly critical methodological stance adopted, and serves to highlight the relationship which exists between the foreign policy literature and the reflexivity in the international system documented by the thesis.

Units

Over the first ten years of the post Cold War period, Germany, Japan and China have each pursued strategies which reflect a distinctive set of foreign policy preferences. The preferences fall outside of the ranges of behaviour anticipated by either the neorealist or the institutionalist models, and are summarised in Table 1 below:

Table 1

State Strategies 1989-1999

State	Strategic Preferences	Analyst(s)
Germany	Reflexively Institutionalist	Anderson and Goodman
Japan	Mercantile Realist	Heginbotham and Samuels
China	Identity Realist	Johnston

The preferences articulated by the unified Germany have been characterised by Anderson and Goodman as *reflexively institutionalist*. As it adjusted to the post Cold War transition, "institutions ... restructured and remoulded German interests, so that, in the eyes of the German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments for policy but normative frameworks for policy making" (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:24). Although Anderson and Goodman's characterisation was developed through an analysis of Germany's strategies in the initial post unification period, it may legitimately be extended to its behaviour throughout the 1990s. Contrary to neorealist theory, the united Germany did not begin to relax its major institutional commitments. Contrary to institutionalist theory, Germany's use of institutions reflected not only instrumental calculations about interests but the way in

which Germany's institutional commitments had reshaped its foreign policy preferences. Overall, Germany has developed its strategies in a norm governed fashion over the 1990s, changing the formal procedures through which it participated in international institutions in order to preserve their underlying normative fabric. Germany's strategic preferences may be regarded as liberal, rather than neorealist or institutionalist, in the sense that it has internalised the norms of multilateral institutional frameworks.

Over the 1990s, Japan has articulated an equally distinctive set of strategic preferences. Following Heginbotham and Samuels, it is possible to characterise Japan's preferences as *mercantile realist* in orientation (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1999). Mercantile realism combines economic nationalism with a low political profile. Contrary to neorealist theory, Japan consistently prioritised techno-economic over politico-military interests, defining its strength in terms of wealth and technology and its position in terms of its industrial structure. This has been most notable in its pronounced tendency to continue to free ride on the US for its security over the 1990s, in particular during the Gulf War and in the 1995 National Defence Planning Outline. It has also been apparent in its close economic relations with China over the 1990s, which according to neorealist theory should be a major potential military rival for Japan. Contrary to institutionalist theory, Japan's economic relations with other states have been strongly mercantilist in orientation. This has been reflected in the character of its aid and investment strategies in Asian countries, and in its troubled economic relations with Western economies. In line with mercantile realist behaviour, Japan is co-operating economically with Asian states which have complementary industrial structures (notably China) whilst balancing against other advanced industrialised states. Thus, as with Germany, the distinctive strategic preferences articulated by Japan over the 1990s are compatible with neither neorealist nor institutionalist predictions about its foreign policy behaviour.

Following Johnston, China's strategic preferences since 1989 may be characterised as *identity realist*. Identity realism suggests that Chinese leaders believe that the primary dangers from their security environment come from challenges to the cohesiveness of

internal order, and under these circumstances use realpolitik discourse and behaviour to prop up regime legitimacy (Johnston, 1999). China's identity realism has its origins in the regimes' realisation in 1989 that pursuit of a strategy of developing interdependent relations with the West as a key to social and economic modernisation had major domestic ramifications, and was greatly magnified by the disappearance of a direct external threat to China since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As with the other two cases analysed, the preferences articulated by China over the 1990s are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist international relations theory. Contrary to realism, the intensification of Chinese realpolitik discourse and behaviour since 1989 has been largely symbolic or performative, and has been tempered by tacit acknowledgement by the ruling elite that engagement with the West is a necessary component in sustaining the high growth rates required for continued regime legitimacy. Contrary to institutionalism, the Chinese elite's deep sense of unease with the effects of increased interdependence on its domestic political structure results in foreign policy practices with a strongly realist orientation. The result is an inconsistent mix of motivations underlying Chinese foreign policy which highlight the regimes' underlying concern with identity rather than its relative or absolute status.

In terms of the particular content of their strategies, Germany, Japan and China have responded very differently to the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989. However, it remains possible to generalise about the foreign policy behaviour observed in the cases of Germany, Japan and China over the 1990s. Each of these states has acquired a heightened *capacity for autonomous action*. Their distinctive strategic preferences fall outside of the ranges predicted by neorealist and institutionalist models because of the influence of domestic factors on their foreign policy behaviour. This finding conforms to the predictions offered by a liberal model of the international system, which, as has been stressed, does not require states to articulate liberal preferences. Indeed, particularly, at the margins of change, the articulation of non-liberal preferences is to be expected. Only one of the cases examined, that of Germany, has articulated preferences that may broadly be characterised as 'liberal' in orientation. However, this is not problematic for predictions of the liberal model. The key prediction of the liberal model is that, with

the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal states in the international system, states' domestic preferences will become a chronic factor influencing their international behaviour. This is not to make the claim that states' interactions with other units in the international system have not significantly affected international outcomes, as shall be discussed in the following two sections below. However, it does imply that patterns of state behaviour present anomalies to both neorealist and institutionalist predictions.

Neorealists and institutionalists might object to this claim on the grounds that they can accept that, in particular instances, states' domestic preferences can influence their international behaviour. However, three responses may be made to any such arguments on the basis of the case studies examined. First, these findings apply in relation to the behaviour of three major states that neorealists have identified as candidates to become polar powers within the international system. Such states ought to find themselves exposed to the full force of pressures arising from the international system. Second, Germany, Japan and China operate within radically different circumstances in the sense that there are wide variations in patterns of interdependence faced by each of the three states. Yet across *all three* domestic preferences have heavily influenced foreign policy behaviour. Thirdly, the cases have been examined over a ten year period. In each case, states' domestic political preferences have been a *consistent* factor in influencing foreign policy behaviour over an extended period of time. It cannot be suggested that, in the cases examined, domestic preferences have influenced foreign policy behaviour in an ad hoc fashion. Rather, they have decisively shaped their 'grand strategies' throughout the 1990s. It is difficult for neorealists and institutionalists to suggest that these consistent patterns of behaviour across three major states which operate in very different circumstances over an extended period represent temporary anomalies to the patterns of behaviour their theories predict. By contrast, the capacity for autonomous action they have acquired can be explained with reference to the liberal model of the international system.

Structure

A second distinctive feature of the international system since 1989 has been the structure of interaction which exists between the units. This structure stands out most clearly in the context of East Asia, where the absence of well developed patterns of interdependence combined with Japan and China's non-liberal preferences brings its benign effects into bold relief. In the chapters dealing with Japanese and Chinese state strategies, a wide range of literature was drawn upon to document the distinctive structure of interaction they face. However, for the purposes of exposition, this discussion will focus upon Yunling's article *Changing Sino-US-Japanese Relations*, which provides a particularly clear outline of these trends (Yunling, 1997). Yunling's analysis will be summarised before generalising his findings to the structural characteristics displayed by the emerging post Cold War international system as a whole.

Yunling documents the emergence of what he refers to as a "triangular structure" of strategic interaction between the US, Japan and China over the post Cold War period (Yunling, 1997:458). This triangular structure consists of three sets of bilateral relations between China and the US, the US and Japan and between China and Japan which are tightly interconnected. Changes in one set of bilateral relations strongly affect both of the others, and consequently have an extended impact on outcomes in the international system as a whole (Yunling, 1997:458). Yunling notes that relations between the US, Japan and China embody common interests and potential contradictions. In terms of commonalties, the three states share a wide base of economic and security interests in maintaining regional stability (Yunling, 1997:458). There are also contradictions because trilateral relations are "out of balance" - the United States seeks regional hegemony, Japan is a would-be superpower which needs US support but does not like US control, and China is a rising power that will not accept US dominance in the region (Yunling, 1997:459-460). However, he suggests that the triangular structure of interaction which exists between the three sets of bilateral relations is such that it can contain these contradictions. This is because no one state can balance against the structure generated by the other two sets of bilateral

relations. Attempting to isolate one state would drive it closer to the third, thus proving counterproductive. By contrast a strategy of co-operation with the same state reinforces the other two sets of bilateral relations by making it harder for any one of them to attempt to balance against the overall structure. The result is a self-reinforcing triangular pattern of interaction between the three sets of bilateral relations.

Yunling demonstrates his claims by working through the consequences of changes in each set of bilateral relationships for patterns of behaviour within the other two. He begins by examining the consequences of a deterioration in Sino-US relations initiated by the US. Under these conditions, "China may try to improve Sino-Japanese relations to ease the pressure from bad Sino-US relations. Japan would then be faced with a difficult choice: it may, in deference to the US, maintain a tough attitude towards China, but this risks a deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. .... (In consequence) Japan may instead decide to lean towards China, exerting pressure on the US" (Yunling, 1997:461). Pursuit of such a strategy would therefore prove counter-productive for the US. Similarly, Japan is constrained by the way in which "(b)ad US-Japanese relations ... bear upon Sino-US relations. Both the US and China may exert pressure on Japan by developing their bilateral relations" (Yunling, 1997:461). Finally, Sino-Japanese relations affect Sino-US and US-Japan relations. In particular, "(w)hen Sino-Japanese ties are close, the US becomes alert and might force Japan to loosen its ties with China. Sino-Japanese relations are thus constrained by Sino-US relations: the US will not allow Sino-Japanese relations to influence Sino-US relations" (Yunling, 1997:461). Furthermore, Yunling analyses the consequences of these three sets of interacting bilateral relations for their likely strategic choices. The United States is likely to pursue the option of "(s)imultaneously developing relations with both China and Japan. The US would seek to maintain the US-Japan Alliance and develop strategic relations with China, pulling her 'into the network' and using relations with China to check Japan" (Yunling, 1997:462). For Japan, the logical strategy in "(m)aintaining the US-Japan alliance while developing stable relations with China. The critical issue here is how Japan handles the US-Japan alliance. If Japan uses the alliance with the US to confront China, the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations will be undermined. If instead Japan treats its alliance with the US

as a support as it engages with China ... Sino-Japanese friendship will increase" (Yunling, 1997:463). Finally, China is encouraged to pursue a strategy of "(s)imulaneously developing relations with the US and Japan and confronting neither". This avoids the risks of isolation that arise from allying with either the US or Japan to oppose the third party (Yunling, 1997:464). Overall, Yunling concludes that the triangular structure of interaction he identifies "indicates that despite differences of interest and differing policy making orientations, the possibility of confrontation or antagonism in Sino-US-Japanese relations is relatively low" (Yunling, 1997:464).

The emergence of the structure of interaction documented by Yunling's analysis of changing Sino-US-Japanese relations strongly conforms to the patterns of behaviour predicted by a liberal model of the international system. Liberalism predicts that, with the emergence of a critical mass of formally liberal states within the global international system since 1989, units have acquired a heightened capacity for autonomous action. In a situation where there are three major states, this automatically generates an overall *configuration* of preferences conducive to the formation of a triangular structure of interaction along the lines suggested by Yunling. This is because the preferences adopted by any one state will be a necessary feature in the calculations made in the other two sets of bilateral relationships. As a result, any given state in the structure cannot risk alienating the other two by attempting to balance against either one of them. Alternatively expressed, each state is influenced by the structure of interaction generated by the overall configuration of preferences within the system. The result is that, even in a region such as East Asia where patterns of interdependence between states are poorly developed and there are large numbers of states which articulate non-liberal preferences, the prospects for peaceful change are high.

Yunling's analysis has more specific implications concerning the level and type of institutionalisation which takes place between the US, Japan and China, the form their relations take, and the sources of power for them. Again, these fit clearly within the ranges of behaviour predicted by the liberal model. The structure of interaction encourages states to transparently convey a benign set of preferences towards each of

the other two states in the triangle. Thus levels of institutionalisation will be higher than anticipated by neorealist and institutionalist theory because states are encouraged to share information about their underlying strategic intentions towards one another. It follows that the type of institutionalisation which will occur in the international system will be organised around the diffuse practice of reciprocity through the exchange of information about strategic intentions. In terms of the form they take, Sino-US-Japanese relations will increasingly be negotiated on the basis of independence and equality. Each state is independent in the sense that it has a high degree of autonomy of action in the strategic preferences which it articulates. However, no one state has complete dominance over the behaviour of the other two in their interactions, and as such will be unable to skew the triangle in its favour. The overall effect is to promote a balanced set of relations within which each state is an equal partner in the trilateral structure. Finally, trust becomes the major source of power for states. It enables any one state in the triangle to develop deeply institutionalised relations with *both* the others simultaneously. Neorealism suggests that this is not possible for states. Institutionalism holds that, when it is possible, institutionalisation will be limited and will only develop around the practice of specific reciprocity. Thus sustaining the trust of others enables states to behave in ways which otherwise they would not be able to.

The structure of interaction documented by Yunling in an East Asian context is symptomatic of wider global trends which have impacted directly on Germany's behaviour. These arise because the configuration of preferences in the international system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by a core of formally liberal democratic states. Under these conditions, information about states' underlying strategic intentions towards one another becomes the key variable affecting international behaviour and outcomes. Thus in terms of levels of institutionalisation Germany's deeply internalised commitment to multilateralism may be understood as falling into alignment with the structure of interaction of the system within which it operates. In terms of type of institutionalisation, Germany's appreciation of the importance of transparency about its underlying strategic intentions suggests that the structure of interaction it faces encourages it to organise its relations with others on

the basis of the diffuse practice of reciprocity. Germany has also shown strong signs of developing a more active and independent involvement in multilateral institutions, and participating on a more equal basis within them. This echoes the form being taken by Sino-US-Japanese relations. Finally, Germany has found that the key to developing this overall pattern of institutional commitments is sustaining the trust of its partners. Sustaining trust about its underlying strategic intentions has allowed it to rethink its position on the use of military force abroad and initiate a strategy of differentiated integration. These developments have been critical in allowing Germany to sustain its reflexive commitment to both NATO and the EU, and in this sense has allowed it to develop a pattern of institutionalised ties which it would otherwise have been unable to. That is to say, Germany has identified that trust is the major form of power for it in the emerging international system.

The overall pattern of change which emerges at the level of the global international system is therefore highly distinctive. Levels of institutionalisation occurring in the post Cold War system are high, in contrast to the moderate level of institutionalisation anticipated by institutionalist theory and the low levels anticipated by neorealist theory. This holds both in Western Europe, and more significantly, in East Asia which exists at the core-periphery margin. In terms of the type of institutionalisation, norms of diffuse reciprocity increasingly characterise the relationships between the major powers within the system. This reflects the way in which states locked into the overall structure will be encouraged to reveal information about their underlying strategic preferences as a basis for their relations with others in the international system. Relationships between states are increasingly negotiated and sustained on the basis of independence and equality. At present the involvement of the United States in both the Europe and East Asia skews relationships between the major powers. However, trends in relations between the US and Germany, Japan and China indicate that the US is likely to be encouraged to reduce its participation in both these regions to strengthen its relationships with these states. Finally, trust has become the major source of power for states in the post Cold War international system. Sustaining the trust of others allows states to develop more deeply institutionalised ties with others than they would otherwise be capable of doing. These features of the post Cold War

international system ultimately arise because it is overwhelmingly dominated by a core of formally democratic states. Under these conditions, a structure of interaction is generated which, regardless of any particular units' preferences, pushes states towards peaceful cooperation. This general pattern of behaviour is best explained with reference to the predictions of the liberal model, due to its stress on the *configuration* of state preferences as the key variable affecting state behaviour.

Reflexivity

The post Cold War international system is not only distinctive in terms of the behaviour of the units and the structure of interaction which exists between them. A further general pattern of behaviour may be observed across the three cases examined. In particular, Germany, Japan and China each face a major crisis of national identity in the face of the changes that have taken place in the international system since 1989. This reflects the way in which the distinctive structure generated by the liberal core in turn feeds back so as to alter the behaviour of units within the international system. Units become socialised to the norms of the dominant core by internalising liberal patterns of behaviour, a process which stands in complex relation to the autonomy of action they acquire.

Germany's crisis of national identity reflects the way in which, as the 1990s progressed, many of the institutional commitments which had underpinned its strategies in the past became increasingly unsustainable. In the initial period of adjustment between 1989 and 1991, Germany's reflexively institutionalist preferences encouraged it to continue to pursue strategies compatible with the distinctive 'post national and European' orientation that it had developed over the post-War period. However, sustaining the institutional commitments this involved has proved impossible for the unified Germany. This has been felt most acutely in relation to Germany's participation in the use of military force outside the NATO area, and the severe economic pressures placed on Germany by simultaneous broadening and deepening of the EU. These issues, particularly the question of the use of military force abroad, have raised fundamental questions about the basic way in which

Germany defines its 'interests' within the international system. In the process of redefining its role within NATO and the EU over the 1990s, Germany has taken a more active approach to managing its international affairs. In turn this has caused Germany to make major changes in the way in which it participates in these international institutions, a process which has raised uncomfortable questions for it about the extent of its independence as an actor and its 'normalisation' within the international system. However, it is important to recognise that through the process of change Germany has actually *strengthened* its commitment to multilateralism. By altering the terms of its participation in international institutions, Germany has attempted to increase the degree of reciprocity they embody. As a result, its preference for multilateralism has evolved in a norm governed fashion, reflecting an active and reflexive process of adaptation rather than a passive policy reflex. Whilst Germany has altered the procedures through which it participates in international institutions, it has done so precisely in order to preserve their basic underlying normative fabric.

Japan's predicament mirrors the one facing the unified Germany in the sense that the distinctive strategies it developed after World War II have proven increasingly inappropriate to its position within the international system during the 1990s. The mercantile realist preferences that Japan has articulated over the period since 1989 reflect the central tenets of the Yoshida doctrine, originally developed in the 1950's. As the 1990s have progressed, the domestic underpinnings of the Yoshida strategy have been rapidly corroded in response to the changes which have taken place in the international system. Two major developments have made this trend increasingly apparent. The first came in 1993, with the demise of the Liberal Democratic Party as the party of government for the first time since it was founded in the 1950's. The second came in 1998, when recession meant that structural problems with Japan's system of economic management became apparent. Behind these trends were pressures for Japan to adopt a more active political role in the world, and to liberalise its economy. Taken together, these changes indicate the extent to which Japan's mercantile realist strategic preferences are increasingly out of line with the overall trajectory of change in the international system. They have raised significant questions about the way in which Japan defines its national interests, and its sense of purpose

and identity in the international system. At the root of this crisis of identity is a search for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role in the world.

China's crisis of identity has been reflected directly in the distinctive foreign policy preferences it has articulated over the period since 1989. Over the 1990s, China has intensified realist foreign policy discourse and behaviour in response to the threat posed to its political regime by the consequences of growing international interdependence. The initial impetus to the process came after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, when the Chinese elite first came to realise the extent of the challenge to its political authority posed by domestic changes begun in the mid-1970's. In this sense China's identity realist foreign policy preferences are a result of the domestic political challenges it faces in terms of the changes brought by economic and social modernisation and domestic challenges to the legitimacy of Communist party authority. However, the international context China has faced since the end of the Cold War is equally important in explaining the largely symbolic or performative nature of China's realpolitik behaviour. China's identity realism is the product of the most distinctive features of the post Cold War international system in terms of the absence of a clear direct threat to China, and China's inability to pursue traditional realist balancing strategies in the face of the structure of interaction generated by the liberal core. China's crisis of national identity in the post-1989 period is therefore intimately bound up with its *failure* to abandon its realist foreign policy orientation, and internalise liberal norms through a process of socialisation.

In each case examined, the crisis of identity confronted by the state penetrates deeply into the very fabric of its domestic political constitution. In particular, the identity crisis faced is intimately related to powerful decentralising tendencies operating both above and below the level of the state. In the case of Germany, this trend has been reflected in the 'Europeanisation' of the state in terms of both pervasive procedural adaptations and a constitutionally prescribed institutional programming for further involvement in the integration process by all public political institutions. This has resulted in the participation of Germany in an emerging mutli-tiered pattern of

governance in Europe, linking the Lander and supra-national institutions. It has been reinforced by Germany's pursuit of a variable geometry Europe as a means of resolving the potential contradictions of pursuing a strategy of broadening and deepening the EU in tandem. This has led to an increasingly close institutional fit between Germany's federal constitution and the emerging patchwork of European institutions operating around the principle of subsidiarity (see especially Goetz, 1996). In the case of Japan, decentralising trends are evident in the need for it to internalise the norms of regional and global international institutions, particularly those of an economic nature. This demands increasing openness to the international economy, creating related pressures for political decentralisation. Politicians such as Ichiro Ozawa identified as 'normalisation nationalists' within Japan are not associated with demands for increased centralisation of the Japanese state, but instead advocate a vision of the Japanese nation compatible with the devolution of state power both upwards and downwards (see especially Nakano, 1998).

However, it is in China that decentralising tendencies have developed most clearly in the sense that they present a serious and direct challenge to the state's formal political authority. Trends towards informal federalisation in China have become chronic over the 1990s, arising from its nationalities problem in the provinces, the growing participation of its coastal regions into the world economy, and the integration of Hong Kong, Macao and perhaps in future Taiwan into the PRC along the 'One China Two Systems' model. In consequence, the Chinese state finds itself devolving power both upwards and downwards in a trend which mirrors closely what, in a German/European context, is referred to as multi-level governance (see especially Segal, 1994). It is therefore possible to identify powerful decentralising trends in the case of each country examined, even, and indeed especially, in the 'hard case' provided by a regime which is formally authoritarian and undemocratic, and operates in a region where networks of formal international institutions are not well developed. This reflects the close connections which exist between deep seated changes taking place in the internal identity structures of the cases examined and pressures arising directly from the overall nature of change in the international system. Decentralising trends in Germany, Japan and China are symptomatic of the wider crisis of identity

engendered by the need for it to internalise increasingly liberal norms as a basis for their international interactions. They signal an increasingly reflexive interaction between the internal and external dimensions of politics required by trends in the international system. Moreover, it is important to recognise that these changes are occurring as much informally and in response to considerations of political power as they are through constitutional processes. In the case of Germany, decentralisation has been formalised and actively encouraged by statesmen as a means to increase political legitimacy and participation in international institutions. However, the case of China reveals the extent to which devolution is a structural response to the shifts taking place in the internal identity structures of states as they come under increasing pressure to internalise liberal norms.

As well as penetrating deeply into the domestic political constitution of each of the cases examined, there are also strong parallels between the underlying historical process through which Germany, Japan and China have experienced their crisis of national identity. In particular, the responses of all three states to the end of the Cold War embody a high degree of *historicity*, understood as a process of adjustment informed by past patterns of behaviour. Each state defined its initial reaction to the sudden and largely unexpected changes that occurred in the international system between 1989 and 1991 in terms of cues provided by the strategies they had pursued over the post-War period. In adjusting to change, Germany sought to protect the institutional commitments it developed under the shelter of the Cold War. Similarly, the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine have heavily influenced Japan's response to the post-1989 transition. In the case of China, foreign policy elites have attempted to behave in ways which preserve and shore up the 'traditional' sense of national identity it developed prior to 1989. However, historicity is an active process which implies not simply passive or path dependent change, but also the adjustment of past practices to fit changed circumstances. As the 1990s have progressed it has become apparent that policy reflexes established in the past need to be revised in the light of changes which have taken place in the international system. Germany has found that to sustain its deep commitment to multilateralism, it had to take on a more independent and active role in international institutions than it had in the past. By adjusting past policies to its

present needs, Germany's strategies have evolved coherently, and it has been able to take positive steps towards resolving the crisis of identity transition it has faced since 1989. Indeed, Germany has discovered that this process of reflexive adjustment can be empowering for it, if managed appropriately. By contrast, over the 1990s Japan and China have proved more reluctant to confront and resolve the problems generated by the altered international circumstances they face. The result is that the strategies they have pursued have become increasingly incoherent in response to change, and they have faced an ongoing crisis of national identity in the post Cold War period.

The historicity evident in the responses Germany, Japan and China have made to the end of the Cold War reflects the way in which they have dealt with the high degree of autonomy of action they have acquired in the post Cold War period. Cues provided by past patterns of behaviour became the most obvious point of reference for states in formulating their post Cold War strategies. The distinctive preferences they built up over the post War period therefore heavily influenced their initial responses to the end of the Cold War. However, the autonomy of action acquired by units in turn fed into the structure of interaction within the international system, generating powerful pressures for each of them to become socialised to the dominant norms of the liberal core and participate more fully in its multilateral frameworks. Under these circumstances, units were encouraged to alter established patterns of behaviour, and make a more independent and active contribution to international institutions than in the past. Their capacity for autonomous action was thereby further enhanced in the sense that each unit is required to become more self-reflexive in the way it defines its interests and constructs its strategic identity within the international system. As they came under pressure to internalise liberal norms, units were encouraged to continually monitor and revise their behaviour as part of an ongoing process of transformation in the international system. Relatedly, each unit requires a more reflexive construction of its sense of national identity as a basis for its post-Cold War state strategies. In the past, Germany and Japan and China either actively suppressed their sense of national identity, or defined it largely in opposition to competing states. Today, these states require a sense of national identity compatible with making a full and independent contribution to an international community in which relationships between states are

increasingly negotiated and sustained on the basis of trust and equality between partners.

Patterns of identity construction taking place within the international system in turn come to reinforce the liberal configuration of preferences within the international system, thereby strengthening the overall trajectory of socialisation within it. The international system itself comes to embody higher and higher levels of reflexivity as the increasingly reflexive behaviour on the behalf of units within the system further reinforces the structure of interaction provided by the liberal core, which in turn feeds back so as to increase unit autonomy. This process is depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1

Reflexivity In the International System



With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of liberal states has been reached in the international system. As a consequence, the democratic peace begins to develop powerful socialisation effects because the structure of interaction within the international system as a whole is overwhelmingly dominated by the liberal core. The socialisation effects generated by the core encourage states at the margins of change to adopt shifts in their underlying identity, a process which in turn feeds into the properties of the system. Overall, the system continually reconstitutes itself through

an ongoing process of transformation which defines a self reinforcing positive feedback loop.

Given the overtly critical methodological stance adopted by the literature, it is important to recognise the relationship which exists between the expansion of reflexivity in the international system documented by this thesis and the professional discourse on foreign policy within the discipline of international relations. The methodological premise of this thesis is that the survey of the foreign policy literature upon which this thesis is draws to substantiate its empirical claims develops a double hermeneutic - it consists not just of works 'about' the foreign policy of each of the states concerned, but also actively helps to constitute their strategies. The purpose of adopting this premise is to sensitise the research to the constitutive functions played by the professional discourse on international relations. Having adopted this methodological premise, a final conclusion which may be drawn by this thesis is that the foreign policy literature upon which the empirical findings of this thesis is based is itself both symptomatic and constitutive of the reflexivity in the international system it identifies. In an international system characterised by high levels of reflexivity, the routine incorporation of expert foreign policy analysis into the strategic practices of states becomes intimately intertwined with the ongoing transformation of the international system taking place. Similarly, the literature itself can and routinely does play a role in bringing about, or hindering, the process of transformative change in patterns of behaviour and outcomes in the international system.

The most prominent example of where the former has occurred is in the debates surrounding the 1995 review of US security policy in East Asia, or the Nye report (Office Of International Security Affairs, 1995). The Nye report, which concluded that the US should maintain its forward defence presence in the East Asia region as a basis for multilateralism, is so-called because it was supervised by the prominent institutionalist Joseph Nye. Its conclusions follow logically from institutionalist international relations theory, which suggests that in the absence of a situation of complex interdependence in the East Asia region, the US presence is a necessary precondition for international institutions to take on instrumental value for key states

in the region. The report has been enormously influential in shaping the responses of both Japan and China to the post Cold war international system. One of the key objectives of the report was to develop Japan as a non-military or 'civilian power' in the East Asia region, a policy which in practice strongly coincides with Japan's mercantile realist orientation. It has influenced China by encouraging the US to develop an engagement strategy as part of the development of multilateralism in the East Asia region. Furthermore, the Nye report has also exerted a more subtle and indirect impact on patterns of interaction which have taken place between Japan and China. The low political profile that the Nye Report encourages Japan to adopt has helped it to foster good economic relations with China, despite China's rising military capabilities and political influence in the region.

The Nye report and its implications have been widely discussed in the foreign policy literature over the 1990s, both before and after its formal publication in 1995. The report has its intellectual precursors in a series of influential articles published by Hans Maull, Yoshi Fubabashi and Nye himself in the journals *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* in the early 1990s (Maull, 1991; Funabashi, 1991; Funsbashi, 1992; Nye, 1992). These analysts developed the idea that the United States should pursue a policy of maintaining Germany and Japan as civilian powers, a strategy which, it was argued, was suited to an emerging international system characterised by multi-level interdependence. The articles responded to those articulating the view, broadly compatible with neorealist international relations theory, that the end of the Cold War would encourage Germany and Japan to adopt increasingly hostile relations with the United States in the post Cold War period. In so doing, they were themselves the consequence of the wider debate about the role Germany and Japan would play in the post Cold War international system which was occurring in the foreign policy literature in the early 1990s. The articles proved enormously influential, and are routinely referred to in the foreign policy literature of the period. The publication of the Nye report in 1995 was itself accompanied by the publication of an influential article in *Foreign Affairs* setting out and justifying the strategy (Nye, 1995). Moreover, at the point at which it became incorporated into US foreign policy, the report become the object of routine analysis and criticism throughout the foreign

policy literature on states behaviour in the East Asia region. Thus 'expert' literature become reflexively incorporated into the policy of major powers within the region, a development which in turn fed back into the professional discourse about foreign policy.

As well as the theoretical and policy oriented professional discourse affecting the strategic practices of major states, the literature surveyed also provides examples of where the strategies pursued by states involve making use of the professional foreign policy discourse. This trend has been most clearly evident in the case of German foreign policy over the 1990s. German policy makers have routinely published articles in the professional foreign policy literature in justifying its major strategic initiatives over the 1990s, including the reinterpretation of their constitution to allow the use of military force abroad and the announcement of a strategy of differentiated integration. They have done so not out of academic interest, but as a means of transparently and publicly conveying their benign strategic intentions towards other actors. They are cognisant of the way in which sustaining the trust of other actors is a major source of power for Germany in the international system in the sense that it allows Germany to retain its deep commitment to multilateralism whilst simultaneously developing greater flexibility in its pattern of institutionalised behaviour. Use of the literature in this manner is also apparent in an East Asian context. Publications such as Shinn's Council of Foreign Relations pamphlet on conditional engagement with China and the Abramowitz *et al* track two publication on trilateral relations between China, the US and Japan taking place as part of the ARF security dialogue both reflect and identify the importance of transparency between the major actors in the Asia Pacific region (Shinn, 1995; Abramowitz *et al*, 1998). Moreover, as was stressed in the discussion of these publications in chapters on Japan and China, the information about states' intentions towards one another they disclose is not of incidental to the conduct of states in the region, but addresses issues of crucial importance to their routine conduct towards one another. Only *after* the collapse of the Soviet Union became apparent did the international system reach a point of criticality after which states achieved a heightened capacity for autonomous action within it. Under these conditions, information about states intentions towards one another took on special significance

for the constitution of international behaviour and outcomes. As a result, the foreign policy literature took on a historically distinctive role as a potential source of power for states because it provides a means of disclosing benign intentions transparently to other actors. Finally, it is important to recognise that the use of the professional literature of transparently convey information about states intentions towards one another itself provides knowledge that feeds back into theories of the international system, posing anomalies for neorealist and institutionalist approaches and supporting liberal claims about the importance of state preferences in the constitution of international outcomes.

These examples serve to highlight both the general involvement of the foreign policy literature in a double hermeneutic, and the historically specific way in which the foreign policy literature has been drawn into the process of transformation that has been taking place in the international system since 1989. At the level of the general involvement of the literature in a double hermeneutic, the examples demonstrate the way in which it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between professional theorising about international relations, expert analysis and commentary on foreign policy, and states' strategic practices. The majority of the literature on the state strategies of Germany, China and Japan is oriented towards providing expert analysis and commentary which will be relevant to decisions being made by policy makers. However, this literature routinely draws upon theoretical concepts of a contested nature, either implicitly or explicitly. For example, the term 'international system' appears throughout the foreign policy literature surveyed, whether or not the theoretical assumptions this terms carries are clearly specified. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to discuss relations between the strategies of the three states examined without some reference to the general patterns of interaction through which they conduct their affairs. Furthermore, the literature also enters into foreign policy practices. Although the degree to which any one piece influences behaviour varies, in general the literature is routinely incorporated into wider public and elite debates about foreign policy. In consequence there is no clear, discernible distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' literature on the state strategies analysed because the secondary literature shades off into advice incorporated into policy. In the same way

that it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between professional theorising about international relations and advice to policy makers in the case of any one particular article, the line between what constitutes 'policy advice' and policy practice' is also blurred in any particular instance. Thus it is important to acknowledge that the positive knowledge produced in foreign policy literature, and upon which the empirical findings of this thesis is based, routinely serves to organise the patterns of behaviour being reported upon. It both reflects and contributes to a much broader professionalised and routinised process of theoretical and empirical reflection on state strategies the post Cold War international system with which it is intimately bound up with as both cause and consequence.

At the level of the specific way in which the foreign policy literature has been drawn into the process of transformation that has been taking place in the international system since 1989, the examples serve to illustrate the involvement of the literature in the reflexivity documented by the thesis. This thesis has identified the way in which the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989 have encouraged states to reflect on their identity as actors and reflexively adjust their strategic preferences in line with the dramatically altered overall trajectory of international change. However, it is important to recognise that the foreign policy literature itself is intimately bound up with this process of reflection and adjustment. For example, the findings of this thesis identify important limitations in the advice offered by the Nye report. The US forward defence presence in East Asia has frustrated the emergence of a more equal and balanced set of trilateral relations between the US, Japan and China, and prevented the development of transparency in relations between the US and Japan and the US and China. This is because the highly asymmetrical relations it promotes between the US and Japan directly encourages Japan to continue with its mercantile realist orientation, and promotes inconsistency in principles of engagement with China. The expert advice offered by the Nye report represents knowledge which has been incorporated into the historically specific process of transformation which has taken place in the international system since 1989. It has been drawn into the reflexivity documented by this thesis in the sense that it has inhibited rather than facilitated the process of transformation taking place in the

international system. This stands in direct contrast to the manner in which literature published by German statesmen and policy makers has been incorporated into reflexivity in the international system. By using the literature to transparently convey their benign intentions towards other states has empowered Germany, and played a major role in promoting systemic transformation since the end of the Cold War.

Conversely, the knowledge generated by this thesis is itself part of the reflexivity in the international system it identifies. This thesis has contributed to the critical evaluation of the existing body of positive knowledge within the discipline of international relations. Critical activity of this kind is itself inherently theoretical in the sense that it involves probing deeply into fundamental assumptions about the possibility for action in the international system. Thus the counter productive nature of the strategy suggested by Nye points up limitations in his underlying assumptions about the nature and constitution of the international system. Similarly, by appreciating the significance of using the foreign policy literature to clarify Germany's strategic intentions towards its major partners, German statesmen and policy makers have posed anomalies to both neorealist and institutionalist international relations theory. However, criticism is not a wholly negative process aimed solely at highlighting the limitations of existing knowledge. It necessarily involves reconstruction and reconceptualisation of basic theoretical categories in order to identify sources of transformation. In this way, it reflexively feeds back into positive research about the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system. In so doing it promises to both enlighten policy makers about possible sources of transformative change, and to become a major source of power for them in formulating their strategies. In turn, this highlights the significance of adopting a critical methodological stance as a prerequisite to the successful identification of positive trends in the post Cold War international system of interest to both professional social scientists and policy analysts and makers. The dramatic and largely unexpected nature of the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989 have opened up fundamental questions about the overall nature of international change at the turn of the century. By examining how major states have responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, this thesis

has challenged prevailing conceptions of the overall nature of change in the post Cold War international system. Thinking differently about international relations after the Cold War may enable statesmen and policy makers to make full use of the new opportunities presented to them in the emerging international system.

Bibliography

Abramowitz, M.I. (1998) "The Not-So-Plain Geometry of a Trilateral Relationship". In M. I. Abramowitz *et. al. China-Japan-US: Managing The Trilateral Relationship* pp.37-46. Tokyo: Japan Centre For International Exchange.

Abramowitz, M.I. *et. al.*, (1998) *China-Japan-US: Managing The Trilateral Relationship*. Tokyo: Japan Centre For International Exchange.

Ahn, B. (1993) "Japanese Policy Towards Korea". In G.L. Curtis (Ed.) *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War: Coping With Change* pp.263-273. London: East Gate Publishers.

Akaha ,T. (1995) "Japan's Security Agenda In The Post-Cold War Era", *The Pacific Review* **8**:45-76.

Anderson, J.J. (1997) "Hard Interests, Soft Power, and Germany's Changing Role In Europe". In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany In Europe* pp.80-107. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Anderson, J.J and J.B. Goodman. (1993) "Mars Or Minerva? A United Germany In A Post Cold War Europe". In R.O. Keohane *et al* (Eds.) *After The Cold War: International Institutions And State Strategies in Europe 1989-1991*, pp.23-62. London: Harvard University Press.

Arase, D. (1993) "Japanese Policy Towards Democracy And Human Rights", *Asian Survey* **33**:935-952.

Ashley, R. K. (1986) "The Poverty Of Neorealism". In R.O. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism And Its Critics* pp. 255-300. New York: Columbia University Press.

Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R.O. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies And Institutions". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 85-115. New York: Columbia University Press.

Baldwin, D.A. (1993) "Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 3-28. New York: Columbia University Press

Banchoff, T. (1997) "German Policy Toward The European Union: A Constructivist Perspective" Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Toronto, Canada.

Baring, A. (1994) "Germany: What Now?". In A. Baring (Ed.), *Germany's New Position In Europe* pp.1-20. Oxford: Berg.

Berger, T.U. (1993) "From Sword To Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture Of Anti-Militarism". *International Security* **17**:119-150.

Bernstein, R. and R. H. Munro, (1997) "The Coming Conflict With America". *Foreign Affairs* **76**:18-32.

Berton, P. (1993) "Russia And Japan In The Post Cold War Era". In J.C. Hsiung (Ed.) *Asia Pacific In The New World Politics* pp.21-48. London: Lynne Reinner.

Bertram, C. (1990) "The German Question". *Foreign Affairs* **69**:45-62.

Bertram, C. (1994) "The Power And The Past: Germany's New International Loneliness". In A. Baring (Ed.) *Germany's New Position In The Centre Of Europe*, pp. 91-105. Oxford: Berg.

Beylerian, O. and Canivet, (1997) "China: Role Conceptions After The Cold War". In P.G. Le Prestre (Ed.) *Role Quests In The Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies In Transition* pp.187-224. London: McGill Queens University Press.

Bhagwati, J. (1996) "The US-Japan Car Dispute: A Monumental Mistake". *International Affairs* **72**:261-279.

Bilveer, S. (1998) "East Asia In Russia's Foreign Policy: A New Russio-Chinese Axis?". *Pacific Review* **11**:485-503.

Blaker, M. (1993) "Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance". In G.L. Curtis (Ed.) *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War: Coping With Change* pp.1-42. London: East Gate Publishers.

Bluth, C. (1995) "Defining The National Interest". *The World Today* **51**:51-55.

Bridges, B. (1992) "Japan And Europe: Rebalancing A Relationship". *Asian Survey* **32**:230-246.

Bulmer, S.J. (1997) "Shaping The Rules? The Constitutive Politics Of The European Union And German Power". In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany In Europe* pp.49-79. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Bulmer, S.J. and W.E. Paterson (1996)"Germany In The European Union: Gentle Giant Or Emergent Leader?". *International Affairs* **72**:9-32.

Buzan, B. (1988) "Japan's Future: Old History Versus New Roles", *International Affairs* **64**:557-574.

Buzan, B. (1993) "From International System To International Society: Structural Realism And Regime Theory Meet The English School". *International Organisation* **47**:327-352

Buzan, B. (1995) "Japan's Defence Probelmatique", *The Pacific Review* 8:25-43.

Buzan, B. (1998) "The Asia Pacific: What Sort Of Region In What Sort Of World?". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia Pacific In The New World Order*. London: Routledge.

Buzan, B. and G. Segal, (1994) "Rethinking East Asian Security", *Survival* 36:3-21.

Buzan, B. *et. al.* (1993) *The Logic Of Anarchy: Neorealism To Structural Realism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cable, V. and P. Ferdinand, (1994) "China As An Economic Giant: Threat Or Opportunity?". *International Affairs* 70:243-261.

Calder, K.E. (1996) *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy And Growth Threaten To Destabilise Asia-Pacific*. London: Nicolas Brealy.

Carlile, L.E. (1994) "The Changing Political Economy Of Japan's Economic Relations With Russia: The Rise And Fall Of *Seikei Fukabun*". *Pacific Affairs* 67: 411-432.

Carpenter, T.G. (1998) "Roiling Asia: US Coziness With China Upsets The Neighbours". *Foreign Affairs* 77:2-6.

Christensen, T.J. (1999) "China, The US-Japan Alliance, And The Security Dilemma In East Asia". *International Security* 23:49-80.

Conrandt, D. (1996) *The German Polity*. London: Longman.

Cox, R.W. (1986) "Social Forces, States And World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory". In R.O. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism And Its Critics* pp.204-254. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dessler, D. (1989) "What's At Stake In The Agent-Structure Debate?". *International Organisation* **43**:441-474.

Dibb, P. (1995) *Towards A New Balance Of Power In Asia*. Adelphi Paper 295, London: Brasseys.

Dorff, R.H. (1997) "Normal Actor Or Reluctant Power? The Future Of German Security Policy". *European Security* **6**:56-69.

Dyson, K. (1996) "The Economic Order - Still Modell Deutschland?". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.194-210. London: Macmillan.

Elman, C. (1996a) "Horses For Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories Of Foreign Policy?". *Security Studies* **6**:7-53

Elman, C. (1996b) "Cause, Effect, And Consistency: A Response To Kenneth Waltz". *Security Studies* **6**:58-61

Er, L.P. (1996) "Japan And The Spratly's Dispute: Aspirations And Limitations". *Asian Survey* **36**:995-1010.

Feeney, W.R. (1998) "China And Multilateral Economic Institutions". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.239-264. Oxford: Westview Press.

Fewsmith, J. (1995) "Neoconservatism And The End Of The Dengist Era", *Asian Survey*. **35**:635-651.

Flockton, C. (1996) "Economic Management And The Challenge Of Reunification". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.211-232. London: Macmillan.

Foot, R. (1998) "China In The ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisational Processes And Domestic Modes of Thought", *Asian Survey* **38**:425-440.

Fravel, M. T. (1996) "China's Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989", *Asian Survey* **36**:1102-1121.

Friedman, E. (1997) "The Challenge Of A Rising China: Another Germany?". In R.J. Lieber (Ed.) *Eagle Adrift? American Foreign Policy At The Turn Of The Century* pp. 215-245. New York: Longman.

Fukushima, K. (1996) "The Revival Of 'Big Politics' In Japan". *International Affairs* **72**:53-72.

Funabashi, Y. (1991) "Japan And The New World Order". *Foreign Affairs* **70**:58-74.

Funabashi, Y. (1992) "Japan And America: Global Partners". *Foreign Policy* **86**:24-39.

Funabashi, Y. (Ed.) (1995) *Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role In APEC.* Washington D.C., Institute For International Economics.

Funabashi, Y. (1998a) "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, 77:26-36.

Funabashi, Y. (1998b) "Thinking Trilaterally". In M. I. Abramowitz *et. al.*, *China-Japan-US: Managing The Trilateral Relationship* pp. 47-60. Tokyo: Japan Centre For International Exchange.

Funabashi, Y. *et. al.* (1994) *An Emerging China In A World Of Interdependence.* New York: The Trilateral Commission.

Gallagher, M. (1994) "China's Illusory Threat To The South China Sea", *International Security* **19**:169-194.

Gangopadhyay, P. (1998) "Patterns Of Trade, Investment And Migration In The Asia-Pacific Region" pp.20-54. In G. Thompson (Ed.) *Economic Dynamism In The Asia-Pacific*. London: Routledge.

Garrett, B.N. and B.S. Glaser, (1994) "Multilateral Security In The Asia-Pacific Region And Its Impact On Chinese Interests: Views From Beijing". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* **16**:14-34.

Garrett B. N., and B.S. Glaser (1995) "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control". *International Security* **20**:43-78.

Garrettt, B. and B. Glaser, (1997) "Chinese Apprehensions About Revitalisation Of The US-Japan Alliance". *Asian Survey* **37**:383-402.

Garton Ash, T. (1994) "Germany's Choice". *Foreign Affairs* **73**:65-81.

Garver, J.W. (1998) "Sino-Russian Relations". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp. 114-132. Oxford: Westview Press.

George, A. (1993) "Japan's Participation In UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure Or Predictable Response", *Asian Survey*, **33**:560-575.

Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution Of Society: Outline Of The Theory Of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Giddens, A. (1985) *The Nation State And Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences Of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity And Self Identity: Self And Society In The Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1993) *New Rules Of Sociological Method* (Second Edition). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1994) *Beyond Left And Right: The Future Of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal Of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gillessen, G. (1994) "Germany's Position In the Centre Of Europe: The Significance Of Germany's Position And Misunderstandings About German Interests". In A. Baring (Ed.) *Germany's New Position In The Centre Of Europe* pp.21-34. Oxford: Berg,.

Gilpin, R. (1991) "Where Does Japan Fit In?". *Millennium*, 18:329-342.

Glees, A. (1996) *Reinventing Germany: German Political Development Since 1945*. Oxford: Berg.

F. Godement, (1997) "Does China Have An Arms Control Policy?". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp.90-106. London: Routledge.

Godwin, P.H. (1996) "From Continent To Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy And Capabilities Towards 2000", *China Quarterly* 146:464-484.

Godwin, P.H. (1998) "Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares For The Twenty-First Century". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp. 171-192. Oxford: Westview Press.

Goetz, K.H. (1996) "Integration Policy In A Europeanised State: Germany And The Intergovernmental Conference". *Journal Of Public Policy* 3:23-44.

Goldmann, K. (1996) "International Relations: An Overview". In *A New Handbook Of Political Science* edited by R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingemann pp.401-427. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goo, X. (1993) "China's Policy Towards Russia". Aussenpolitik 44:288-297.

Goodman, D, and G. Segal (Eds.) (1989) *China At Forty: Mid-Life Crisis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Green, M.J. and B.L. Self (1996) "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism To Reluctant Realism". *Survival* 38:35-58.

Grieco, J.M (1993a) "Anarchy And The Limits Of Cooperation: A Realist Critique Of The Newest Liberal Institutionalism". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 116-142. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grieco, J.M. (1993b) "Understanding The Problem Of International Cooperation: The Limits Of Neoliberal Institutionalism And The Future Of Realist Theory". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 301-338. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grieco, J.M. (1996) "State Interests And Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation Of The Maastricht Treaty And European Economic And Monetary Union". *Security Studies* 5:261-306.

Grieco, J.M. (1999) "Realism And Regionalism: American Power And German And Japanese Institutional Strategies During And After The Cold War". In E. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (Eds.) *Unipolar Politics: Realism And State Strategies After The Cold War* pp.319-352. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gu, X. (1996) "Taiwan: Time Bomb In The Far East". *Aussenpolitik* 47:197-206.

Gutjahr, L. (1994) *German Foreign And Defence Policy After Unification*. London: Pinter.

Gutjahr, L. (1995) "Stability, Integration And Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests", *Review Of International Studies*, 21:301-317.

Hall, I.P. (1994) "Japan's Asia Card". *The National Interest* 38:19-27.

C. L. Hamrin, (1994) "Elite Politics And The Development Of China's Foreign Relations". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.70-114. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Harding, H. (1993) "China At The Crossroads: Conservatism, Reform Or Decay?". In Adelphi Paper 275 *Asia's International Role In the Post Cold War Era Part I* pp.49-57.London:IISS/Brasseys.

Harding, H. (1994) "'On The Four Great Relationships': The Prospects For China", *Survival* 36:22-42.

Harris, S. (1997) "China's Role In The WTO And APEC". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp.34-155. London: Routledge.

Heginbotham, E. and R.J. Samuels. (1999) "Mercantile Realism And Japanese Foreign Policy". In Kapstein and Mastanduno (Eds.) *Unipolar Politics: Realism And State Strategies After The Cold War* pp.182-217. New York:Columbia University Press.

Heilbrun, J. (1994) "Tomorrow's Germany". *The National Interest* **36**:44-53.

Heilbrun, J. (1996) "Germany's New Right", *Foreign Affairs* **75**:80-98.

Hellmann, G. (1996) "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy Of Contemporary Germany", *Mershon International Studies Review* **40**:1-39.

Hinton, H.C. (1994) "China As An Asian Power". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.348-372. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hisahiko, O. (1990) "The Anglo-Dutch Conflict: A Lesson For Japan", *The Japan Echo* **17**:13-16.

Horlemann, R. (1995) "Japan's Changing Policy On China". *Aussenpolitik* **46**:384-393.

Horsley, W. (1992) "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique Of German Foreign Policy". *Millennium* **21**:225-241.

Hughes, C. (1996a) "Japan's Subregional Security And Defence Linkages With ASEANs, South Korea And China In The 1990's", *The Pacific Review* 9:229-250.

Hughes, C. (1996b) "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis And Japanese Security". *Survival* **38**:79-103.

Hurrell, A. "International Society And The Study Of Regimes: A Reflective Approach". In V. Rittberger (Ed.) *Regime Theory And International Relations* pp.49-72. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Huntley, W.L. (1996) Kant's Third Image: Systemic Sources Of The Liberal Peace. *International Studies Quarterly* **40**:45-76.

Hyde-Price, A. (1996) "'Of Dragons And Snakes': Contemporary German Security Policy". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.173-193. London: Macmillan.

Ienaga, S. (1993) "The Glorification Of War In Japanese Education", *International Security* **18**:113-133.

Inada, J. (1989) "Japan's Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political Or Strategic?". *Millennium* **18**:399-414.

Inoguchi, T. (1991) "Japan And Europe: Wary Partners", *European Affairs* **20**:54-58.

Inoguchi, T. (1992) "Japan's Role In International Affairs", Survival **34**: 77-87.

Inoguchi, T. (1993) *Japan's Foreign Policy In An Era Of Global Change*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Inoguchi, T. and P.C. Jain, (1997) "Introduction". In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (Eds.) *Japanese Politics Today* pp.1-10. Melbourne: Macmillan.

Itoh, M. (1995) "Extending Japan's Role In The United Nations". *The Pacific Review* **8**:283-302.

Jain, C. (1997) "Party Politics At The Crossroads". In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (Eds.) *Japanese Politics Today* pp.11-29. Melbourne: Macmillan.

Janning, J. (1996) "A German Europe - A European Germany? On The Debate Over Germany's Foreign Policy". *International Affairs* **72**: 33-41.

Jervis, R. (1997) *System Effects: Complexity In Social And Political Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Ji, Y. (1997) "A Blue Water Navy: Does It Matter?". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp. 71-89. London: Routledge.

Jisi, W. (1997) "The Role Of The Untied States As A Global And Pacific Power: A View From China". *Pacific Review* **10**:11-18.

Jisi, W. (1998) "Building A Constructive Relationship". In M.I. Abramowitz *et al*, *China-Japan-US: Managing The Trilateral* Relationship pp.21-36. New York: Japan Centre For International Exchange.

Joffe, E. (1997) "How Much Does The PLA Make Foreign Policy?". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp.53-70. London: Routledge.

Joffe, J. (1994) "German Grand Strategy After The Cold War". In A. Baring (Ed.) *Germany's New Position In The Centre Of Europe* pp.79-89. Oxford: Berg.

Johnson, C. and Keehn, E.B. (1995) "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, **74**:102-114.

Johnston, A. I. (1995) "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept Of Limited Deterrence". *International Security* **20**: 5-42.

Johnston, A.I. (1996) "Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change In Chinese Arms Control Policy In The 1980's and 1990's". *The China Journal* **35**:27-61.

Johnston, A.I. (1998) "International Structures And Chinese Foreign Policy". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.55-87. Oxford: Westview Press.

Johnston, A.I. (1999) "Realism(s) And Chinese Security Policy In The Post-Cold War Period". In E. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (Eds.) *Unipolar Politics: Realism And States Strategies After The Cold War* pp.261-318. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kaifu, T. (1990) "Japan's Vision", *Foreign Policy*, **80**:28-39.

Kaiser, K. (1995) "Forty Years Of German Membership In NATO". *NATO Review* **43**:3-8.

Kapstein, E.B. and M. Mastanduno (Eds.) (1999) *Unipolar Politics: Realism And State Strategies After The Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzenstein, P.J. (1993) "Taming Of Power: German Unification, 1989-90". In M. Woo-Cumings and M. Loriaux (Eds.). *Past As Prelude: History In The Making Of A New World Order* pp.59-82. Oxford: Westview Press.

Katzenstein, P.J. (1997a) "United Germany In An Integrating Europe". In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany In Europe* pp.1-48. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Katzenstein, P.J. (1997b) "Germany And Mitteleuropa". In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) "Mitteleuropa: Between Europe And Germany" pp.1-39. Oxford: Berghahn.

Katzenstein, P.J. and N. Okawara. (1993) "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms And Policies". *International Security*, **17**:84-118.

Kawasaki, T. (1997) "Between Idealism And Realism In Japanese Security Policy: The Case Of The ASEAN Regional Forum". *The Pacific Review* **10**:480-503.

Keohane, R.O. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation And Discord In The World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1986b) "Theory Of World Politics: Structural Realism And Beyond". In R.O. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism And Its Critics* pp. 158-203. New York: Columbia University Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1989a) "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective On World Politics". In R.O. Keohane *International Institutions And State Power: Essays In International Relations Theory* pp. 1-20. London: Westview Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1989b) "Reciprocity In International Relations". In R.O. Keohane *International Institutions And State Power: Essays In International Relations Theory* pp. 132-157. London: Westview Press.

Keohane, R.O. (1989c) "International Institutions: Two Approaches". In R.O. Keohane *International Institutions And State Power: Essays In International Relations Theory* pp. 158-179. London: Westview Press

Keohane, R.O. (1993) "Institutional Theory And the Realist Challenge After The Cold War". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 269-300. New York: Columbia University Press.

Keohane, R.O. "International Relations: Old And New". In *A New Handbook Of Political Science* edited by R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingemann pp.462-478. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keohane, R.O. and J.N. Nye, (1989) *Power And Interdependence: World Politics In Transition* (Second Edition). Boston: Little,Brown.

Keohane, R.O. *et al* (Eds.) (1993) *After The Cold War: International Institutions And State Strategies In Europe, 1989-1991*. London: Harvard University Press.

Kim, S.S. (1992) "China as a Regional Power". *Current History* **91**: 247-252.

Kim, S.S. (1994) "China's International Organisational Behaviour". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.401-434. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kim, S.S. (1998) "Chinese Foreign Policy In Theory And Practice". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.3-33. Oxford: Westview Press.

Kim, S.S. and L. Dittmer, (1993) "Whither China's Quest For National Identity?". In L. Dittmer and S.S. Kim (Eds.) *China's Quest For National Identity* pp.237-290. Ithica: Cornell University Press

Kinkel, K. (1992) "NATO's Enduring Role In European Security", *NATO Review* **40**: 3-7.

Kirchner, E.J. (1996) "Germany And The European Union: From Junior To Senior Role". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp. 156-172. London: Macmillan.

Kitano, M. (1994) "The New China: Dynamism And Vulnerability". *Pacific Review* 7:153-161.

Klein, D.W. (1998) "Japan And Europe In China's Foreign Relations". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.133-150. Oxford: Westview Press.

Krasner, S.D. (1983a) "Structural Causes And Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables". In S.D. Krasner (Ed.) *International Regimes* pp. 1 -22. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Kreile, M. (1993) "The Political Economy Of The New Germany". In P. Stares (Ed.) *The New Germany And The New Europe*, pp.55-92. Washington: Brookings.

Lampton, D.M. (1997) "China and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" *Asian Survey* **37**:1099-1118.

Layne, C. (1993) "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise". *International Security* **17**:5-51.

Layne, C. (1996) "Less Is More: Minimal Realism In East Asia". *The National Interest* **43**:64-77.

Le Gloannec, A.M. (1993) "The Implications Of German Unification For Western Europe". In P. Stares (Ed.) *The New Germany And The New Europe* pp.251-278. Washington D.C.: Brookings.

Lehmann, J.P. (1992) "France, Japan, Europe, And Industrial Competition: The Automotive Case" *International Affairs* **68**:37-53.

Leifer, M. (1997) "China In Southeast Asia: Interdependence And Accommodation". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp.156-171. London: Routledge.

Letourneau, P. and M. Rakel, (1997) "Germany: To Be Or Not To Be Normal?". In P. Le Prestre (Ed.) *Role Quests In The Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies In Transition* pp.111-130. London: McGill Queens University Press.

Levine, S.I. (1994) "Perception And Ideology In Chinese Foreign Policy". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.30-46. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Levine, S.I. (1998) "Sino-American Relations: Practising Damage Control". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.91-113. Oxford: Westview Press.

Lincoln, E. J. (1993) *Japan's New Global Role.* Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Linnenkamp, H. (1993) "The Security Policy Of The New Germany". In P. Stares (Ed.), *The New Germany And the New Europe* pp.93-125. Washington D.C.: Brookings.

Lippert, B. and Stevens-Strohmann, R. (1993) *German Unification and EC Integration: German and British Perspectives*. London: Pinter.

Macardle Kelleher, C. (1993) "The New Germany: An Overview". In P. Stares (Ed.) *The New Germany And The New Europe*, pp.11-54. Washington D.C.: Brookings.

Macleod, A. (1997) "Japan: A Great Power Despite Itself". In P. Le Prestre (Ed.) *Role Quests In The Post Cold War Era: Foreign Policies In Transition*. London: McGill-Queens University Press.

Mak, J.N. (1998) "The Asia-Pacific Security Order". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia-Pacific In The New World Order* pp.88-120. London: Routledge.

Markovits, A.S. and Reich, S. (1991) "*Modell Deutschland* And The New Europe", *Telos*, **89**:45-65.

Markovits, A.S. and Reich, S. (1997) *The German Predicament: Memory And Power In The New Europe*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Malik J.M. (1995) "China-India Relations In The Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry". *China Quarterly* **142**:317-355.

Maull, H. (1991) "Germany And Japan: The New Civilian Powers". *Foreign Affairs* **69**:1-106.

Maull, H.W.(1995) "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis". *Survival* **37**:99-130.

Maull, H. W. (1997) "Reconciling China With International Order". *Pacific Review* **10**:466-479

Maull, H. W. *et. al.* (Eds.) (1998) *Europe And The Asia-Pacific*. London: Routledge.

Mayer, H. (1997) "Early At The Beach And Claiming Territory: The Evolution Of German Ideas On A New European Order". *International Affairs* **73**:724-737.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990) "Back To The Future: Instability In Europe After The Cold" *International Security* **15**: 5-56.

Meiers, F.J. (1995) "Germany: The Reluctant Power". *Survival* **37**:82-103.

Menon, R. (1996) "Japan-Russia Relations And North-east Asian Security". *Survival* **38**:59-78.

Minkenberg, M. (1995) "What's Left Of The Right?". In D. Conrandt (Ed.) *Germany's New Politics: Parties And Issues In The 1990's* pp.255-272. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Mochizuki, M.M *et. al.* (1998) *Toward A True Alliance: Restructuring US-Japan Security Relations*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Mochizuki, M.M. and M. O'Hanlon (1998) "A Liberal Vision For The US-Japanese Alliance". Survival **40**:127-134.

Moller, K. (1996) "Germany and China: A Continental Temptation". *China Quarterly* **147**:706-725.

Moravcsik, A. (1997) "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory Of International Politics". *International Organisation* **51**:513-553

Mukae, R. (1996) "Japan's Diet Resolution On World War Two: Keeping History At Bay", *Asian Survey* **36**:1011-1030.

Mulgan, A.G. (1997) "The Role Of Foreign Pressure (Gaitsu) In Japan's Agricultural Trade Liberalisation". The Pacific Review **10**:165-209.

Muller, H. (1993) "German Foreign Policy After Unification". In P. Stares (Ed.) *The New Germany And The New Europe* pp.126-176. Washington D.C.: Brookings.

Mullins, R.E. (1995) "The Dynamics Of Chinese Missile Proliferation". *Pacific Review* **8**:137-157.

Nakano, K. (1998) "Nationalism And Localism In Japan's Political Debates Of The 1990's", *Pacific Review* **11**:505-524.

Nathan, A.J. and R.S. Ross (1997) *The Great Wall And The Empty Fortress: China's Search For Security*. London: W.W. Norton.

Neves, M.S. (1995) "Towards A Common China Policy: A Portuguese Perspective". In R.L. Grant (Ed.) *The European Union and China: A European Strategy For The Twenty-First Century*. pp.75-88. London: Royal Institute For International Affairs.

Nuttall, S. (1996) "Japan And The European Union: Reluctant Partners". *Survival* **38**:104-120.

Nye, J.S. (1992) "Coping With Japan". *Foreign Policy* **89**:96-115.

Nye, J.S. (1995) "The Case For Deep Engagement". *Foreign Affairs* **74**:90-102.

Nye, J.S. (1997) "China's Re-emergence And The Future Of The Asia-Pacific". *Survival* **39**:65-79.

Office For International Security Affairs (1995) "United States Security Strategy For The East Asia-Pacific Region". Department Of Defence, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Ozawa, I. (1994) *Blueprint For A New Japan: The Rethinking Of A Nation*. London: Kodansha International.

Paterson, W.E. (1996) "Beyond Bipolarity: German Security Policy In A Post Cold War World". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.134-155. London: Macmillan:.

Pharr, S.J. (1993) "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy And The Politics Of Burden Sharing". In G.L. Curtis (Ed.) *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War: Coping With Change* pp.235-262. London: East Gate Publishers.

Pond, E. (1992) "Germany In The New Europe" *Foreign Affairs* **71**:114-130.

Pond, E. and K.N. Waltz, "Correspondence: International Politics, Viewed From The Ground". *International Security* **19**:195-199.

Pond, E. and D. Schoenbaum (1996) *The German Question and Other German Questions*. London: Macmillan.

Powell, R. (1993) "Absolute And Relative Gains In International Relations Theory". In D.A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* pp. 209-233. New York: Columbia University Press.

Powell, R. (1994) "Anarchy In International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate". *International Organisation* **48**:313-344.

Pulzer, P. (1995) "The Nation State And National Sovereignty". *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, **17**: 5-14.

Pulzer, P. (1996) "Model Or Exception: Germany As A Normal State?". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.303-316. London: Macmillan.

Pye, L.W. (1991) "China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society". *Foreign Affairs* **69**:50-74.

Pyle, K.B. (1996) *The Japanese Question: Power And Purpose In A New Era* (Second Edition). Washington D.C.: AEI Press.

Pyle, K.B. (1998) "Restructuring Foreign And Defence Policy: Japan". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia-Pacific In The New World Order*, pp.121-138. London: Routledge.

Rachman, G. (1996) "Containing China". *Washington Quarterly* **19**:129-139.

Ruggie, J.G. (1986) "Continuity And Transformation In The World Polity: Towards A Neorealist Synthesis". In R.O. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism And Its Critics* pp. 131-157. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ruhe, V. (1993) "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy For A New Era". *Survival* **35**:129-137.

Robinson, T.W. (1994) "Chinese Foreign Policy From The 1940's To The 1990's". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.) *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.555-602. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Robinson, T.W. (1998) "[In][ter]dependence In China's Post-Cold War Foreign Relations". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.193-216. Oxford: Westview Press.

Rometsch, D. (1996) "The Federal Republic Of Germany". In D. Rometsch and W. Wessels (Eds.) *The European Union And Member States: Towards Institutional Fusion* pp.61-104. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rometsch, D. and W. Wessels (1996) "German Administrative Interaction And European Union: The Fusion Of Public Policies". In Y. Meny *et al* (eds.) *Adjusting To Europe: The Impact Of The European Union On National Institutions And Practices*".London: Routledge.

Roy, D. (1994) "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat To East Asian Security". *International Security* **19**:149-168.

Roy, D. (1998a) "Restructuring Foreign And Defence Policy: The People's Republic Of China". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia-Pacific In The New World Order* pp.137-157. London: Routledge.

Roy, D. (1998b) *China's Foreign Relations*. London: Macmillan.

Sato, H. (1993) "Implications Of German Unification For Japan". In P. Stares (Ed.) *The New Germany And The New Europe*, pp.365-386. Washington: D.C. Brookings.

Sato, H. (1998) "The Political Economy Of US-Japan Policy Co-ordination: The Case Of China", Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Minneapolis, USA.

Saito, M. (1993) "Japan's 'Northward' Foreign Policy And The Yoshida Doctrine". In G.L. Curtis (Ed.) *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War: Coping With Change* pp.274-302. London: East Gate Publishers.

Salameh, M. G. (1995) "China, Oil And The Risk Of Regional Conflict". *Survival* **37**:133-146.

Salmon, T.C. (1992) "Testing Times For European Political Co-operation: The Gulf And Yugoslavia 1990-1992". *International Affairs* **68**:233-253.

Sasae, K. (1994) *Rethinking Japan-US Relations: An Analysis Of The Relationship Between Japan And The US And Implications For The Future Of Their Security Alliance*. Adelphi Paper 292, London: IISS/Brasseys.

Schlor, W.F. (1993) *German Security Policy*. Adelphi Paper 277, London: IISS/Brasseys.

Schmidt, P. (1996) "German Security Policy In The Framework Of The EU, WEU and NATO". *Aussenpolitik* **47**: 211-222.

Schollgen, G. (1994) "National Interest And International Responsibility: Germany's Role In World Affairs". In A. Baring (Ed) *Germany's New Position In Europe: Problems And Perspectives*, pp.35-49. Oxford: Berg.

Schwarz, H.P. (1994) "Germany's National And European Interests". In A. Baring (Ed.) *Germany's New Position In The Centre Of Europe* pp.107-130. Oxford: Berg.

Segal, G. (1993) "The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan?". *World Policy Journal* **10**:27-32.

Segal, G. (1994) *China Changes Shape: Regionalism And Foreign Policy*. Adelphi Paper 287 London: IISS/Brasseys.

Segal, G.(1996) "East Asia And The 'Constrainment' Of China". *International Security* **20**:107-135.

Segal, G. (1998) "Asia Pacific: What Kind Of Challenge?". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia-Pacific In The New World Order* pp.316-331. London: Routledge.

Seymour, J.D. (1998) "Human Rights In Chinese Foreign Relations". In S.S. Kim (Ed.) *China And The World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces The New Millennium* pp.217-238. Oxford: Westview Press.

Shambaugh, D.(1992) "China's Security Policy In The Post-Cold War Era". Survival **34**:88-106.

Shambaugh, D. (1994) "Growing Strong: China's Security Challenge To Asian Security". *Survival* **36**:43-59.

Shambaugh, D. (1996) "Containment Or Engagement Of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses". *International Security* **21**:180-209.

Shinn J. (Ed.) (1996) *Weaving The Net: Conditional Engagement With China*. New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press.

Smith, G. (1996) "The Party System At The Crossroads". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German* Politics, pp. 55-75. London: Macmillan.

Smith, G. *et al* (1996) "Introduction". In G. Smith *et al* (Eds.) *Developments In German Politics* pp.1-13. London: Macmillan,.

Smith, M.E. (1996) "Sending the Bundeswehr To The Balkans: The Domestic Politics Of Reflexive Multilateralism", *German Politics And Society* **14**:49-67.

Smith, M.E. (1998) "The European Union And The Asia-Pacific". In A. McGrew and C. Brook (Eds.) *Asia-Pacific In The New World Order* pp.289-315. London: Routledge

Smyser, W.R. (1992) *The Economy Of A United Germany: Colossus At The Crossroads*. New York: St Martin's Press.

Snow, P. (1994) "China And Africa: Consensus And Camouflage". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.283-321. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Soesastro, H. (1995) "ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circles Work?". *Pacific Review*, 8:475-493.

Spruyt, H. (1998) "A New Architecture For Peace? Reconfiguring Japan Among The Great Powers", *The Pacific Review* 11:364-388.

Stockwin, J.A.A. (1997) "Reforming Japanese Politics: Highway Of Change Or Road To Nowhere?". In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (Eds.) *Japanese Politics Today* pp.75-91. Melbourne: Macmillan.

Stuth, R. (1992) "Germany's New Role In A Changing Europe" *Aussenpolitik* 43:22-32.

Swaine, M.D. "(1995) *China: Domestic Change And Foreign Policy*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Tewes, H. (1998) "Between Deepening And Widening: Role Conflict In Germany's Enlargement Policy". *West European Politics* 21:117-133.

Tadokoro, M. (1994) "The End Of Japan's Non-Decision Politics". *Asian Survey*, 34:1002-10015.

To, L.L. (1997) "East Asian Assessments Of China's Security Policy". *International Affairs* 73:251-262.

Tow, W.T. (1994) "China And The International Strategic System". In T. W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (Eds.), *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice* pp.115-157. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Valencia, M.J. (1995) *China And The South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting Claims And Potential Solutions In The South China Sea*. Adelphi Paper 298 London: IISS/Brasseys.

Van Wolferen, K. (1990) *The Enigma Of Japanese Power* (Second Edition). London: Macmillan.

Voigt, K. (1996) "German Interest In Multilateralism". *Aussenpolitik* **47**:107-116.

Wallace, W. (1995) "Germany As Europe's Leading Power", *The World Today* **51**:62-164.

Wallerstein, M.B. (1996) "China and Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?". *Survival* Vol. **38**:58-66.

Waltz, K.N. (1979) *Theory Of International Politics*. New York: Random House.

Waltz, K.N. (1986) "Reflections On 'Theory Of International Politics': A Reply To My Critics". In R.O. Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism And Its Critics* pp. 322-346. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waltz, K.N. (1993) "The Emerging Structure Of International Politics". *International Security* **18**: 44-79.

Waltz, K.N. (1996) "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy". *Security Studies* **6**:54-57.

Waltz, K.N. (1997) "Evaluating Theories". *American Political Science Review* **91**:913-917.

Wan, M. (1997) "Human Rights And Sino-US Relations: Policies And Changing Realties". *Pacific Review* **10**:237-255.

Wan, M. (1995) "Japan And The Asia Development Bank". *Pacific Affairs* **68**:509-528.

Wang, Q.K. (1994) "Towards Political Partnership: Japan's China Policy". *The Pacific Review* **7**:171-182.

Wendt, A.E. (1987) The Agent-Structure Problem In International Relations Theory. *International Organisation* **41**:335-370.

Wendt, A.E. (1992) Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics. *International Organisation* **46**:391-425.

Wendt, A.E. (1994) Collective Identity Formation And The International State. *American Political Science Review* **88**:384-396.

Wendt, A.E. *et. al.* (1996) "Norms, Identity And Culture In National Security". In P.J. Katzenstein (Ed.) *The Culture Of National Security: Norms And Identity In World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Whyte, M.K. (1992) "Prospects For Democratisation In China". *Problems Of Communism*, **51**:58-70.

Wood, P.C. (1995) "The Franco-German Relationship In The Post-Maastricht Era". In C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (Eds.) *The State Of The European Union: Building A European Polity?* pp.221-230. Longman: Boulder, Colorado.

Yahuda, M. (1996a) *The International Politics Of The Asia-Pacific 1945-1995*. London: Routledge.

Yahuda, M. (1996b) *Hong Kong: China's Challenge*. London: Routledge.

Yahuda, M. (1997) "How Much Has China Learned About Interdependence". In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (Eds.) *China Rising: Nationalism And Interdependence* pp. 6-26. London: Routledge.

Yahuda, M. (1996) *The International Politics Of The Asia Pacific, 1945-1995.* London: Routledge.

Yasutomo, D.T. (1993) "The Politicisation Of Japan's Post-Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy". In G.L. Curtis (Ed.) *Japan's Foreign Policy After The Cold War: Coping With Change* pp.323-346. London: East Gate Publishers.

Yunling, Z. (1997) "Changing Sino-US-Japanese Relations". *The Pacific Review* **10**:451-465.

Zheng, Y. (1994) "Perforated Sovereignty: Provincial Dynamism And China's Foreign Trade". *Pacific Review* 7:309-321.

Zhurkin, V. (1996) "Russia And Germany: From Enemy To Partner? A Contradictory Relationship". In B. Heurlin (Ed.) *Germany In Europe In The Nineties* pp.210-221. London: Macmillan.